[178] One can say that the remembrance of an edenic state and of God's garden is nevertheless preserved in the secret recess of our self-consciousness, as an obscure anamnesis of another being, similar to the dreams of golden childhood and most accessible to childhood. These are distinct, palpable revelations of the world's sophianicity in our soul, although they are usually obscured in the soul by our failure to believe in their genuineness or even in their possibility. But it is important to understand the possibility and reality of the edenic state of the world and of man irrespective of the presence or absence of their traces in our present world. The Garden of Eden is conceived in the biblical story as expressly planted by God so that man would dwell in it (see Gen. 2:8).
Beyond the Garden stretches the whole natural world, which is born in the instinctive exertions of the world soul, of the "earth," which actualizes the creative seeds of its sophianicity. This is the future place of Adam's "expulsion" from the edenic (and as if supranatural [sic]) conditions of being into the natural world, full of the "struggle for existence." He is cast into this world by God's determination, which, of course, does not change human nature but only affirms the ontological inevitability of this path of life in the natural world after and as a consequence of the fall. This earth, which had contained the possibility of becoming God's garden through Adam's creative obedience in "keeping and dressing" it, now, because of his disobedience, has become a meager land, bringing forth "thorns and thistles." Only this natural world is known to fallen man. In it there is no Eden, which for a time is removed, as it were, from the world after Adam's expulsion from it: "Therefore the Lord God sent him forth from the garden of Eden, to till the ground from whence he was taken" (Gen. 3:23). From this earth are emitted the moans of "evolutionary" being, with the struggle for existence, "economic materialism," and death. The first attempt to inwardly overcome this evolutionism did not appear to succeed. Eden was taken from the world as an unactualized and unactualizable possibility. It was removed to the heavenly plane of the prototypes of the world that is known to fleshless spirits, its protectors and servants. And Eden, closed to man, is protected for a time by the flaming sword of the angel.
But what was this earthly and "historical" Eden? First of all, it was an edenic perception of creation: Sinless man could not see it except as God's garden. His knowledge might have been incomplete and limited, because [179] in Eden he lived separated from the rest of the world, as, in general, all in him was in a state of preliminary, not final harmony. But Eden, as the express dwelling of man, was possible on the earth only on the condition of this sinlessness, with man's openness to all of creation, which is proper to him as one called to become its king. (This openness finds its expression in his ability to name the animals; Gen. 2:19.) But, in conformity with this ability of man to perceive Eden, it could have appeared on the earth by a special and complementary creative act of God (see Gen. 2:8-9), which nature could have received thanks only to the presence of a perfect creature, sinless man.
Eden was a preparation for what was hidden in the recesses of all of natural being. It was a sort of eschatology of natural being: The image of the new Eden sketched out in Revelation 22:1-5, with the river and tree of life, includes what was in the original Garden of Eden. But the original Eden, which appeared on the earth only in connection with the sinless state of man, becomes inaccessible, transcendent to creation, and as if nonexistent after its fall. Eden's trees degenerate and turn wild, while its rivers become those of actual geography and history. Between them there is no longer a place for Eden, for the edenic vision has faded. If, prior to his fall, man could have a habitation only in Eden, in the preliminary revealed perfection of nature, then after the fall he could no longer contain this perfection, and only the earth of exile became accessible to him, that is, a state of the natural world that was proper to the world prior to and apart from man, outside of his lordly protection and cultivation. And man himself became only natural.
Therefore, in the natural world, one does not find and cannot find traces of Eden as the supranatural illumination of natural being. A rupture has formed in the inner life of nature, owing to which "the creature was made subject to vanity" (i.e., lost its edenic perfection) "not willingly, but by reason of him who hath subjected the same," and "groaneth and travaileth in pain...until now" (Rom. 8:20, 22). Two possibilities were marked out in the life of creation: (1) the "evolutionary"-instinctive development of creation before man, but one that later, under man's rule, was to acquire the light of reason and become liberated from the power of nonhypostatic elementalness; and (2) the development of creation with man, who was called to become the created god, the protector and cultivator of Eden. But instead of humanizing nature, man himself became the slave of nature and a prisoner to its necessity. And he will be a slave until the new Adam, the "Man from heaven," returns to humankind the kingship that it has lost, and the natural world becomes a new heaven and a [180] new earth, with a new city, the holy Jerusalem (see Rev. 21:1). At the same time that Eden was removed from the earth, or (what is the same thing) Adam was expelled from it, Adam was deprived of God's glory (see Rom. 2:23), and donned the "coats of skins" (Gen. 3:21) of history "to till the ground from whence he was taken" (3:23). That is, he was called to ascend, by a long historical path, to his original state, which he had lost.
Thus, in history, we know neither Eden nor the state of the sinlessness of our progenitors, in statu naturae purae. All this belongs to meta-history, and one should therefore not seek this in the historical world and time. It belongs to history only as its prologue. Prior to his fall, Adam is the only "progenitor." After the fall, he is one of many progenitors; he belongs to a specific generation and is empirically connected with the whole organic world. And Eve becomes "the mother of all who live," that is, she represents the unitary naturalness of humankind, which is actualized in a series of natural births. One can say that an ontological abyss lies between the meta-history of the first three chapters of Genesis and the history of Adam's race. Even if we accept that the Adam of the initial Genesis narrative is the same person as the Adam of the later chapters (which is not really necessary, since the "adam" of the first chapters is man in general, whereas in the later chapters he is a specific individual, with his own name), they are still separated by the threshold lying between meta-history and history. Beginning with the fourth chapter, Adam is a "patriarch," the progenitor of a specific generation, and this is clearly a generation that is by no means unique in history. From the text of chapter 4 it follows that other human tribes, besides the "adamites," are meant here.
We can draw the following general conclusion about the historical and meta-historical Genesis 1-3. On the pathways of the development of life on our planet, on the phylogenetic ladder of man, there appear both the animal species homo sapiens and, in this species, an individual capable and worthy of becoming the vessel for the human spirit, of serving for its incarnation. This corresponds to the passages where it is said that "God formed man of the dust of the ground" (Gen. 2:7), from that very same "earth" that brought forth all the species of organic life (so that in this sense even the identification "dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return" [Gen. 3:19] became possible). This splendid animal, by its form already prefiguring man, takes from God the human spirit and is illuminated by it. Through this act, which transcends the being of the organic world and therefore is not subject to any empirical observation and interpretation, a perfect man arises from this perfect animal. This man is perfect in the sense that he corresponds to the creative design, and he bears [181] within himself the task and potential of the world's humanization. This perfect man issues out of God's hands into the world, into the Garden of Eden that was expressly humanized for him. But, in his fall, man loses his perfect humanity, which remains beyond the limits of history as an unactualized ideal. Human history begins and proceeds in the same "evolutionary" way as the rest of creation, with the difference, of course, that, even in the natural process, man retains the supranatural principle of his spirit.
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Source: Sergius Bulgakov, Bride of the Lamb, trans. Boris Jakim (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2002), 178–181.
Showing posts with label commentary. Show all posts
Showing posts with label commentary. Show all posts
Thursday, August 13, 2015
Wednesday, July 1, 2015
Ceremonial Law vs. Moral Law
The same Leviticus straw men keep appearing.
There are two types of law in the Torah: 1) moral law; 2) ceremonial law.
See following humorous video for advancement in self-education:
Sunday, May 31, 2015
Some Commonly Repeated Biblical Myths
Here are a number of urban legends that get repeated in sermons. Some are more pervasive than others, even appearing in commentaries and scholarly works.
1. The “eye of the needle” refers to a gate outside Jerusalem.
“It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich person to enter the kingdom of God,” says Jesus in Mark 10:25. Maybe you’ve heard of the gate in Jerusalem called the “eye of the needle.” The camel could pass through it only after stooping down and having all its baggage taken off.
The illustration is used in many sermons as an example of coming to God on our knees and without our baggage. The only problem is… there is no evidence for such a gate. The story has been around since the 15th century, but there isn’t a shred of evidence to support it.
2. The high priest tied a rope around his ankle so that others could drag him out of the Holy of Holies in case God struck him dead.
Various versions of this claim have been repeated by pastors, but it is a legend. It started in the Middle Ages and keeps getting repeated. There is no evidence for the claim in the Bible, the Apocrypha, the Dead Sea Scrolls, Josephus, the Pseudepigrapha, the Talmud, Mishna or any other source. Furthermore, the thickness of the veil (three feet) would have precluded the possibility of a priest being dragged out anyway. [...]
6. Gehenna was a burning trash dump outside Jerusalem.
I’ve used this illustration many times. But there isn’t evidence to support this idea. Still, because it seems like a reasonable explanation for the origin of the Hinnom Valley as “hell,” commentators and preachers have accepted it. It’s possible that the verdict may still be out on this one, but not if Todd Bolen is right:
Source for the above: Trevin Wax, "Urban Legends: The Preacher's Edition," TGC, April 27, 2011, accessed May 30, 2015, http://www.thegospelcoalition.org/blogs/trevinwax/2011/04/27/urban-legends-the-preachers-edition/.
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[Further information on Gehenna from various sources:]
1. The “eye of the needle” refers to a gate outside Jerusalem.
“It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich person to enter the kingdom of God,” says Jesus in Mark 10:25. Maybe you’ve heard of the gate in Jerusalem called the “eye of the needle.” The camel could pass through it only after stooping down and having all its baggage taken off.
The illustration is used in many sermons as an example of coming to God on our knees and without our baggage. The only problem is… there is no evidence for such a gate. The story has been around since the 15th century, but there isn’t a shred of evidence to support it.
2. The high priest tied a rope around his ankle so that others could drag him out of the Holy of Holies in case God struck him dead.
Various versions of this claim have been repeated by pastors, but it is a legend. It started in the Middle Ages and keeps getting repeated. There is no evidence for the claim in the Bible, the Apocrypha, the Dead Sea Scrolls, Josephus, the Pseudepigrapha, the Talmud, Mishna or any other source. Furthermore, the thickness of the veil (three feet) would have precluded the possibility of a priest being dragged out anyway. [...]
6. Gehenna was a burning trash dump outside Jerusalem.
I’ve used this illustration many times. But there isn’t evidence to support this idea. Still, because it seems like a reasonable explanation for the origin of the Hinnom Valley as “hell,” commentators and preachers have accepted it. It’s possible that the verdict may still be out on this one, but not if Todd Bolen is right:
“The explanation for the ‘fire of Gehenna’ lies not in a burning trash dump, but in the burning of sacrificed children. Already in Old Testament times, the Valley of Hinnom was associated with the destiny of the wicked. That the valley was just outside the city of Jerusalem made it an appropriate symbol for those excluded from divine blessing.”---
Source for the above: Trevin Wax, "Urban Legends: The Preacher's Edition," TGC, April 27, 2011, accessed May 30, 2015, http://www.thegospelcoalition.org/blogs/trevinwax/2011/04/27/urban-legends-the-preachers-edition/.
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[Further information on Gehenna from various sources:]
“Gehenna is presented as diametrically opposed to ‘life’: it is better to enter life than to go to Gehenna. . .It is common practice, both in scholarly and less technical works, to associate the description of Gehenna with the supposedly contemporary garbage dump in the valley of Hinnom. This association often leads scholars to emphasize the destructive aspects of the judgment here depicted: fire burns until the object is completely consumed. Two particular problems may be noted in connection with this approach. First, there is no convincing evidence in the primary sources for the existence of a fiery rubbish dump in this location (in any case, a thorough investigation would be appreciated). Secondly, the significant background to this passage more probably lies in Jesus’ allusion to Isaiah 66:24.”Source: Peter Head, “The Duration of Divine Judgment in the New Testament,” in The Reader Must Understand: Eschatology in Bible and Theology, ed. by K. E. Brower and M. W. Elliott (Leicester, UK: Apollos, 1997), 223.
Ge-Hinnom (Aramaic Ge-hinnam, hence the Greek Geenna), ‘The Valley of Hinnom,’ lay south of Jerusalem, immediately outside its walls. The notion, still referred to by some commentators, that the city’s rubbish was burned in this valley, has no further basis than a statement by the Jewish scholar Kimchi (sic) made about A.D. 1200; it is not attested in any ancient source. The valley was the scene of human sacrifices, burned in the worship of Moloch (2 Kings 16:3 and 21:6), which accounts for the prophecy of Jeremiah that it would be called the Valley of Slaughter under judgment of God (Jer. 7:32-33). This combination of abominable fires and divine judgment led to the association of the valley with a place of perpetual judgment (see Isa. 66:24) and later with a place of judgment by fire without any special connection to Jerusalem (see, for example, 1 Enoch 27:1ff., 54:1ff., 63:3-4, and 90:26ff).Source: G. R. Beasley-Murray, Jesus and the Kingdom of God (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1986), 376-377, footnote 92.
The traditional explanation that a burning rubbish heap in the Valley of Hinnom south of Jerusalem gave rise to the idea of a fiery Gehenna of judgment is attributed to Rabbi David Kimhi's commentary on Psalm 27:13 (ca. A.D. 1200). He maintained that in this loathsome valley fires were kept burning perpetually to consume the filth and cadavers thrown into it. However, Strack and Billerbeck state that there is neither archeological nor literary evidence in support of this claim, in either the earlier intertestamental or the later rabbinic sources (Hermann L. Strack and Paul Billerbeck, Kommentar zum Neuen Testament aus Talmud and Midrasch, 5 vols. [Munich: Beck, 1922-56], 4:2:1030). Also a more recent author holds a similar view (Lloyd R. Bailey, "Gehenna: The Topography of Hell," Biblical Archeologist 49 [1986]: 189Source: Hans Scharen, "Gehenna in the Synoptics," Bibliotheca Sacra 155 (January-March 1998) 328, footnote 17.
