The following is a wonderful application of the Aristotelian-Thomistic notion of virtue to culture and taste: a truly virtuous man takes delight in doing the good. A sign of his lingering viciousness is if he still finds it distasteful to do the good. And St. Thomas further suggests that art disposes us either to good or evil by how it affects us.
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Now, pardon me for telling you frankly, you cannot have good architecture merely by asking people’s advice on occasion. All good architecture is the expression of national life and character; and it is produced by a prevalent and eager national taste, or desire for beauty. And I want you to think a little of the deep significance of this word ‘taste;’ for no statement of mine has been more earnestly or oftener controverted than that good taste is essentially a moral quality. ‘No,’ say many of my antagonists, ‘taste is one thing, morality is another. Tell us what is pretty; we shall be glad to know that; but preach no sermons to us.’
Permit me, therefore, to fortify this old dogma of mine somewhat. Taste is not only a part and an index of morality — it is the only morality. The first, and last, and closest trial question to any living creature is, ‘What do you like?’ Tell me what you like, and I’ll tell you what you are. Go out into the street, and ask the first man or woman you meet, what their ‘taste’ is, and if they answer candidly, you know them, body and soul. ‘You, my friend in the rags, with the unsteady gait, what do you like?’ ‘A pipe and a quartern of gin.’ I know you. ‘You, good woman, with the quick step and tidy bonnet, what do you like?’ ‘A swept hearth and a clean tea-table, and my husband opposite me, and a baby at my breast.’ Good, I know you also. ‘You, little girl with the golden hair and the soft eyes, what do you like?’ ‘My canary, and a run among the wood hyacinths.’ ‘You, little boy with the dirty hands and the low forehead, what do you like?’ ‘A shy at the sparrows, and a game at pitch-farthing.’ Good; we know them all now. What more need we ask?
‘Nay,’ perhaps you answer: ‘we need rather to ask what these people and children do, than what they like. If they do right, it is no matter that they like what is wrong; and if they do wrong, it is no matter that they like what is right. Doing is the great thing; and it does not matter that the man likes drinking, so that he does not drink; nor that the little girl likes to be kind to her canary, if she will not learn her lessons; nor that the little boy likes throwing stones at the sparrows, if he goes to the Sunday school.’ Indeed, for a short time, and in a provisional sense, this is true. For if, resolutely, people do what is right, in time they come to like doing it. But they only are in a right moral state when they have come to like doing it; and as long as they don’t like it, they are still in a vicious state. The man is not in health of body who is always thirsting for the bottle in the cupboard, though he bravely bears his thirst; but the man who heartily enjoys water in the morning and wine in the evening, each in its proper quantity and time. And the entire object of true education is to make people not merely do the right things, but enjoy the right things — not merely industrious, but to love industry — not merely learned, but to love knowledge — not merely pure, but to love purity — not merely just, but to hunger and thirst after justice.
But you may answer or think, ‘Is the liking for outside ornaments, — for pictures, or statues, or furniture, or architecture, — a moral quality?’ Yes, most surely, if a rightly set liking. Taste for any pictures or statues is not a moral quality, but taste for good ones is. Only here again we have to define the word ‘good.’ I don’t mean by ‘good,’ clever — or learned — or difficult in the doing. Take a picture by Teniers, of sots quarrelling over their dice: it is an entirely clever picture; so clever that nothing in its kind has ever been done equal to it; but it is also an entirely base and evil picture. It is an expression of delight in the prolonged contemplation of a vile thing, and delight in that is an ‘unmannered,’ or ‘immoral’ quality. It is ‘bad taste’ in the profoundest sense — it is the taste of the devils. On the other hand, a picture of Titian’s, or a Greek statue, or a Greek coin, or a Turner landscape, expresses delight in the perpetual contemplation of a good and perfect thing. That is an entirely moral quality — it is the taste of the angels. And all delight in art, and all love of it, resolve themselves into simple love of that which deserves love. That deserving is the quality which we call ‘loveliness’ — (we ought to have an opposite word, hateliness, to be said of the things which deserve to be hated); and it is not an indifferent nor optional thing whether we love this or that; but it is just the vital function of all our being. What we like determines what we are, and is the sign of what we are; and to teach taste is inevitably to form character. As I was thinking over this, in walking up Fleet Street the other day, my eye caught the title of a book standing open in a bookseller’s window. It was — ‘On the necessity of the diffusion of taste among all classes.’ ‘Ah,’ I thought to myself, ‘my classifying friend, when you have diffused your taste, where will your classes be? The man who likes what you like, belongs to the same class with you, I think. Inevitably so. You may put him to other work if you choose; but, by the condition you have brought him into, he will dislike the other work as much as you would yourself. You get hold of a scavenger, or a costermonger, who enjoyed the Newgate Calendar for literature, and “Pop goes the Weasel” for music. You think you can make him like Dante and Beethoven? I wish you joy of your lessons; but if you do, you have made a gentleman of him:— he won’t like to go back to his costermongering.’