The traditional explanation for this seems to go back to Rabbi David Kimhi’s commentary on Psalm 27 (around 1200 C.E.). He remarked the following concerning the valley beneath Jerusalem’s walls:Gehenna is a repugnant place, into which filth and cadavers are thrown, and in which fires perpetually burn in order to consume the filth and bones; on which account, by analogy, the judgement of the wicked is called ‘Gehenna.’
Kimhi's otherwise plausible suggestion, however, finds no support in literary sources or archaeological data from the intertestamental or rabbinic periods. There is no evidence that the valley was, in fact, a garbage dump, and thus his explanation is insufficient. [...]
Even after the valley ceased to function as a cult center, it continued to be regarded as the location of an entrance to the underworld over which the sole God was sovereign. This is clear from the following statements in the Babylonian Talmud: (Rabbi Jeremiah ben Eleazar further stated:) Gehenna has three gates; one in the wilderness, one in the sea and one in Jerusalem. (According to Rabbi Johanan ben Zakkai's school:) There are two palm trees in the Valley of Ben Hinnom and between them smoke arises..,. and this is the gate of Gehenna? (Babylonian Talmud, Erubin, 19a-see Slotki 1938: 130-31)Source: Lloyd R. Bailey, "Gehenna: The Topography of Hell," Biblical Archaeologist 49, no. 3 (1986): 189, 191.
It seems that the location of the city-dump of the late Second Temple period in this particular part of the city had a previous long history in the late Iron Age II. The Book of Nehemiah mentions several times a gate called Saar ha-Aspot/Sopot (Neh 2, 13; 3:13-14; 12:31). This toponym is usually translated as ‘Dung Gate’, based on the analogy with 2 Sam 2,8 and Ps 113,7 (Simons 1952, 123). These verses mention the city’s poor people, who most probably were foraging the city dump for food. Even if we accept B. Mazar’s suggestion (1975, 194-95), to relate spt to tpt – the Tophet – which was an extramural high place in the Valley of Hinnom (2 Kgs 21, 6; 2 Chr 33,6), we remain in an area of dirt. This place involved an extensive use of fire, which produced burning waste such as ashes, soot and charred wood. Also the location of the Gate of the pottery sherds (Sa’ar ha-Harsit), in the south (Jer 19,2), might point to a pile of garbage (Simons 1952, 230), as pottery vessels were the type of household item broken and discarded in antiquity more than any other type of artifact.Source: Ronny Reich and Eli Shukron, “The Jerusalem City-Dump in the Late Second Temple Period," Israel Exploration Journal 53 (2003): 17.
All the various types of city-garbage (ashes, pottery shards, waste of human occupation, etc.) were moved and dumped at the southeastern side of the city of Jerusalem, in the Iron Age and Persian periods. This was the city dump to where also the debris of the smashed cult objects and related material that was created during the Josianic religious reform, were moved and dumped, mentioning particularly the Kidron Valley (2 Kgs 23,4,6,10,12)”
Thursday, May 28, 2015
Fr. Alexis on Our Father Who Art in Heaven
Having warned His disciples about the pitfalls of praying for the wrong things with vain repetitions, having cautioned them about the dangers of praying for the wrong reasons such as being seen by others, our Lord then directs His disciples about the way they should pray giving as an example the most widely known prayer in Christendom, the Lord’s Prayer or the Our Father. Many times, we may say it without fully appreciating the significance of each phrase or how every sacred vessel of meaning orients us towards God, towards life, and towards each other in ways that can transform us, purify us, and ultimately make us a bit more like Christ. To help their fellow believers appreciate the treasure of the Lord’s Prayer, some of the Church Fathers have written beautiful commentaries that suggest not only what the petitions in the prayer mean, but how they should be reflected in our lives.
The Lord’s Prayer begins with pure revelation from on high. There is a God in heaven and He is our Father. Saint Augustine notes that the word “father” calls forth from within the soul both love, “for what is dearer to sons than a father,” and the sentiments of a humble petitioner [supplex affects] (Sermon on the Mount, book 2, chapter 4, PL 34.1276). The words “Our Father” should bring to mind immediately the parable of the prodigal son, which assures us that “He never turns away from us, but it is we who distance ourselves from Him” (Saint John Chrysostom, Exhortation to Theodore After His Fall, Letter 1). Saint Augustine further notes that just saying the words, “our Father” we have received the greatest possible gift, to be sons and daughters of God (Sermon on the Mount, book 2, chapter 4, PL 34.1276). Thus, love, humility, and gratitude are set before us as prime virtues with the mere utterance of the first words of this most holy prayer. Those words tell us not only who God is, but who we are and where our home lies. And this should warm our hearts, comfort our souls, and cause our spirit to leap for joy.
That this Father is “our Father” also means that we “belong to a great family” (Augustine, Sermon 9) and despite the vast inequality among fathers on earth, we are equal in the sense of having the same Father in heaven. That we say “our Father” and not “my Father” means that we share the same Father and that “we do not look for our own best interests, but for those of our neighbor.” This in turn “takes away hatred, quells pride, casts out envy, and brings in love, the mother of all good things. It eliminates the inequality of human things, and shows how far the equality reaches between the king and the poor man, if at least in those things which are greatest and most indispensable, we are all of us brethren” (Saint John Chrysostom, Homily 19 on Matthew, PG 51.45). In other words, we learn that we are all brothers and sisters, children of a single of Father, children of heaven, and equal in the one honor that really matters, our relationship with God.
Finally, if our Father is in heaven, then our place is in heaven as well. But how are we to be in heaven while yet on earth? Saint John Chrysostom answers, “The distance between heaven and earth is even greater if we are negligent, but if we do our best, we shall find ourselves at its gates in a single moment, for these distances are not determined by the interval between places, but by the quality of one’s frame of mind [οὐ γὰρ μήκει τόπων, ἀλλὰ γνώμῃ τρόπων]” (Homily 1 on Matthew, PG 56.23). And this is precisely what the “Our Father” said from the heart does. It “lifts us up,” “gives wings to our mind,” (Homily 14 on Ephesians, PG 62.105) teaching us to “set our mind on the things that are above, not on the things that are upon the earth” (Colossians 3:20). In so doing, we find not only stability and permanence (Discourse 6 to the Newly Illumined), but “goodness itself, sanctification, rejoicing, strength, glory, purity, eternity,… and as much can be conceived concerning the divine nature by the divine scriptures and our own thoughts” (Saint Gregory of Nyssa, Discourse 2 on the Lord’s Prayer). “Our Father which art in heaven!” What a treasure this is for those who know it to be true!
The Lord’s Prayer begins with pure revelation from on high. There is a God in heaven and He is our Father. Saint Augustine notes that the word “father” calls forth from within the soul both love, “for what is dearer to sons than a father,” and the sentiments of a humble petitioner [supplex affects] (Sermon on the Mount, book 2, chapter 4, PL 34.1276). The words “Our Father” should bring to mind immediately the parable of the prodigal son, which assures us that “He never turns away from us, but it is we who distance ourselves from Him” (Saint John Chrysostom, Exhortation to Theodore After His Fall, Letter 1). Saint Augustine further notes that just saying the words, “our Father” we have received the greatest possible gift, to be sons and daughters of God (Sermon on the Mount, book 2, chapter 4, PL 34.1276). Thus, love, humility, and gratitude are set before us as prime virtues with the mere utterance of the first words of this most holy prayer. Those words tell us not only who God is, but who we are and where our home lies. And this should warm our hearts, comfort our souls, and cause our spirit to leap for joy.
That this Father is “our Father” also means that we “belong to a great family” (Augustine, Sermon 9) and despite the vast inequality among fathers on earth, we are equal in the sense of having the same Father in heaven. That we say “our Father” and not “my Father” means that we share the same Father and that “we do not look for our own best interests, but for those of our neighbor.” This in turn “takes away hatred, quells pride, casts out envy, and brings in love, the mother of all good things. It eliminates the inequality of human things, and shows how far the equality reaches between the king and the poor man, if at least in those things which are greatest and most indispensable, we are all of us brethren” (Saint John Chrysostom, Homily 19 on Matthew, PG 51.45). In other words, we learn that we are all brothers and sisters, children of a single of Father, children of heaven, and equal in the one honor that really matters, our relationship with God.
Finally, if our Father is in heaven, then our place is in heaven as well. But how are we to be in heaven while yet on earth? Saint John Chrysostom answers, “The distance between heaven and earth is even greater if we are negligent, but if we do our best, we shall find ourselves at its gates in a single moment, for these distances are not determined by the interval between places, but by the quality of one’s frame of mind [οὐ γὰρ μήκει τόπων, ἀλλὰ γνώμῃ τρόπων]” (Homily 1 on Matthew, PG 56.23). And this is precisely what the “Our Father” said from the heart does. It “lifts us up,” “gives wings to our mind,” (Homily 14 on Ephesians, PG 62.105) teaching us to “set our mind on the things that are above, not on the things that are upon the earth” (Colossians 3:20). In so doing, we find not only stability and permanence (Discourse 6 to the Newly Illumined), but “goodness itself, sanctification, rejoicing, strength, glory, purity, eternity,… and as much can be conceived concerning the divine nature by the divine scriptures and our own thoughts” (Saint Gregory of Nyssa, Discourse 2 on the Lord’s Prayer). “Our Father which art in heaven!” What a treasure this is for those who know it to be true!
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Source: Fr. Alexis Trader, "Our Father which Art in the Heavens," Ancient Christian Wisdom blog, February 27, 2015, accessed May 28, 2015, http://ancientchristianwisdom.com/2015/02/27/our-father-which-art-in-the-heavens/.
Source: Fr. Alexis Trader, "Our Father which Art in the Heavens," Ancient Christian Wisdom blog, February 27, 2015, accessed May 28, 2015, http://ancientchristianwisdom.com/2015/02/27/our-father-which-art-in-the-heavens/.
Sunday, December 28, 2014
Garrigou-Lagrange on Evolution and Inequality in Creatures
This problem of the origin of multitude, discussed by Plato in the dialogue entitled Parmenides, reappears in modern evolution in the following form: How did the distinction of things, mineral, vegetative, animal, and human, arise from the primitive, homogeneous being? How did vegetative life, sensation, and intellection arise? The evolutionists try to conceal the difficulty by saying that the distinction of things appeared only slowly and progressively. But metaphysically speaking it makes little difference whether these distinctions appeared slowly or suddenly, whether they appeared only after a thousand years, or six days, or suddenly. This question of time, as also with regard to creation, is of minor consequence. The important question, abstracting from time, is how a multitude can originate from the primitive unity. This question is similar to that other important question asked in the next article: If God is infinitely good and the cause of all things, what is the cause of evil?
Reply. St. Thomas shows that this problem of the origin of the multitude of things is insoluble without the idea of free creation. His reply is that the distinction of things and multitude are from the intention of the first agent, who is God.
Proof from authority. "In the beginning God created heaven and earth. . . . And He divided the light from the darkness. . . . And God made a firmament, and divided the waters that were under the firmament, from those that were above the firmament." This is a popular expression of the truth, accommodated to the intelligence of the Israelites, who thought of the heavens as a solid firmament. But when it is revealed that the heavens (which you think of as a solid firmament) are created by God, it is not revealed that the heavens are a solid firmament, for in the revealed proposition the verb "is" refers to "created" (the heavens are created) and not to "solid." Hence it may be that some error is mingled in the subject of the proposition without making the proposition erroneous in its formal meaning, that is, with regard to the verb "is" and those things to which "is" refers. On other occasions it is more clearly stated that God created visible and invisible beings and that God "ordered all things in measure and number and weight."
In the body of the article St. Thomas presents and then refutes two theories: the ascending evolution of the materialists and the descending evolution of Avicenna.
The theory of the ancient materialists was that the distinction of things arises by chance according to the movement of matter. This opinion was held by Democritus and later by Epicurus. Modern materialists with their theory of evolution were unable to add anything to this ancient theory; they were unable to explain how the first nebulae, the incandescendent stars, the habitable earth could come from primitive homogeneous matter except by chance or by the activity of some unknown forces, and the appearance of vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual life remained for them an insoluble enigma. They would be forced to admit that more proceeds from less and that the perfect proceeds from the imperfect, and they find themselves at a loss how to explain the multitude and diversity of organisms except by chance. But to say that these things are by chance is no explanation, but rather an absence of explanation, for chance is a cause <per accidens> which presupposes a cause ordered <per se> to one effect, and if there is no cause <per se> there can be no cause <per accidens>. A man digging a grave could not accidentally find a treasure if he were not <per se> digging in the earth and if some one else had not buried the treasure.
St. Thomas points out that Anaxagoras approached a solution of this problem when he admitted an intelligent cause that orders the universe, but at the same time Anaxagoras thought that a distinction pre-existed in eternal matter, that is in the homeomeriae.
Reply. In his reply to the materialists St. Thomas presents two arguments which apply equally to the ascending evolutionism of modern materialists.