And so completely and unexceptionally is this so, that, if I had time to-night, I could show you that a nation cannot be affected by any vice, or weakness, without expressing it, legibly, and for ever, either in bad art, or by want of art; and that there is no national virtue, small or great, which is not manifestly expressed in all the art which circumstances enable the people possessing that virtue to produce.
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Source: John Ruskin, "Traffic," in The Crown of Wild Olive. Found at https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/r/ruskin/john/crown/lecture2.html
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James Spates's comment on the above passage when he was a professor:
On the not too distant past, I often read the Ruskin passage below to my students; after which, I passed out copies of it. I told them they could easily test out what he had in mind. They could go back to their dorm rooms and take a careful look at the posters, art, or pictures they had put on their walls and make a list of them. That done, they could make a second list: Of the music--titles of albums, songs, names of artists--they listened to regularly. Then they could make a third list: Of all the things they had posted on Facebook and Twitter during the past week. After that--always trying to get them to do a little sociology!--I suggested they might go and do the same sort of gazing at their friends' dorm room walls, asking those familiars to create similar lists of their own music favorites and social media "interactions," an request which, surely, these friends, being such, would be more than happy to oblige. (As it turned out, some of these folks weren't so eager to be friendly regarding such requests.) The last step was obvious: After thinking carefully about what was on their own walls and in their lists and comparing these with whatever friends' versions they had collected, they'd have a fairly accurate sense of what their, and these others', tastes were. I can honestly say that not a few of my young reporters reported being fairly appalled at what their taste appeared to be, appalled by what they found, or did not find, on the lists! (It might be useful to generate such lists ourselves.)
Source: http://www.victorianweb.org/authors/ruskin/spates5.html
Saturday, July 6, 2019
Wednesday, May 1, 2019
Accepting the Pre-1955 Holy Week Requires Accepting the Novus Ordo
[Emphases mine.]
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Source: Arturo Vasquez, "Notes on Liturgical Maximalism," Reditus blog, April 30, 2019, https://arturovasquez.wordpress.com/2019/04/30/notes-on-liturgical-maximalism/.
Tuesday, April 30, 2019
Warning of Eugenio Cardinal Pacelli (Pope Pius XII) at Notre Dame de Paris (1937)
Be vigilant! Yes, there are many who, like the apostles in Gethsemane the moment their Master was about to be arrested, seem to fall asleep in their blind unconsciousness, convinced that the threat hanging upon the world does not affect them, that they bear no responsibility and run no risk in the crisis in which the universe struggles in anguish. … How many remain deaf and inert to Christ’s warning to his own Apostles: Vigilate et orate ut non intretis in tentationem! … Be vigilant!
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Source: Luiz Sérgio Solimeo, "ISIS and a Jesuit Priest Rejoice as Notre Dame Burns," The American TFP, April 23, 2019, https://www.tfp.org/isis-and-a-jesuit-priest-rejoice-as-notre-dame-burns/.