1. If there is any distinction from matter, this distinction should be referred to some higher cause. Why? Because matter is created by God, as we have said above, for matter is not a being in itself. Matter is moved and perfected and therefore it is moved and perfected by another; matter does not move or perfect itself, it does not confer on itself vegetative, sensitive, or intellectual life; it is not its own action or its own being. Matter is always in potency to other determinations and it is not related to being, the ultimate actuality of all things, as A is to a. This argument also applies to Plato's dualism.
2. Matter is because of the form, and the form is not because of the matter. But the distinction of things takes place through the specific forms. Therefore the distinction is not on account of matter but conversely matter is on account of the distinction of things. Matter is the principle of individuation and is ordered to the multitude of species.
This second argument applies also to evolutionism, for there can be no evolution with a tendency to something definite and congruous without some finality. Otherwise the direction of such a tendency would be without any reason, and no tendency would ever attain to the constitution of any of our organs, the heart, the head, the eye, etc. John of St. Thomas restates these two arguments against materialism as follows:
1. Act is simply prior to potency, and therefore matter, which is the potency to a higher act, is not uncreated, nor is it therefore the first cause for the distinction of things, for example, the distinctions of vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual life, which matter cannot produce because it is inferior to them. Matter is merely the real capacity for receiving a perfection.
2. Potency is referred to act and is because of act, or matter is because of the form and on account of the diverse forms, and therefore it is not the cause of the specific distinction of the forms. Matter is because of the distinction of these forms.
The first conclusion therefore is that the specific distinction of things cannot be explained by a material cause.
2. The second theory refuted by St. Thomas might be called descending evolutionism. It calls to mind Plotinus' emanatism. This second theory was advanced by Avicenna, who tried to explain the specific distinction of things by efficient causes. Avicenna declared that God in understanding Himself produced the first intelligence (Plotinus' <logos>, the second <<hypostasis>>); then, when the first intelligence understood itself, it produced the soul of the world (Plotinus' third <<hypostasis>>, the god of the Stoics).
Modern pantheists, who support a descending evolution rather than an ascending evolution, try to explain the distinction of things in almost the same way. Spinoza tried to derive two infinite attributes from the divine substance: cogitation and infinite extension, besides the finite modes of cogitation and extension. But because he rejected free creation he was unable to derive the finite modes from an infinite substance, and therefore he simply stated without proof that these finite modes come into being successively from eternity in some necessary way.
In trying to explain the distinction of things Schelling began with the Absolute, but because he rejected the revealed truth of free creation he spoke of a fall of the Absolute by which the Absolute became the world in some kind of descent. Hegel, who supported an ascending evolution, ridiculed Schelling's dream of the fall of the Absolute, but Hegel's position is no less ridiculous, for according to Hegel God is becoming in the world but He does not yet exist and will never properly be, as Renan said.
Reply. To this second theory of the emanatists, St. Thomas replied that creation belongs to God alone and the total being of anything cannot be produced except by creation from nothing, and creation is not emanation, for in creation God is the sole efficient and final cause, but in no sense the material cause. Hence God does not become the world nor is the world made from God. Avicenna's second <hypostasis>, therefore, if it is created, cannot create a third, and the third cannot create something inferior to itself.
Furthermore, St. Thomas replies, according to Avicenna the totality and distinction of things would not derive from the intention of the first agent but from a concourse of many active causes. This concourse of causes, however, must come about by chance if it does not come from the intention of the first cause. But chance, since it is a cause <per accidens>, presupposes a cause ordered <per se> to its effect and therefore it cannot be the first cause of the specific distinction of things. Manifestly the distinction between vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual life in the world does not come from chance. In other words, there would be no finality in the world, and natural agents would tend to something determined and fitting without any reason, the order in things would be derived from an absence of order, more would come from the less, and the more perfect would come from the imperfect. Nor can it be said that the distinction in things comes from the form of secondary causes, for these forms do not exist of themselves and they themselves are distinct from one another and thus their own distinction must be explained.
Nor can it be said that the cause of the distinction in things is God inasmuch as He operates by a necessity of His nature. This argument was answered in the reply to the first difficulty and was refuted above: "It is of the nature of a natural agent that it produces one effect, because a nature (determined to one thing) operates in one and the same way unless it is impeded (for example, the vital principle in a plant operates in the same way in the same circumstances). This is because a natural agent acts according to its specific being, and as long as it is such a being it acts only in this one way. Since the divine being is infinite. . ., it cannot be that it acts by a necessity of nature unless it were to cause something infinite in being, which is impossible. The divine being, therefore, does not act by a necessity of nature, but the effects determined by its infinite perfection proceed according to the determination of its will and intellect."
The second conclusion, therefore, is that the distinction of things does not come from God as acting by a necessity of nature.
Until this point St. Thomas has not considered the opinion that the distinction of things comes from God as operating by a necessity of wisdom, an opinion espoused by the absolute optimism of Plato and by Leibnitz in modern times. Here is an attempt to explain the distinction of things, which is assumed to be necessary, by a final cause. In this instance the necessity of the distinction of things is not metaphysical or physical but moral. St. Thomas says: "Plato supposed that it was due to the goodness of God as understood and loved by God Himself that He should produce the most perfect of worlds. This could, of course, be true if we consider only those things that are and not those things that could be. This universe is the best of those that are, and the fact that it is the best is due to the goodness of God. But the goodness of God is not obligated to this universe in such a way that God could not make a better or worse universe." "Whenever the end is proportionate to the things that are made on account of that end, the wisdom of the maker is limited to some determined order. But the divine goodness is an end disproportionately exceeding created things. Therefore the divine wisdom is not determined to some order of things."
The third conclusion, therefore, is that the distinction of things does not come from God operating by a necessity of wisdom.
By eliminating the material cause, natural efficient causes, and the final cause that implies the necessity of the production of things, we come to the positive conclusion: the distinction of things arises from the free intention of God the Creator.
The proof may be somewhat easier if we join this last section of the article with the reply to the first difficulty, in which the divine liberty is affirmed.
A free agent can produce distinct effects according to whatever distinct forms he understands. But God, as a free agent, wished to manifest His goodness through diverse creatures. Therefore the distinction of things is explained by the intention of God the free Creator. and this distinction can have no other cause.
Explanation of the major. An agent that acts by its nature acts by the form by which it is, and this form is only one for each agent. Therefore such an agent acts only in one way. A free agent, however, acts according to a form received in the intellect.
Explanation of the minor. God is a voluntary and free agent. It does not conflict with God's unity and simplicity that He understands many things, for the multitude of things understood by God do not effect a real distinction in Him. Since God can understand many things, He can also make many things.
God, however, wished freely to manifest His goodness by diverse creatures. Why? St. Thomas explains in the last section: "Because by one creature the divine goodness cannot be adequately represented, God made many different things so that whatever is lacking in one to represent the divine goodness will be supplied by another."
The validity of this solution. This solution is of faith. From the philosophical viewpoint it is necessary, for the ascending evolution of the materialists and even of Hegel is repugnant both to the principle of causality (more cannot be produced by the less) and to the principle of finality (every agent acts according to the end to which it is ordered) and, moreover, ascending evolution does not explain the distinction of things. Similarly, descending evolution fails to explain the distinction of things for, if God operates by a necessity of nature, He will necessarily produce only one effect.
Similarly the absolute optimism of Plato and Leibnitz does not take into account the disproportion between any created universe and the divine goodness, which is to be manifested. We must, therefore, have recourse to the liberty of God the Creator, or we must, with Parmenides, deny all multitude and all distinction in things. In the end the solution is that the most eminent unity of God virtually contains the infinite multitude of possible things, from which God freely chose the things He wished to create.
The higher unity differs from the lower unity in the fact that it virtually contains the multitude; the higher the unity the richer its content, for, as Dionysius said, "those things that are divided in inferior beings are united in the higher beings." This is especially clear when we ascend from one order to another; the vital principle of the plant virtually contains all the acts of agents lower than itself. Similarly, the faculty of vision, which in itself is simple, extends itself to a spreading panorama; the central sense in the common sense unites the objects of the particular senses; the intellect knows the universal, which virtually contains the individual. Great musicians, like Mozart, hear the melody they are composing completely at one time and they often express the whole theme virtually in the prelude of the composition. Great philosophers reduce the whole of philosophy to a few sublime principles. When the saints arrive at the unitive way they unite in this unity various virtues. In a still higher plane, the unity and simplicity of God virtually contain the infinite multitude of possible beings, and from this multitude God chooses those that He wishes to create. By the divine liberty, then, we are able to solve the problem of how a multitude proceeds from the supreme and most simple principle. Plato and Aristotle were not able to offer a solution because they had not attained to the idea of free creation.
Second Article: Whether The Inequality Of Things Is From God
State of the question. Many men cannot understand how the inequality in things can come from God. The Manichaeans tried to explain this inequality by two, opposite principles, and Origen, trying to rectify their error, explained that in the beginning God created only intellectual beings and that all these beings were equal. Some of these sinned and as a punishment they were united to bodies. In modern times some thinkers have declared that that great inequality among animals, whereby the strong devour the weak, cannot come from God. They ask why there should be such a great inequality in the intellectual and moral aptitudes of men. This is the language of egalitarianism. As we shall see in the body of the article, it is a materialistic theory that does not take into account the subordination of the forms of agents and ends.
These unfortunate inequalities, says Schopenhauer, cannot come from a good and omnipotent God, and he concludes that God is not omnipotent and that the principle of all things is some kind of will that is always trying to persevere in being. This attempt is always associated with sorrow and is like an insatiable thirst. Therefore in his pessimism he concluded, that this desire for life must be eradicated so that we may come to that negative bliss which is the ending of all sorrow.
Schopenhauer's difficulties can be reduced to the difficulties proposed at the beginning of the present article: the best God should have made the best things, and therefore all equal, otherwise, according to the third objection, it would be an injustice for God to distribute His gifts unequally to creatures.
Reply. The reply is that the divine wisdom is the cause of the distinction of things for the sake of the perfection of the universe, and therefore the divine wisdom is also the cause of inequality.
1. Proof from authority. "Why doth one day excel another, and one light another, and one year another year, when all come of the Lord? By the knowledge of the Lord they were distinguished." In the canticle, "All ye works of the Lord, bless the Lord," we see the inequality of creatures, each of which in its own way praises the Lord. The description of the creation in the Book of Genesis shows the inequality of creatures, and the Fourth Council of the Lateran declared that "God at one time and in the beginning of time established both creatures, the spiritual and corporeal, and then the human creature, as it were a common being constituted by spirit and body."
2. Proof from reason: a) by the refutation of Origen's theory; b) positively.
a) In opposing the Manichaeans, Origen declared that God in the beginning had created spiritual beings, who were all equal. Those that sinned were bound to bodies, and the greater the sin the closer the union with matter. Some of these beings did not sin, and these now constitute the different grades of angels according to their different merits. In this way Origen combined the doctrine of original sin with the Platonic myths about the pre-existence of souls.
St. Thomas replies: "The totality of corporeal beings would then not be because of the communication of God's goodness to creatures but for the punishment of sin. But this is contrary to the words of Genesis, "And God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good." St. Augustine exclaims: "What could be more stupid than to say that by this sun, as there is but one in the world, God was concerned not with the splendor of beauty or the welfare of corporeal things, but that this sun came to be because one soul sinned?"
What could be more stupid than to say that the stars are in the sky, that the pure air exists, that the rose, the lily, the dove, the lamb were made because someone sinned? St. Augustine is speaking formally when he says, "what could be more stupid," for it is stupidity, opposed to the wisdom which explains the beauty of even the sensible world as a manifestation of God's goodness, while this theory explains all this by sin, not by the highest cause but by something that is less than nothing. Schopenhauer's doctrine is even greater folly when he speaks of a fall of the Absolute or of God. He tries to explain the inequalities and sorrows of the world by a primitive, non-omnipotent, or rather impotent will. The first cause is subsisting being itself and therefore omnipotent, because operation follows being, and anything that is able to possess the nature of being is comprised in the object of divine power, which can effect anything that has no repugnance to being.
b) The positive proof is from the principle of finality, out of which is drawn the corollary of the principle of the subordination of ends, forms, and agents, against materialistic egalitarianism. Leibnitz adopted St. Thomas' argument but exaggerated it, as we shall see. St. Thomas' argument can be reduced to the following: The specific or formal distinction is more important than the material or numerical distinction, because matter is on account of the form and the individuals in any species of corruptible beings are for the conservation of the species. But the formal distinction always requires inequality, since the forms of things are subordinate like numbers, ascending from the elements to mixed beings, to plants, and to animals, and in each instance one species is found more perfect than the others, for example, the diamond or radium among minerals, the rose among the flowers, and man among the animals. Therefore the inequality of beings is required for the perfection of the universe so that in different ways the wisdom of God might make known His goodness.
The major is evident, since matter is because of the form, according to the principle of finality that the imperfect is on account of the perfect. In the same way the many individuals of the same species of corruptible being are for the conservation of the species. Excluding the subsisting spiritual soul, individuals are ordered to the preservation of the species. Thus individuals pass away but the species remains; it is negatively eternal in the sense that it prescinds from the here and now, and thus it is somehow above time, representing the divine idea, the idea of rose, of lily, of lion, etc. Therefore, St. Thomas says, the hen gathers the chicks under her wing and defends them against the hawk because the hen naturally loves the good of its species more than its own good.
The major therefore is certain, namely, the formal or specific distinction is more important than the material or numerical distinction; any material individual of this or that species is of minor importance. This, however, is not true of a person, because the soul of the person is subsisting and immortal and thus is of greater value than the species of lion or horse.
The minor. But the formal distinction requires the inequality or subordination of forms. This is affirmed with a serene mind and not lugubriously as was the case with Origen. On this point St. Thomas differs entirely from the pessimism of Schopenhauer. But it should be noted that the holy doctor is speaking here of the primary distinction and inequality existing prior to sin; he is not now speaking of how after original and actual sin this inequality is often increased and causes that miserable state of servitude in which so many men spent their entire lives before the spread of Christianity.
The primary inequality of things pertains to their natures independently of sin, for, as Aristotle says, "the species of things are subordinate like numbers." For numbers vary by the addition or subtraction of unity and the species of things differ by the addition or subtraction of a specific difference. For example, a substance is incorporeal or corporeal, and here there is inequality; similarly, the corporeal substance is living or inanimate; if living, it is sensitive or not; if sensitive, it is rational or not. Everywhere we find the inequality and subordination of forms as with numbers.
Hence St. Thomas says, "In each of these we find one species more perfect than the others," for example, man among the animals, and the animals that have both internal and external senses are superior to the animals that do not possess all the senses, as the oyster and the sponge, which appear to have only the sense of touch. So there is also a certain subordination among plants and flowers and among minerals; the diamond, or perhaps radium, seems to be the most precious of minerals.
These considerations are valid against materialism and mechanism, which take into consideration only quantity and not quality. If quality is something prior to quantity, the variation of heat from the tenth to the twentieth degree is perhaps greater than between the twentieth and thirtieth degrees. Materialism looks at everything as if it were in the same horizontal plane, as if, for instance, animals were machines and as if the human soul were not essentially superior to the soul of the brute. This is absolute egalitarianism, which reduces everything to the lowest plane.
Spiritualism, on the other hand, considers everything as in a vertical line, inasmuch as the species of things are subordinated in a hierarchy for the splendor of the universe, because those things that are united in God can be only divisively in creatures and because the formal distinction requires inequality. Many modern writers do not understand this subordination, confusing it with coordination, for example, when they compare the first cause and the second cause with two men rowing a boat.
The conclusion is confirmed by the solution of the objections.
Reply to first objection. The most perfect agent produces his perfect total effect, but he produces it with a subordination of parts, for example, with the subordination of organs and functions in the plant and animal organisms. The animal would be less perfect if all its parts were equal, if all, for instance, had the dignity or importance of the eye.
Thus the universe is more perfect with angels, men, animals, plants, minerals than if there were only angels and all the angels were equal. Here was Origen's error. According to St. Thomas the angels could not be equal, for in the angels there is a particular subordination of forms since the angels are pure subsisting forms. Since individuation takes place through matter, there can be only one individual in each angelic species. Michael is the only individual in his species. Hence among the angels we have a perfect hierarchy or subordination.
Reply to second objection. In the Blessed Trinity there is equality according to the processions <ad intra> by which the entire divine nature is communicated. The Word and the Holy Ghost are equal to the Father. On the other hand there must be inequality in the procession <ad extra> because the creature is an inadequate manifestation of the divine goodness and many subordinate creatures are required.
Reply to third objection. The primitive inequality is not unjust since it is because of the perfection of the universe. This Origen was not able to understand.
Thus some are born inclined to fortitude and must acquire meekness, others inclined to meekness must acquire fortitude. Each must ascend the mountain of perfection by traversing the various parts of the mountain. The justice of God is not commutative, regulating the changes among equals, but it is distributive according to the requirements of the common good. God is His own law. Cajetan remarks: "Therefore God is just in condescension in order to manifest His goodness."
Leibnitz exaggerated this doctrine of inequality when he denied matter in his monadology and reduced all substance to spiritual monads which are subordinated as are the angels in St. Thomas' doctrine. Leibnitz held that there could not be in the world two beings absolutely similar because God would have created these perfectly similar beings without reason, just as a man would have two perfectly similar copies of the same edition of Virgil in his library without reason.
Reply. Two perfectly similar individuals can exist, especially in succession, for the preservation of the species and they are distinguished from each other by matter marked by quantity, as in the case of two drops of water or two perfectly identical twins. We concede only that there cannot be two angels perfectly similar in species, and this would also be true of men if they were monads without matter.
St. Thomas does admit a certain individual inequality of souls in the same human species: the soul of Christ is higher even in the natural order than the soul of Judas, but this inequality is not unrelated to the body, although on the other hand a body is better disposed because of a higher individual soul, since causes are mutually causes to each other in different genera of causes.
Reply. St. Thomas shows that this problem of the origin of the multitude of things is insoluble without the idea of free creation. His reply is that the distinction of things and multitude are from the intention of the first agent, who is God.
Proof from authority. "In the beginning God created heaven and earth. . . . And He divided the light from the darkness. . . . And God made a firmament, and divided the waters that were under the firmament, from those that were above the firmament." This is a popular expression of the truth, accommodated to the intelligence of the Israelites, who thought of the heavens as a solid firmament. But when it is revealed that the heavens (which you think of as a solid firmament) are created by God, it is not revealed that the heavens are a solid firmament, for in the revealed proposition the verb "is" refers to "created" (the heavens are created) and not to "solid." Hence it may be that some error is mingled in the subject of the proposition without making the proposition erroneous in its formal meaning, that is, with regard to the verb "is" and those things to which "is" refers. On other occasions it is more clearly stated that God created visible and invisible beings and that God "ordered all things in measure and number and weight."
In the body of the article St. Thomas presents and then refutes two theories: the ascending evolution of the materialists and the descending evolution of Avicenna.
The theory of the ancient materialists was that the distinction of things arises by chance according to the movement of matter. This opinion was held by Democritus and later by Epicurus. Modern materialists with their theory of evolution were unable to add anything to this ancient theory; they were unable to explain how the first nebulae, the incandescendent stars, the habitable earth could come from primitive homogeneous matter except by chance or by the activity of some unknown forces, and the appearance of vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual life remained for them an insoluble enigma. They would be forced to admit that more proceeds from less and that the perfect proceeds from the imperfect, and they find themselves at a loss how to explain the multitude and diversity of organisms except by chance. But to say that these things are by chance is no explanation, but rather an absence of explanation, for chance is a cause <per accidens> which presupposes a cause ordered <per se> to one effect, and if there is no cause <per se> there can be no cause <per accidens>. A man digging a grave could not accidentally find a treasure if he were not <per se> digging in the earth and if some one else had not buried the treasure.
St. Thomas points out that Anaxagoras approached a solution of this problem when he admitted an intelligent cause that orders the universe, but at the same time Anaxagoras thought that a distinction pre-existed in eternal matter, that is in the homeomeriae.
Reply. In his reply to the materialists St. Thomas presents two arguments which apply equally to the ascending evolutionism of modern materialists.
1. If there is any distinction from matter, this distinction should be referred to some higher cause. Why? Because matter is created by God, as we have said above, for matter is not a being in itself. Matter is moved and perfected and therefore it is moved and perfected by another; matter does not move or perfect itself, it does not confer on itself vegetative, sensitive, or intellectual life; it is not its own action or its own being. Matter is always in potency to other determinations and it is not related to being, the ultimate actuality of all things, as A is to a. This argument also applies to Plato's dualism.
2. Matter is because of the form, and the form is not because of the matter. But the distinction of things takes place through the specific forms. Therefore the distinction is not on account of matter but conversely matter is on account of the distinction of things. Matter is the principle of individuation and is ordered to the multitude of species.
This second argument applies also to evolutionism, for there can be no evolution with a tendency to something definite and congruous without some finality. Otherwise the direction of such a tendency would be without any reason, and no tendency would ever attain to the constitution of any of our organs, the heart, the head, the eye, etc. John of St. Thomas restates these two arguments against materialism as follows:
1. Act is simply prior to potency, and therefore matter, which is the potency to a higher act, is not uncreated, nor is it therefore the first cause for the distinction of things, for example, the distinctions of vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual life, which matter cannot produce because it is inferior to them. Matter is merely the real capacity for receiving a perfection.
2. Potency is referred to act and is because of act, or matter is because of the form and on account of the diverse forms, and therefore it is not the cause of the specific distinction of the forms. Matter is because of the distinction of these forms.
The first conclusion therefore is that the specific distinction of things cannot be explained by a material cause.
2. The second theory refuted by St. Thomas might be called descending evolutionism. It calls to mind Plotinus' emanatism. This second theory was advanced by Avicenna, who tried to explain the specific distinction of things by efficient causes. Avicenna declared that God in understanding Himself produced the first intelligence (Plotinus' <logos>, the second <<hypostasis>>); then, when the first intelligence understood itself, it produced the soul of the world (Plotinus' third <<hypostasis>>, the god of the Stoics).
Modern pantheists, who support a descending evolution rather than an ascending evolution, try to explain the distinction of things in almost the same way. Spinoza tried to derive two infinite attributes from the divine substance: cogitation and infinite extension, besides the finite modes of cogitation and extension. But because he rejected free creation he was unable to derive the finite modes from an infinite substance, and therefore he simply stated without proof that these finite modes come into being successively from eternity in some necessary way.
In trying to explain the distinction of things Schelling began with the Absolute, but because he rejected the revealed truth of free creation he spoke of a fall of the Absolute by which the Absolute became the world in some kind of descent. Hegel, who supported an ascending evolution, ridiculed Schelling's dream of the fall of the Absolute, but Hegel's position is no less ridiculous, for according to Hegel God is becoming in the world but He does not yet exist and will never properly be, as Renan said.
Reply. To this second theory of the emanatists, St. Thomas replied that creation belongs to God alone and the total being of anything cannot be produced except by creation from nothing, and creation is not emanation, for in creation God is the sole efficient and final cause, but in no sense the material cause. Hence God does not become the world nor is the world made from God. Avicenna's second <hypostasis>, therefore, if it is created, cannot create a third, and the third cannot create something inferior to itself.
Furthermore, St. Thomas replies, according to Avicenna the totality and distinction of things would not derive from the intention of the first agent but from a concourse of many active causes. This concourse of causes, however, must come about by chance if it does not come from the intention of the first cause. But chance, since it is a cause <per accidens>, presupposes a cause ordered <per se> to its effect and therefore it cannot be the first cause of the specific distinction of things. Manifestly the distinction between vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual life in the world does not come from chance. In other words, there would be no finality in the world, and natural agents would tend to something determined and fitting without any reason, the order in things would be derived from an absence of order, more would come from the less, and the more perfect would come from the imperfect. Nor can it be said that the distinction in things comes from the form of secondary causes, for these forms do not exist of themselves and they themselves are distinct from one another and thus their own distinction must be explained.
Nor can it be said that the cause of the distinction in things is God inasmuch as He operates by a necessity of His nature. This argument was answered in the reply to the first difficulty and was refuted above: "It is of the nature of a natural agent that it produces one effect, because a nature (determined to one thing) operates in one and the same way unless it is impeded (for example, the vital principle in a plant operates in the same way in the same circumstances). This is because a natural agent acts according to its specific being, and as long as it is such a being it acts only in this one way. Since the divine being is infinite. . ., it cannot be that it acts by a necessity of nature unless it were to cause something infinite in being, which is impossible. The divine being, therefore, does not act by a necessity of nature, but the effects determined by its infinite perfection proceed according to the determination of its will and intellect."
The second conclusion, therefore, is that the distinction of things does not come from God as acting by a necessity of nature.
Until this point St. Thomas has not considered the opinion that the distinction of things comes from God as operating by a necessity of wisdom, an opinion espoused by the absolute optimism of Plato and by Leibnitz in modern times. Here is an attempt to explain the distinction of things, which is assumed to be necessary, by a final cause. In this instance the necessity of the distinction of things is not metaphysical or physical but moral. St. Thomas says: "Plato supposed that it was due to the goodness of God as understood and loved by God Himself that He should produce the most perfect of worlds. This could, of course, be true if we consider only those things that are and not those things that could be. This universe is the best of those that are, and the fact that it is the best is due to the goodness of God. But the goodness of God is not obligated to this universe in such a way that God could not make a better or worse universe." "Whenever the end is proportionate to the things that are made on account of that end, the wisdom of the maker is limited to some determined order. But the divine goodness is an end disproportionately exceeding created things. Therefore the divine wisdom is not determined to some order of things."
The third conclusion, therefore, is that the distinction of things does not come from God operating by a necessity of wisdom.
By eliminating the material cause, natural efficient causes, and the final cause that implies the necessity of the production of things, we come to the positive conclusion: the distinction of things arises from the free intention of God the Creator.
The proof may be somewhat easier if we join this last section of the article with the reply to the first difficulty, in which the divine liberty is affirmed.
A free agent can produce distinct effects according to whatever distinct forms he understands. But God, as a free agent, wished to manifest His goodness through diverse creatures. Therefore the distinction of things is explained by the intention of God the free Creator. and this distinction can have no other cause.
Explanation of the major. An agent that acts by its nature acts by the form by which it is, and this form is only one for each agent. Therefore such an agent acts only in one way. A free agent, however, acts according to a form received in the intellect.
Explanation of the minor. God is a voluntary and free agent. It does not conflict with God's unity and simplicity that He understands many things, for the multitude of things understood by God do not effect a real distinction in Him. Since God can understand many things, He can also make many things.
God, however, wished freely to manifest His goodness by diverse creatures. Why? St. Thomas explains in the last section: "Because by one creature the divine goodness cannot be adequately represented, God made many different things so that whatever is lacking in one to represent the divine goodness will be supplied by another."
The validity of this solution. This solution is of faith. From the philosophical viewpoint it is necessary, for the ascending evolution of the materialists and even of Hegel is repugnant both to the principle of causality (more cannot be produced by the less) and to the principle of finality (every agent acts according to the end to which it is ordered) and, moreover, ascending evolution does not explain the distinction of things. Similarly, descending evolution fails to explain the distinction of things for, if God operates by a necessity of nature, He will necessarily produce only one effect.
Similarly the absolute optimism of Plato and Leibnitz does not take into account the disproportion between any created universe and the divine goodness, which is to be manifested. We must, therefore, have recourse to the liberty of God the Creator, or we must, with Parmenides, deny all multitude and all distinction in things. In the end the solution is that the most eminent unity of God virtually contains the infinite multitude of possible things, from which God freely chose the things He wished to create.
The higher unity differs from the lower unity in the fact that it virtually contains the multitude; the higher the unity the richer its content, for, as Dionysius said, "those things that are divided in inferior beings are united in the higher beings." This is especially clear when we ascend from one order to another; the vital principle of the plant virtually contains all the acts of agents lower than itself. Similarly, the faculty of vision, which in itself is simple, extends itself to a spreading panorama; the central sense in the common sense unites the objects of the particular senses; the intellect knows the universal, which virtually contains the individual. Great musicians, like Mozart, hear the melody they are composing completely at one time and they often express the whole theme virtually in the prelude of the composition. Great philosophers reduce the whole of philosophy to a few sublime principles. When the saints arrive at the unitive way they unite in this unity various virtues. In a still higher plane, the unity and simplicity of God virtually contain the infinite multitude of possible beings, and from this multitude God chooses those that He wishes to create. By the divine liberty, then, we are able to solve the problem of how a multitude proceeds from the supreme and most simple principle. Plato and Aristotle were not able to offer a solution because they had not attained to the idea of free creation.
Second Article: Whether The Inequality Of Things Is From God
State of the question. Many men cannot understand how the inequality in things can come from God. The Manichaeans tried to explain this inequality by two, opposite principles, and Origen, trying to rectify their error, explained that in the beginning God created only intellectual beings and that all these beings were equal. Some of these sinned and as a punishment they were united to bodies. In modern times some thinkers have declared that that great inequality among animals, whereby the strong devour the weak, cannot come from God. They ask why there should be such a great inequality in the intellectual and moral aptitudes of men. This is the language of egalitarianism. As we shall see in the body of the article, it is a materialistic theory that does not take into account the subordination of the forms of agents and ends.
These unfortunate inequalities, says Schopenhauer, cannot come from a good and omnipotent God, and he concludes that God is not omnipotent and that the principle of all things is some kind of will that is always trying to persevere in being. This attempt is always associated with sorrow and is like an insatiable thirst. Therefore in his pessimism he concluded, that this desire for life must be eradicated so that we may come to that negative bliss which is the ending of all sorrow.
Schopenhauer's difficulties can be reduced to the difficulties proposed at the beginning of the present article: the best God should have made the best things, and therefore all equal, otherwise, according to the third objection, it would be an injustice for God to distribute His gifts unequally to creatures.
Reply. The reply is that the divine wisdom is the cause of the distinction of things for the sake of the perfection of the universe, and therefore the divine wisdom is also the cause of inequality.
1. Proof from authority. "Why doth one day excel another, and one light another, and one year another year, when all come of the Lord? By the knowledge of the Lord they were distinguished." In the canticle, "All ye works of the Lord, bless the Lord," we see the inequality of creatures, each of which in its own way praises the Lord. The description of the creation in the Book of Genesis shows the inequality of creatures, and the Fourth Council of the Lateran declared that "God at one time and in the beginning of time established both creatures, the spiritual and corporeal, and then the human creature, as it were a common being constituted by spirit and body."
2. Proof from reason: a) by the refutation of Origen's theory; b) positively.
a) In opposing the Manichaeans, Origen declared that God in the beginning had created spiritual beings, who were all equal. Those that sinned were bound to bodies, and the greater the sin the closer the union with matter. Some of these beings did not sin, and these now constitute the different grades of angels according to their different merits. In this way Origen combined the doctrine of original sin with the Platonic myths about the pre-existence of souls.
St. Thomas replies: "The totality of corporeal beings would then not be because of the communication of God's goodness to creatures but for the punishment of sin. But this is contrary to the words of Genesis, "And God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good." St. Augustine exclaims: "What could be more stupid than to say that by this sun, as there is but one in the world, God was concerned not with the splendor of beauty or the welfare of corporeal things, but that this sun came to be because one soul sinned?"
What could be more stupid than to say that the stars are in the sky, that the pure air exists, that the rose, the lily, the dove, the lamb were made because someone sinned? St. Augustine is speaking formally when he says, "what could be more stupid," for it is stupidity, opposed to the wisdom which explains the beauty of even the sensible world as a manifestation of God's goodness, while this theory explains all this by sin, not by the highest cause but by something that is less than nothing. Schopenhauer's doctrine is even greater folly when he speaks of a fall of the Absolute or of God. He tries to explain the inequalities and sorrows of the world by a primitive, non-omnipotent, or rather impotent will. The first cause is subsisting being itself and therefore omnipotent, because operation follows being, and anything that is able to possess the nature of being is comprised in the object of divine power, which can effect anything that has no repugnance to being.
b) The positive proof is from the principle of finality, out of which is drawn the corollary of the principle of the subordination of ends, forms, and agents, against materialistic egalitarianism. Leibnitz adopted St. Thomas' argument but exaggerated it, as we shall see. St. Thomas' argument can be reduced to the following: The specific or formal distinction is more important than the material or numerical distinction, because matter is on account of the form and the individuals in any species of corruptible beings are for the conservation of the species. But the formal distinction always requires inequality, since the forms of things are subordinate like numbers, ascending from the elements to mixed beings, to plants, and to animals, and in each instance one species is found more perfect than the others, for example, the diamond or radium among minerals, the rose among the flowers, and man among the animals. Therefore the inequality of beings is required for the perfection of the universe so that in different ways the wisdom of God might make known His goodness.
The major is evident, since matter is because of the form, according to the principle of finality that the imperfect is on account of the perfect. In the same way the many individuals of the same species of corruptible being are for the conservation of the species. Excluding the subsisting spiritual soul, individuals are ordered to the preservation of the species. Thus individuals pass away but the species remains; it is negatively eternal in the sense that it prescinds from the here and now, and thus it is somehow above time, representing the divine idea, the idea of rose, of lily, of lion, etc. Therefore, St. Thomas says, the hen gathers the chicks under her wing and defends them against the hawk because the hen naturally loves the good of its species more than its own good.
The major therefore is certain, namely, the formal or specific distinction is more important than the material or numerical distinction; any material individual of this or that species is of minor importance. This, however, is not true of a person, because the soul of the person is subsisting and immortal and thus is of greater value than the species of lion or horse.
The minor. But the formal distinction requires the inequality or subordination of forms. This is affirmed with a serene mind and not lugubriously as was the case with Origen. On this point St. Thomas differs entirely from the pessimism of Schopenhauer. But it should be noted that the holy doctor is speaking here of the primary distinction and inequality existing prior to sin; he is not now speaking of how after original and actual sin this inequality is often increased and causes that miserable state of servitude in which so many men spent their entire lives before the spread of Christianity.
The primary inequality of things pertains to their natures independently of sin, for, as Aristotle says, "the species of things are subordinate like numbers." For numbers vary by the addition or subtraction of unity and the species of things differ by the addition or subtraction of a specific difference. For example, a substance is incorporeal or corporeal, and here there is inequality; similarly, the corporeal substance is living or inanimate; if living, it is sensitive or not; if sensitive, it is rational or not. Everywhere we find the inequality and subordination of forms as with numbers.
Hence St. Thomas says, "In each of these we find one species more perfect than the others," for example, man among the animals, and the animals that have both internal and external senses are superior to the animals that do not possess all the senses, as the oyster and the sponge, which appear to have only the sense of touch. So there is also a certain subordination among plants and flowers and among minerals; the diamond, or perhaps radium, seems to be the most precious of minerals.
These considerations are valid against materialism and mechanism, which take into consideration only quantity and not quality. If quality is something prior to quantity, the variation of heat from the tenth to the twentieth degree is perhaps greater than between the twentieth and thirtieth degrees. Materialism looks at everything as if it were in the same horizontal plane, as if, for instance, animals were machines and as if the human soul were not essentially superior to the soul of the brute. This is absolute egalitarianism, which reduces everything to the lowest plane.
Spiritualism, on the other hand, considers everything as in a vertical line, inasmuch as the species of things are subordinated in a hierarchy for the splendor of the universe, because those things that are united in God can be only divisively in creatures and because the formal distinction requires inequality. Many modern writers do not understand this subordination, confusing it with coordination, for example, when they compare the first cause and the second cause with two men rowing a boat.
The conclusion is confirmed by the solution of the objections.
Reply to first objection. The most perfect agent produces his perfect total effect, but he produces it with a subordination of parts, for example, with the subordination of organs and functions in the plant and animal organisms. The animal would be less perfect if all its parts were equal, if all, for instance, had the dignity or importance of the eye.
Thus the universe is more perfect with angels, men, animals, plants, minerals than if there were only angels and all the angels were equal. Here was Origen's error. According to St. Thomas the angels could not be equal, for in the angels there is a particular subordination of forms since the angels are pure subsisting forms. Since individuation takes place through matter, there can be only one individual in each angelic species. Michael is the only individual in his species. Hence among the angels we have a perfect hierarchy or subordination.
Reply to second objection. In the Blessed Trinity there is equality according to the processions <ad intra> by which the entire divine nature is communicated. The Word and the Holy Ghost are equal to the Father. On the other hand there must be inequality in the procession <ad extra> because the creature is an inadequate manifestation of the divine goodness and many subordinate creatures are required.
Reply to third objection. The primitive inequality is not unjust since it is because of the perfection of the universe. This Origen was not able to understand.
Thus some are born inclined to fortitude and must acquire meekness, others inclined to meekness must acquire fortitude. Each must ascend the mountain of perfection by traversing the various parts of the mountain. The justice of God is not commutative, regulating the changes among equals, but it is distributive according to the requirements of the common good. God is His own law. Cajetan remarks: "Therefore God is just in condescension in order to manifest His goodness."
Leibnitz exaggerated this doctrine of inequality when he denied matter in his monadology and reduced all substance to spiritual monads which are subordinated as are the angels in St. Thomas' doctrine. Leibnitz held that there could not be in the world two beings absolutely similar because God would have created these perfectly similar beings without reason, just as a man would have two perfectly similar copies of the same edition of Virgil in his library without reason.
Reply. Two perfectly similar individuals can exist, especially in succession, for the preservation of the species and they are distinguished from each other by matter marked by quantity, as in the case of two drops of water or two perfectly identical twins. We concede only that there cannot be two angels perfectly similar in species, and this would also be true of men if they were monads without matter.
St. Thomas does admit a certain individual inequality of souls in the same human species: the soul of Christ is higher even in the natural order than the soul of Judas, but this inequality is not unrelated to the body, although on the other hand a body is better disposed because of a higher individual soul, since causes are mutually causes to each other in different genera of causes.
---
Source: Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, The Trinity and God the Creator, EWTN, http://www.ewtn.com/library/theology/trinity1.htm, ch. 21, articles 1–2.
Tuesday, September 23, 2014
St. Thomas Aquinas on Rationalizing Sexual Hedonsim
For know you this and understand: that no fornicator or unclean or covetous person, which is a serving of idols, hath inheritance in the kingdom of Christ and of God. Let no man deceive you with vain words. For because of these things cometh the anger of God upon the children of despair. Be ye not therefore partakers with them. (Eph. 5:5–7)The Apostle above forbade carnal sins (5:3); here he threatens them with the penalty of damnation that is inflicted on sinners. [...]
He states For know you this and understand, that is, be actually certain of it and not just habitually. “These things I write to you that you may know that you have eternal life; you who believe in the name of the Son of God” (1 Jn. 5:13). And what does he write? That no fornicator or unclean or covetous person, which is a serving of idols, hath inheritance in the kingdom of Christ and of God.
Notice that he calls covetousness idolatry, for idolatry happens when the honor due God alone is given to creatures. Now there is a twofold honor due God; we must establish him as the goal of our life and we must put our trust of reaching the goal in him. Hence, whoever places these ‘in creatures is guilty of idolatry. A covetous person commits this when he fixes his end in a created reality as well as putting all his trust in it. “Of their silver and their gold they have made idols to themselves, that they might perish” (Os. 8:4). This happens since, as Proverbs 11 (28) affirms: “He that trusteth in his riches shall fall.” [...]
Notice that only in reference to carnal vices does he teach them to avoid being deceived. For from the beginning men have rationalized to find reasons why fornication and other venereal sins were not really sins so that they might indulge their cupidity without restraint. Hence he states vain words since words that claim these are not sins and do not exclude one from the kingdom of God and of Christ are irrational. “Beware lest any man cheat you by prophecy and vain deceit” (Col. 2:8).”
He demonstrates that such men are deceivers and their words fallacious since, if carnal sins were not sins, they would not be punished by God; God is just and does not impose a penalty where there is no offense. But such acts are punished by God and therefore are sins. He proves the minor when he says For because of these things comes the anger of God, namely, on account of carnal sins, upon the children of despair. This is evident in the flood (Gen. 7), in what happened to the Sodomites (Gen. 19); and again, almost the whole tribe of Benjamin was destroyed on account of this (Jg. 19 & 20).
He says the children of despair because those who sin in this way despair of eternal life. If they acted this way and still hoped for eternal life, it would rather be presumption than hope, which is the certain expectation of obtaining future beatitude meritoriously.
---
Source: St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians, trans. by Matthew L. Lamb (Albany, NY: Magis Books, 1966), Dominican House of Studies website, accessed Sept. 23, 2014, http://dhspriory.org/thomas/Eph5.htm#3, 5.3.
Friday, July 4, 2014
Commentary on the "Veni Creator Spiritus"
Veni Creator Spiritus,
Mentes tuorum visita,
Imple superna gratia,
Quæ tu creasti pectora
Qui diceris Paraclitus,
Altissimi donum Dei,
Fons vivus, ignis, caritas,
Et spiritalis unctio.
Tu septiformis munere,
Digitus Paternæ dexteræ,
Tu rite promissum Patris,
Sermone ditans guttura.
Accende lumen sensibus,
Infunde amorem cordibus
Infirma nostri corporis
Virtute firmans perpeti.
Hostem repellas longius,
Pacemque dones protinus;
Ductore sic te prævio,
Vitemus omne noxium.
Per te sciamus da Patrem,
Noscamus atque Fillium,
Teque utriusque Spiritum
Credamus omni tempore.
Deo Patri sit gloria,
Et Fillo, qui a mortuis
Surrexit, ac Paraclito,
In sæculorum sæcula.
Creator-Spirit, all-Divine,
Come, visit every soul of Thine,
And fill with Thy celestial flame
The hearts which Thou Thyself didst frame.
O gift of God, Thine is the sweet
Consoling name of Paraclete—
And spring of life and fire and love
And unction flowing from above.
The mystic sevenfold gifts are Thine,
Finger of God’s right hand divine;
The Father’s promise sent to teach
The tongue a rich and heavenly speech.
Kindle with fire brought from above
Each sense, and fill our hearts with love;
And grant our flesh, so weak and frail,
The strength of Thine which cannot fail.
Drive far away our deadly foe,
And grant us Thy true peace to know;
So we, led by Thy guidance still,
May safely pass through every ill.
To us, through Thee, the grace be shown
To know the Father and the Son:
And Spirit of Them both, may we
Forever rest our faith in Thee.
To Sire and Son be praises meet,
And to the Holy Paraclete;
And may Christ send us from above
That Holy Spirit’s gift of love.
Translation by Father Aylward, O.P. There are about sixty translations; eight of which are in the Annus Sanctus.
Mentes tuorum visita,
Imple superna gratia,
Quæ tu creasti pectora
Qui diceris Paraclitus,
Altissimi donum Dei,
Fons vivus, ignis, caritas,
Et spiritalis unctio.
Tu septiformis munere,
Digitus Paternæ dexteræ,
Tu rite promissum Patris,
Sermone ditans guttura.
Accende lumen sensibus,
Infunde amorem cordibus
Infirma nostri corporis
Virtute firmans perpeti.
Hostem repellas longius,
Pacemque dones protinus;
Ductore sic te prævio,
Vitemus omne noxium.
Per te sciamus da Patrem,
Noscamus atque Fillium,
Teque utriusque Spiritum
Credamus omni tempore.
Deo Patri sit gloria,
Et Fillo, qui a mortuis
Surrexit, ac Paraclito,
In sæculorum sæcula.
English translation:
Creator-Spirit, all-Divine,
Come, visit every soul of Thine,
And fill with Thy celestial flame
The hearts which Thou Thyself didst frame.
O gift of God, Thine is the sweet
Consoling name of Paraclete—
And spring of life and fire and love
And unction flowing from above.
The mystic sevenfold gifts are Thine,
Finger of God’s right hand divine;
The Father’s promise sent to teach
The tongue a rich and heavenly speech.
Kindle with fire brought from above
Each sense, and fill our hearts with love;
And grant our flesh, so weak and frail,
The strength of Thine which cannot fail.
Drive far away our deadly foe,
And grant us Thy true peace to know;
So we, led by Thy guidance still,
May safely pass through every ill.
To us, through Thee, the grace be shown
To know the Father and the Son:
And Spirit of Them both, may we
Forever rest our faith in Thee.
To Sire and Son be praises meet,
And to the Holy Paraclete;
And may Christ send us from above
That Holy Spirit’s gift of love.
---
Translation by Father Aylward, O.P. There are about sixty translations; eight of which are in the Annus Sanctus.
Liturgical Use: Hymn for Vespers and Terce on Whitsunday and throughout the octave. Terce (the 3rd hour, 9am) was the hour on which the Holy Ghost descended upon the Apostles (Acts 2, 15). The hymn is used on many other solemn occasions in liturgical and extra-liturgical functions as an invocation to the Holy Spirit. With the exception of the Te Deum, there is probably no other hymn so extensively used in the Church as the Veni Creator Spiritus. [...]
1. "Come, Creator Spirit, visit the souls of Thy children, and fill with heavenly grace the hearts which Thou hast made."
Creator: The three Divine Persons concur equally
in their external operation; thus the Father created, the
Son created, and the Holy Ghost created.
Source: Fr. Matthew Britt, OSB, The Hymns of the Breviary and Missal (New York, NY: Benzinger Brothers, 1922), 162–164.
---
If there are few perfect souls, this is because there are few that follow the direction of the Holy Ghost. His seven gifts often have little effect in many souls because they are, as it were, fettered by contrary habits and affections. More or less deliberate and frequent venial sins exclude the graces necessary to produce the acts of the gifts. But we cannot doubt their existence, because Scripture, tradition, and the liturgy speak of them, and, if the obstacles were removed, we should ordinarily see the gradual realization of what the Church makes us implore in the Veni Creator [....]
This prayer, which should be said by the faithful soul with an ever increasing fervor of will, reminds us that the life of grace is eternal life begun; and it ends by asking for the normal fruit of this "grace of the virtues and of the gifts," the infused contemplation of the Blessed Trinity dwelling in us:
---
Source: Fr. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, OP, Christian Contemplation and Perfection, trans. by M. Timothea Doyle (Rockford, IL: TAN Books, 2003), 406–408.
2. "Thou who art called the Paraclete, the gift of God most high, the living fountain, fire, love, and spiritual unction."
Paraclitus: the Paraclete, the Holy Spirit; a
Greek word signifying—the consoler, comforter. In the
Scriptures the word occurs only in St. John 14, 16; 14, 26;
15, 26; 16, 7.
Donum: The Holy Spirit is called the ''gift
of God most high." To receive the gift of the Holy Ghost
(Acts 2, 38) is equivalent to receiving the Holy Ghost with His gifts.
Fons vivus: Sed aqua, quam ego dabo ei, fiet in eo fons aquse salientis in vitam seternam [Translation: But the water that I will give him, shall become in him a fountain of water, springing up into life everlasting.] (John 4, 14).
Ignis: Earthly fire illuminates, enkindles, consumes, and
purifies from dross; so too, in its nature, is the fire of the
Holy Spirit—enlightening, love-enkindling, sin-destroying,
and purifying. This fire manifests itself in works of
charity, and especially in preaching with zeal and fervor
the word of God.
Caritas: Deus caritas est, et qui manet
in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo [Translation: But the water that I will give him, shall become in him a fountain of water, springing up into life everlasting.] (I John 4, 16).
Spiritalis [or] Spiritualis: The grace of God is called unction
or anointing because the effects produced by it in the
spiritual order are analogous to those produced by ointment in the natural order. It cools, refreshes, exhilarates,
strengthens, heals, enriches, etc.
3. "Thou art sevenfold in Thy gifts, the finger of the Father's right hand; Thou art the express promise of the Father, endowing tongues with speech."
Septiformis:
The seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are enumerated by the
Prophet Isaias: Et requiescet super eum spiritus Domini;
spiritus sapientias et intellectus, spiritus consilii et fortitudinis, spiritus scientias et pietatis, et replebit eum spiritus
timoris Domini [Translation: And the spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him: the spirit of wisdom, and of understanding, the spirit of counsel, and of fortitude, the spirit of knowledge, and of godliness. And he shall be filled with the spirit of the fear of the Lord.] (Is. 11, 2-3).
Digitus Dei: The Holy Spirit
is called the "finger of God" as may be seen from the following parallel passages: Si in digito Dei eicio daemonia [Translation: But if I by the finger of God cast out devils...] (Luke 11, 20). Si autem ego in Spiritu Dei eicio daemones [Translation: But if I by the Spirit of God cast out devils...] (Matt. 12, 28).
Rite: explicit, distinctly stated.
Promissum, i = promissio. Et ego mitto promissum Patris mei in
vos [Translation: And I send the promise of my Father upon you...] (Luke 24, 49). Sed expectarent promissionem Patris [Translation: ...but should wait for the promise of the Father...] (Acts 1, 4).
Sermone: A reference to the gift of tongues
(Acts 2, 4).
4. "Enkindle Thy light within our minds, infuse Thy love into our hearts ; strengthen the weakness of our flesh by Thy never-failing power."
5. "Drive far away our enemy, and forthwith grant us peace; so that while Thou leadest the way as our guide, we may avoid everything harmful."
6. "Grant that through Thee we may know the Father; through Thee, the Son; and may we ever believe in Thee, the Spirit of Them both."---
Source: Fr. Matthew Britt, OSB, The Hymns of the Breviary and Missal (New York, NY: Benzinger Brothers, 1922), 162–164.
---
If there are few perfect souls, this is because there are few that follow the direction of the Holy Ghost. His seven gifts often have little effect in many souls because they are, as it were, fettered by contrary habits and affections. More or less deliberate and frequent venial sins exclude the graces necessary to produce the acts of the gifts. But we cannot doubt their existence, because Scripture, tradition, and the liturgy speak of them, and, if the obstacles were removed, we should ordinarily see the gradual realization of what the Church makes us implore in the Veni Creator [....]
This prayer, which should be said by the faithful soul with an ever increasing fervor of will, reminds us that the life of grace is eternal life begun; and it ends by asking for the normal fruit of this "grace of the virtues and of the gifts," the infused contemplation of the Blessed Trinity dwelling in us:
To us, through Thee, the grace be shown[...] We must trust in the Holy Ghost who dwells in us and who increases His work in us in proportion to our growing fidelity to the first commandment: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind" in order to become "adorers in spirit and in truth." Our Lord said: "I will not now call you servants... but I have called you friends." We should believe in the wholly divine strength of the grace received in baptism, of the Holy Ghost who was given to us. We do not see this strength any more than we see the life hidden in an acorn from which a vigorous oak grows. If the oak is encircled by a band of iron, the bark will soon grow over it. Who can measure the supernatural energy contained in the grace of the virtues and the gifts, which is none other than eternal life begun? Who can set a limit to the work of sanctification which the Holy Ghost has begun in us, and prevent souls from reaching even the inner sanctuary where the Blessed Trinity dwells? "Wherefore I wished, and understanding was given me: and I called upon God, and the spirit of wisdom came upon me" (Wis. 7:7). "I confess to Thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because Thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them to little ones" (Mt. 11:25).
To know the Father and the Son:
And Spirit of Them both, may we
Forever hold firm trust in Thee.`
---
Source: Fr. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, OP, Christian Contemplation and Perfection, trans. by M. Timothea Doyle (Rockford, IL: TAN Books, 2003), 406–408.
Thursday, June 26, 2014
Conversion for the Modern Man
Few Catholics get most of their information or influence from God, the Scriptures, or Church teaching. Most are far more aware of and inclined to listen to secular leaders, pop musicians, entertainers, sports figures, and the general cultural din. And this is where they develop even their most critical insights about God, family, sexuality, and many significant moral questions.Source: Msgr. Charles Pope, "The Extraordinary Form of the Mass and the Evangelization of the Culture," Archdiocese of Washington blog, June 8, 2014, accessed June 26, 2014, http://blog.adw.org/2014/06/the-extraordinary-form-of-the-mass-and-the-evangelization-of-the-culture/.
The process of conversion for the modern man, where conversion is always a twofold movement of changing the orientation of the heart away from sin and towards God (metanoia), inevitably will mean moving away from worldly and demonic sources and towards heavenly ones for the inspiration and formation of our worldview, sentiments, and actions. Our progress can be measured by what habitual forms of thinking, speaking, and acting we refer to in day-to-day life. In other words, as the Spirit of God works through us and His inspirations become "connatural" to our way of being, we will know whether we are moving away from or towards God.
The pinnacle of our modernity is the comfort of civilization advanced in its technology, resting on a foundation of modern science and modern philosophical-political ideology after the Enlightenment. How we arrived at this point is irrelevant for understanding conversion, but the point is that at the root of modern life is the seeking of comfort through technological products. This seeking of comfort is so deeply ingrained in our collective consciousness that evil is now primarily defined as that which goes against personal comfort; in other words, evil has been reduced from what properly refers to moral depravity to a scale of feelings deemed negative. Abortion is legitimate in this view because the child would be inconvenient; gay marriage is legitimate because it is the only way for a homosexual couple to be happy and live in the comfort of their mutual affection; religion in the public square is evil because it dictates against the individual's way of life; rape is evil because it violates a person's bodily, psychological, and personal integrity as well as the right to consensual relations. Etc.
Therefore, the process of conversion for the modern man will include a progressive realization of this tendency to seek pleasure and avoid pain, even to the point of mortal sin and justifying that sin. The Christian Faith reveals to us the antithesis of the modern lifestyle: it sees physical evil as a true deprivation but ultimately nothing compared to the evil of sin. Its goal is not comfort but conformity to God, transformation in Christ, connaturality with the movements of the Holy Ghost. It desires that God's name be glorified through the establishment of His kingdom first in the individual soul and then collectively among the nations. This establishment occurs only where God's will is done in all joyful obedience, sustained by the spiritual nourishment that God provides us, above all in the Holy Eucharist. The channel of grace remains open to those who psychologically and spiritually prepare themselves by letting go of resentment and bitterness through the forgiveness of others' sins against us. Finally, it demands that we begin to reconstruct our environment such that it becomes the most conducive towards recollection and true Christian spirituality, that it becomes a place fostering holiness and holy desires. It requires that we remove ourselves from occasions of sin, temptation, and the deliberate participation in both explicitly evil and implicitly spiritually harmful activities and ways of life. This process is summarized in the Our Father in reverse order of its petitions, where the end (the glory of God) is always first in intention but last in execution for the beginner:
Deliver us from evil: we beg for the grace to begin the process of conversion while cooperating with that grace to remove ourselves from the explicit evil in our lives as far as possible.
Lead us not into temptation: we beg for grace to overcome temptation while cooperating with that grace to remove occasions of sin and setting up an environment conducive to holiness.
As we forgive others their trespasses: we are taught humility and forgiveness, the two necessary conditions for receiving God's grace, which begins with God's forgiveness of our sins.
Forgive us our trespasses: This is the moment of justification and the continual strengthening against our vices through receiving the grace of Confession.
Give us this day our daily bread: We beg for the reception of daily strength to grow in our spiritual lives, to persevere, especially through sacramental and spiritual Communion. It is only through the strength that comes from grace that we can do any of these things but above all God's will.
Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven: Strengthened and nourished by the Eucharist and the graces of Confession, we resolve to do God's will. We beg for the grace to know and do God's will in all things.
Thy kingdom come: The consistent doing of God's will is the establishment of God's kingdom in the soul. Where God's will is done, there God reigns. When this commitment to God's will becomes collective, God's kingdom is shared among many individuals.
Hallowed be Thy name: This is the goal of all our striving: the glory of God. This is what we work towards in our service of God. We beg for the grace that this end become a reality in us individually and collectively. This petition demands right worship of God, full assent to His self-revelation, and the joyful accomplishment of His commandments and counsels (to those called to religious life) or even the spirit of the counsels (to the rest), the keeping of which is necessary for spiritual perfection.
Concretely, the beginning of this process involves removing ourselves from all sources of comfort that distract us from God. In this point lies the difficulty of the modern man's conversion: his technological advancements, rather than providing time and space for leisure, serve as an unending means of distraction and agitation from leisure for God. The evil of modern comfort lies not in the comfort itself but in that it is used to distract us from conversion to God and from the facing and repenting of our sins. Here are many things that keep us from God:
Movies, TV, YouTube and other online media entertainment, Facebook and other social websites, video games, including those on cell phones, texting, email, reading useless material, such as newspapers, magazines, books not necessary for professional or spiritual purposes, sports, gambling, radio, secular music (even sacred music removed from its properly sacred context, such as listening to Gregorian chant outside of the liturgy or personal devotional use, where it doesn't belong);
Recreational drug use and alcohol and tobacco;
Sexual activity outside of its procreative function in Holy Matrimony, pornography, eroticism, dating, flirtation, immodesty, tattoos, piercings, vain focus on the body through make-up or dying the hair;
Junk foods and fast foods, sodas, many "juices," coffee or tea that isn't part of a legitimate meal (outside of which becomes a sign of a harmful addiction).
Here are some behaviors that keep us from God:
Swearing and cussing, thoughts and words of hostility, gossip, competitive behavior, threatening, jokes at the expense of others.
Here are some ways we can make prayer constant throughout the day:
Weekly and/or daily Mass, arriving with time to prepare and giving time afterwards for thanksgiving, dressing modestly and reverently, wearing the Miraculous Medal or Brown Scapular or other medals of the Saints, praying the Jesus Prayer, praying Lauds, Vespers, or Compline, praying the Angelus, the Rosary, praying for souls in Purgatory and those in danger of hell.
For more, see: http://chastitysf.com/index.html
Tuesday, April 29, 2014
Commentary on Maureen Dowd's "A Saint, He Ain't"
The New York Times published on April 22, 2014 an opinion article by Maureen Dowd on St. John Paul II's recent canonization, titled "A Saint, He Ain't" (http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/23/opinion/dowd-a-saint-he-aint.html). I discovered this article through a link on The Remnant website, a self-identified traditionalist, Catholic publication. Just a few comments on Dowd's article as well as its place on The Remnant website.
Dowd, while acknowledging that John Paul II did many good things during his pontificate, draws attention to the fact that the late pope did apparently very little to nothing to stop the burgeoning sex abuse crisis within the Church. She draws attention specifically to the very unfortunate re-assigment of Cardinal Bernard Francis Law, and his the defense of Fr. Maciel of the Legionaries of Christ. Concluding the article, Dowd writes powerfully,
She claims that the saint "status" is something "given" by the Church to a person, but this understanding is incorrect. The implication of this understanding, however, is that the Church therefore "makes" a person a saint. But that is not what is meant by the canonization process. By declaring a person a saint, the Church simply recognizes what is already the case, namely, that a person is in heaven, which is all that is meant by "saint" in itself.
Now, being a saint, veneration follows. Dowd's criticism, then, would (or perhaps should) rather be that we should not venerate a man who has committed so many atrocities, specifically because he "looked away in a moral crisis" that caused hell "for so many children and young people in [the Church's] care."
But again, there is a misunderstanding of what it means to be a saint—it simply means a person is in heaven, and that possibility is open to anyone who has the least degree of sanctifying grace in his or her soul. Even Hitler could be in heaven for all we know. It doesn't mean that Hitler led a life that obviously should be venerated (although some do so regardless).
Now, the difficulty is that when a Church specifically declares a person a saint, she further declares the person worthy of veneration. Again, this is Dowd's specific problem (although she worded it in the problematic way that I have pointed out above). Her complaint actually gets to the heart of what many traditionalists have had with the late JPII, namely, how many people swiftly began to attach the title "the Great" to JPII's name—John Paul the Great. This title has been given only to two other popes in history—Pope Leo I and Pope Gregory I (makes one think that if anyone should have gotten the "Great" title, it should have been John Paul I just to keep the "I" theme going). The title has been given as an indication of the excellence of these popes as popes. Therefore, giving John Paul II the title implies that he was a great pope. This is the heart of Dowd's criticism (although she may not have articulated it in this way and in fact didn't). She is confusing two distinct issues—being a saint (which is being in heaven) and being a great pope worthy of veneration as a pope.
There is a second difficulty with Dowd's criticism, which is that we venerate saints because they are models of different aspects of the moral and spiritual life, such as attention to those who are poor, hungry, homeless, imprisoned, sick, or those who are mystics, theologians, leaders, or those who are single, married, or priests, etc. To canonize two popes at the same time in the timespan given implies that these two popes were excellent and worthy of veneration as popes. The issue isn't (or shouldn't be) whether these two saints (or any saints for that matter) did in fact or apparently commit atrocities during their lives.* If we look closely enough, we will quickly see that we're all guilty of atrocities on different scales. Yes, everyone is a sinner. But were these popes excellent as popes? Did they lead the Church as "servants of the servants of God"?
Dowd's issue is that the Church's move to draw John Paul II into the public for veneration specifically as a pope implies that the victims of the sexual abuse scandal are "as a slowly fading asterisk." And perhaps she's right about that. Nevertheless, she goes too far in the next paragraph by saying that such a man "cannot be described as a saint." That's confusing the issue.
---
The second thing that I want to draw attention to is that I found this article through The Remnant website. I find it strange that a self-identified traditionalist, Catholic news publication would link to such an egregiously erroneous and even irreverent article—cf. Dowd's "The buck, or in this case, the Communion wafer, doesn’t stop here" comment (we're talking about the infinitely holy Eucharist here! It's not a swap-out for a slang metaphor!). It's one thing to agree with people that a certain pope (in this case John Paul II) shouldn't have been canonized so quickly or even at all, much less given the title (not by the Church but unofficially by many people) "the Great." It's another thing to ally one's self with those who most likely do not look at the Faith in any way other than its political implications and end up naturalizing it through a culturally-imbibed modernism. It indicates, in other words, that The Remnant is at least unconsciously willing to do anything to make a point, even if it means siding with people, movements, and groups that are inspired (and perhaps run) by Satan himself, such as the New York Times and its op-ed articles. And that's pretty scary.
---
* A third aside, I would also note that being declared a saint by the Church doesn't mean that a specific saint never taught or held anything heretical. St. Thomas Aquinas very famously argued against the Immaculate Conception. Despite this error, the Church canonized St. Thomas and called for his veneration as a theologian because despite some major failings in his conclusions, his work in theology for the far greater part is worthy of study and imitation. Being declared a saint doesn't mean that the saint in question is free from errors or was "impeccable."
Dowd, while acknowledging that John Paul II did many good things during his pontificate, draws attention to the fact that the late pope did apparently very little to nothing to stop the burgeoning sex abuse crisis within the Church. She draws attention specifically to the very unfortunate re-assigment of Cardinal Bernard Francis Law, and his the defense of Fr. Maciel of the Legionaries of Christ. Concluding the article, Dowd writes powerfully,
The church is giving its biggest prize to the person who could have fixed the spreading stain and did nothing. The buck, or in this case, the Communion wafer, doesn’t stop here. There is something wounding and ugly about the church signaling that those thousands of betrayed, damaged victims are now taken for granted as a slowly fading asterisk.
John Paul may be a revolutionary figure in the history of the church, but a man who looked away in a moral crisis cannot be described as a saint.
When the church elevates him, it is winking at the hell it caused for so many children and young people in its care.
A big holy wink.I can't comment on the facticity of Dowd's claims because I'm ignorant about them, and I'm not here to comment on those. My comments are reserved for these concluding paragraphs that I have copied above because despite all the attention Dowd brings to John Paul II's apparent failings, her conclusions and understanding of sainthood are problematic and, even on a prima facie reading, inaccurate.
She claims that the saint "status" is something "given" by the Church to a person, but this understanding is incorrect. The implication of this understanding, however, is that the Church therefore "makes" a person a saint. But that is not what is meant by the canonization process. By declaring a person a saint, the Church simply recognizes what is already the case, namely, that a person is in heaven, which is all that is meant by "saint" in itself.
Now, being a saint, veneration follows. Dowd's criticism, then, would (or perhaps should) rather be that we should not venerate a man who has committed so many atrocities, specifically because he "looked away in a moral crisis" that caused hell "for so many children and young people in [the Church's] care."
But again, there is a misunderstanding of what it means to be a saint—it simply means a person is in heaven, and that possibility is open to anyone who has the least degree of sanctifying grace in his or her soul. Even Hitler could be in heaven for all we know. It doesn't mean that Hitler led a life that obviously should be venerated (although some do so regardless).
Now, the difficulty is that when a Church specifically declares a person a saint, she further declares the person worthy of veneration. Again, this is Dowd's specific problem (although she worded it in the problematic way that I have pointed out above). Her complaint actually gets to the heart of what many traditionalists have had with the late JPII, namely, how many people swiftly began to attach the title "the Great" to JPII's name—John Paul the Great. This title has been given only to two other popes in history—Pope Leo I and Pope Gregory I (makes one think that if anyone should have gotten the "Great" title, it should have been John Paul I just to keep the "I" theme going). The title has been given as an indication of the excellence of these popes as popes. Therefore, giving John Paul II the title implies that he was a great pope. This is the heart of Dowd's criticism (although she may not have articulated it in this way and in fact didn't). She is confusing two distinct issues—being a saint (which is being in heaven) and being a great pope worthy of veneration as a pope.
There is a second difficulty with Dowd's criticism, which is that we venerate saints because they are models of different aspects of the moral and spiritual life, such as attention to those who are poor, hungry, homeless, imprisoned, sick, or those who are mystics, theologians, leaders, or those who are single, married, or priests, etc. To canonize two popes at the same time in the timespan given implies that these two popes were excellent and worthy of veneration as popes. The issue isn't (or shouldn't be) whether these two saints (or any saints for that matter) did in fact or apparently commit atrocities during their lives.* If we look closely enough, we will quickly see that we're all guilty of atrocities on different scales. Yes, everyone is a sinner. But were these popes excellent as popes? Did they lead the Church as "servants of the servants of God"?
Dowd's issue is that the Church's move to draw John Paul II into the public for veneration specifically as a pope implies that the victims of the sexual abuse scandal are "as a slowly fading asterisk." And perhaps she's right about that. Nevertheless, she goes too far in the next paragraph by saying that such a man "cannot be described as a saint." That's confusing the issue.
---
The second thing that I want to draw attention to is that I found this article through The Remnant website. I find it strange that a self-identified traditionalist, Catholic news publication would link to such an egregiously erroneous and even irreverent article—cf. Dowd's "The buck, or in this case, the Communion wafer, doesn’t stop here" comment (we're talking about the infinitely holy Eucharist here! It's not a swap-out for a slang metaphor!). It's one thing to agree with people that a certain pope (in this case John Paul II) shouldn't have been canonized so quickly or even at all, much less given the title (not by the Church but unofficially by many people) "the Great." It's another thing to ally one's self with those who most likely do not look at the Faith in any way other than its political implications and end up naturalizing it through a culturally-imbibed modernism. It indicates, in other words, that The Remnant is at least unconsciously willing to do anything to make a point, even if it means siding with people, movements, and groups that are inspired (and perhaps run) by Satan himself, such as the New York Times and its op-ed articles. And that's pretty scary.
---
* A third aside, I would also note that being declared a saint by the Church doesn't mean that a specific saint never taught or held anything heretical. St. Thomas Aquinas very famously argued against the Immaculate Conception. Despite this error, the Church canonized St. Thomas and called for his veneration as a theologian because despite some major failings in his conclusions, his work in theology for the far greater part is worthy of study and imitation. Being declared a saint doesn't mean that the saint in question is free from errors or was "impeccable."
Wednesday, April 23, 2014
Distinction: St. Paul, St. Thomas Aquinas on Freedom for Excellence vs. Freedom to Sin
Chapter 6, lecture 3, n. 501: But the one who obeys God is made a slave of this obedience, because through the habit of obeying the mind is inclined more and more to obeying and as a result achieves holiness. Therefore, he says: or of obedience, namely, of the divine precepts, which leads to righteousness: “It is the doers of the law who will be justified” (Rom 2:13).
Chapter 6, lecture 4, n. 508: In regard to the first it should be noted that man is by nature free because of his reason and will, which cannot be forced but can be inclined by certain things. Therefore, in regard to the freedom of the will man is always free of compulsion, although he is not free of inclinations. For the free judgment is sometimes inclined to the good through the habit of grace
or righteousness; and then it is in slavery to righteousness but free from sin. But sometimes the free judgment is inclined to evil through the habit of sin; and then it is in slavery to sin and free from righteousness. Now, slavery to sin consists in being drawn to consent to sin against the judgment of reason: “Everyone who commits sin is the slave of sin” (Jn 8:34).
And in regard to this he says: When you were slaves of sin. Freedom from righteousness, on the other hand, implies that a man rushes headlong into sin without the restraint of righteousness; in regard to this he says: you were free in regard to righteousness. This happens especially in those who sin of set purpose: “Long ago you broke your yoke and burst your bonds; and you said, ‘I will not serve’” (Jer 2:20); “A vain man is lifted up into pride, and thinks himself born free like a wild ass’ colt” (Jb 11:12).
509. Yet it should be noted that this state involves true slavery and only apparent freedom. For since man should act according to reason, be is truly a slave when he is led away from what is reasonable by something alien. Furthermore, if he is not restrained by the yoke of reason from following concupiscence, he is free only in the opinion of those who suppose that the highest good is to follow one’s concupiscence.
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When we become slaves to sin, we are free from righteousness. But when we are free from sin, we are slaves to righteousness. Hence the arbitrary freedom of hedonism is diametrically opposed to the freedom for excellence although both make use of the will's profound dynamic energy behind habitus, whether virtuous or vicious.
Notice also how St. Thomas identified so clearly the false autonomy that exists in Western society today: "If he is not restrained by the yoke of reason from following concupiscence, he is free only in the opinion of those who suppose that the highest good is to follow one's concupiscence." Hence people say, for example, of a homosexual couple who "love" each other that they should be allowed to marry and follow their "love." The love itself is justification for the act. This is morality for excellence reduced to bestiality, the moral animal to the beasts.
St. Thomas also identifies the psychological indicator of slavery either to sin or righteousness: the predominant inclination to one or the other. Notice St. Thomas also says that we shall never be free of inclination itself, which is desire. If there is a predominant inclination to sin, such that we usually fall into sin by acting on that inclination, then we know we are enslaved to sin. But if the predominant inclination draws us to act righteously, then we know that we are enslaved to righteousness.
Hence the psychological test that I have given elsewhere to demonstrate one's predominant inclination, namely, can you go at least three months without fixation on some object or action? For example, only recently I was reminded of a song I used to listen to over and over when I was younger. The fact that I haven't thought of that song in such a long time demonstrates to me that I have no attachment to it any longer. I am "free" from that song, not a slave to it.
Then St. John of the Cross shows us that the way to freedom for excellence is to remove ourselves from that object of inclination and enter the dark nothings by which our desire can refocus on God. St. John of the Cross further shows that in the transforming union, the soul reaches such a state that although it may suffer temptations as God allows them, these are alien to its predominant desire, which is centered on God. Hence these temptations are hardly occasion for sin but rather occasions for further perfection.
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Source: St. Thomas Aquinas, Lectures on the Letter to the Romans, trans. by Fabian Larcher, ed. by Jeremy Holmes, Nova et Vetera, accessed April 23, 2014, http://nvjournal.net/files/Aquinas_on_Romans.pdf.
Tuesday, April 1, 2014
Fr. Antonio Royo Marin's Commentary on the Hail Mary, pt. 10: "Now and at the hour of our death"
Now
Holy Mary, Mother of God, pray for us now, through this day, through this hour, through our entire lives, in which there are constant temptations and dangers.
Now, when temptation intensifies and we run into further danger, that the Lord may not permit these temptations to become more violent and dangerous. Now when, as ever, souls are besieged by the world, the devil, and the flesh. Now when, without danger, we cannot walk down streets, nor attend spectacles and shows, nor read magazines and books, nor even look out the window, nor be properly educated at schools. Now when, with so many followers of the devil, men and women seem to have as their sole occupation to tempt men to sin and damn them.
And at the Hour of Our Death
We know not how our death shall be, nor when it shall be, nor whether it shall take us by surprise. When we arrive at our death, the devil will bring back to our minds our many sins, the rigor of divine justice, our failure to make sufficient penance, and how we constantly showed contempt for God's many graces. At that hour of our death, when the pain of infirmity will not allow us to come before You [Translator's note: perhaps the author is thinking here of being before the Blessed Sacrament or at a Church or other holy place]: may it not be sudden, but may we know clearly the gravity of the moment and have at our side a priest who may absolve us, administer Viaticum and Extreme Unction, and commend our souls while suggesting holy affections to us, and with such preparation may we breathe forth our final breath pronouncing your holy Name and the Name of your Son Jesus, our Redeemer and Savior. Amen.
Conclusion
Such is the most beautiful prayer of the Hail Mary in its two parts. It is impossible to find a more beautiful and sublime prayer in praise of Mary and in fervent supplication for graces. The Hail Mary ought to be constantly in the hearts and very frequently on the lips of all the sons of Mary. It has a supernatural efficacy to obtain from Her any grace, and above all others as the most important grace, the grace of a holy death. There exists a special devotion dedicated to this thought, called the Three Hail Marys, which was revealed to St. Matilda by God as the most efficacious way to obtain from Him, through the intercession of Mary, the grace of a happy death. The three Hail Marys ought to be recited piously every day in honor of the three great privileges which the Most Holy Trinity granted to Mary, namely: unlimited power, wisdom, and mercy. Clearly in order to obtain this grace from God, it is necessary to be worthy of it; hence we ought to avoid all sin and live an authentically Christian life, to which praying the three Hail Marys will provide a powerful help.
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Source: Fr. Antonio Royo Marín, La Virgen María, trans. by R. Grablin (Madrid, Spain: BAC, 1996), 458-459. Translation of this commentary is dedicated to V.G.M.S.
Fr. Antonio Royo Marin's Commentary on the Hail Mary, pt. 9: "Pray for us sinners"
Pray for Us
Because you are holy and the Mother of God and are to be for us the Queen and Mother of mercy, our life, our sweetness, and our hope, pray for us who are exiled in this valley of tears. You are the powerful Virgin, the clement Virgin, the faithful Virgin, Mother of Christ, Mother of divine grace. Pray for us, O Refuge of sinners, Help of Christians, Queen of the Angels. Pray for us, for you are the universal Mediatrix of all graces, and unless we beg it of you, we can have neither a holy life nor a holy death. Pray for us that God may not punish us as we deserve—for not only have we sinned, but we can sin further and condemn our very selves; for we have to navigate through the stormy sea of life, surrounded by dangers, dangers at all ages, in all states, in all occupations; for we are tempted, dying, poor, persecuted, and afflicted. Pray for us who are captivated by the deceitful things of this world, by honors and pleasures, wealth, and youth.
Sinners
All men are sinners, and even the just man falls seven times a day as Scripture testifies. Often we do not realize this because the devil deceives us. There are many who believe that they are good, but they sin against chastity, against faith, against charity; they steal, breaking the seventh commandment, but they break it in such a way that they believe that what they are doing is lawful when it isn't.
How many sins we commit! Many venial sins, semi-deliberate, all throughout the day and in almost every single one of our works! Sins against God, by being lukewarm. Sins against our neighbor, by murmuring. Sins against our superiors, by sloppy, sluggish obedience. Sins against ourselves and those under our care, by neglecting the obligations of our state. "Pray for us, sinners," that is, we who seem to have the occupation of violating every commandment and sinning against every virtue, if not gravely, at least venially, and many times with deliberation.
We sin with our eyes, through immodest glances; with our ears, through vain conversations; with our palates, through indulging in delicacies; with our imaginations, through dangerous fantasies; with our minds, through bad thoughts; with our memories, through harmful remembrances; with our hearts, through disordered affections.
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Source: Fr. Antonio Royo Marín, La Virgen María, trans. by R. Grablin (Madrid, Spain: BAC, 1996), 457-458.
Fr. Antonio Royo Marin's Commentary on the Hail Mary, pt. 8: "Holy Mary, Mother of God"
Holy Mary, Mother of God
These words begin the second part of the Hail Mary, which does not appear in the Gospels. Now, we have already noted in the first part of this commentary that the second part of the prayer began to appear in the 14th century, but it was not used universally until the reform of the Roman Breviary, promulgated by Pope St. Pius V in 1568. We pick up again the pious commentary of Fr. Barcón:
1. Holy Mary. God values the sanctity of Mary more than her maternity. Hence, I should prefer Mary to be holy before being the Mother of God. And for this reason, the Church firstly calls her "Holy Mary." And in the litanies we place her sanctity before her other prerogatives, saying: Holy Mary, Holy Mother of God, Holy Virgin of virgins. And it is before holiness that the angels and archangels, the cherubim and seraphim, unceasingly sing before God in heaven: Sanctus, Sanctus, Sanctus [Holy, Holy, Holy]!
Mary is holy because she faithfully fulfilled the will of God in all things. She is holy because, after her Son, nobody had the same degree of charity, the same humility, the same patience, or any of the other virtues to the same degree as her. She is holy in her conception, in her life, in her death. Holy in Bethlehem, in Egypt, in Nazareth, at Calvary.
Holy Mary, obtain for us from your Son celestial light to deem holiness above all the goods of the earth.
We know how one degree of grace is of greater value than the entire good of the universe combined. We ought never waste the occasion to augment our virtues, and we ought to understand the glory that awaits in heaven for all eternity to a single work of virtue. We must believe within that we have come to earth for no other purpose than to be holy. We have come neither to be rich, nor to be praised, nor to be entertained, nor to pursue a happy life, comfortable, and more or less free of faults [as society deems them], but we are here to be chaste, humble, mortified, meek, obedient to the law of God. This is our obligation and our bliss.
2. Mother of God. No mother is a seraphim or cherubim, but all things and the celestial hierarchies are of the Lord and God. No mother is powerful, rich, the owner of great treasures and possessions, nor is any mother the master of the earth and the seas, of the air and the depths of the abyss, of the stars and the clouds, of the birds and the fields.
But the Mother of God is to be a Mother under whose care are all things: those things which, like bodies, perish, and those things which, like souls, are immortal. The Mother of God is to possess, after God, the loftiest dignity, sanctity, goodness, loving-kindness, and power. The Mother of God is to be the Mother most pure, without original sin; the Mother most chaste, the Mother most amiable, the Mother most admirable, the Mother of all Christians, the Mother of the Creator, the Mother of the Savior, the Mother of Beautiful Love, the Mother of divine grace.
3. The Mother of God is our Mother as well. We ought to recall that the life of grace was communicated to us by Mary's Son in Redemption.
Because Christ is head of the Mystical Body, of which we are the members, Mary is our Mother. Because at the foot of the Cross Christ said to Mary, "Woman, behold your son," and we are the adopted sons of God by grace, Mary is our Mother.
And for these reasons we are obliged to reciprocate: She to love us, to defend us, to raise us, to teach us; we to love her, invoke her, reverence her, to present ourselves to her.
He who will not be safeguarded by Mary will be lost; he who will not be led by Mary will walk as a blind man; and he who will not love Mary will not know Jesus, nor will he be preserved in grace, nor will he enter glory, for She is the gate of heaven: ianua cæli [the door of heaven].
Mary, Mother of grace, Mother of mercy, defend us from the enemy and receive us at the hour of death. Show yourself to be a Mother; bring our petitions before Him who, born for us, desired to be your Son.
Source: Fr. Antonio Royo Marín, La Virgen María, trans. by R. Grablin (Madrid, Spain: BAC, 1996), 456-457.
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