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Source: Luiz Sérgio Solimeo, "ISIS and a Jesuit Priest Rejoice as Notre Dame Burns," The American TFP, April 23, 2019, https://www.tfp.org/isis-and-a-jesuit-priest-rejoice-as-notre-dame-burns/.
Leo XIII on When Christendom Existed
There was once a time when States were governed by the philosophy of the Gospel. Then it was that the power and divine virtue of Christian wisdom had diffused itself throughout the laws, institutions, and morals of the people, permeating all ranks and relations of civil society. Then, too, the religion instituted by Jesus Christ, established firmly in befitting dignity, flourished everywhere, by the favor of princes and the legitimate protection of magistrates; and Church and State were happily united in concord and friendly interchange of good offices. The State, constituted in this wise, bore fruits important beyond all expectation, whose remembrance is still, and always will be, in renown, witnessed to as they are by countless proofs which can never be blotted out or ever obscured by any craft of any enemies.
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Source: Leo XII, Encyclical Immortale Dei, Nov. 1, 1885, no. 21, http://w2.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_01111885_immortale-dei.html.
Wednesday, April 24, 2019
Aleister Crowley on the Signs of the Age of Horus
Horus rules the present period of 2,000 years, beginning in 1904. Everywhere his government is taking root. Observe for yourselves the decay of the sense of sin, the growth of innocence and irresponsibility, the strange modifications of the reproductive instinct with a tendency to become bi-sexual or epicene, the childlike confidence in progress combined with nightmare fear of catastrophe, against which we are yet half unwilling to take precautions.
Consider the outcrop of dictatorships, only possible when moral growth is in its earliest stages, and the prevalence of infantile cults like Communism, Fascism, Pacifism, Health Crazes, Occultism in nearly all its forms, religions sentimentalized to the point of practical extinction.
Consider the popularity of the cinema, the wireless, the football pools and guessing competitions, all devices for soothing fractious infants, no seed of purpose in them.
Consider sport, the babyish enthusiasms and rages which it excites, whole nations disturbed by disputes between boys.
Consider war, the atrocities which occur daily and leave us unmoved and hardly worried.
We are children.
Consider the outcrop of dictatorships, only possible when moral growth is in its earliest stages, and the prevalence of infantile cults like Communism, Fascism, Pacifism, Health Crazes, Occultism in nearly all its forms, religions sentimentalized to the point of practical extinction.
Consider the popularity of the cinema, the wireless, the football pools and guessing competitions, all devices for soothing fractious infants, no seed of purpose in them.
Consider sport, the babyish enthusiasms and rages which it excites, whole nations disturbed by disputes between boys.
Consider war, the atrocities which occur daily and leave us unmoved and hardly worried.
We are children.
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Source: Aleister Crowley, The Book of Law and the Book of Lies (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2017), 7.
The Book of Law, of which the above is an excerpt, was originally published in 1938.
Wednesday, January 23, 2019
Fr. Ripperger RIPS a Fellow Exorcist Priest – A Response
A response to Okie Traditionalist's post "Fr. Ripperger RIPS a Fellow Exorcist Priest": https://okietraditionalist.blogspot.com/2019/01/fr-ripperger-rips-fellow-exorcist-priest.html
Update: It seems Okie Traditionalist has blocked me from accessing his blog and also not posted my response, despite claims that the comment box would be open for thoughts about this issue. Comments were welcome except the unwelcome ones such as the one below. Seems only a further proof of what I was saying: too sensitive. This isn't an ad hominem. I address each of his points with a reasoned argument. It's a response given in good will and intended for constructive consideration.
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I can't tell if this is a joke or serious, but will respond as if it is serious.
My opinion is you seem to be way too sensitive to Fr. R's comments. It was a joke, an obvious joke. Everyone in the recording took it as a joke—they laughed. Should they apologize too? Did it use hyperbole to make its point? Yes, but jokes often do that. Honestly, this type of reaction to a joke is what you see with stereotypical SJWs and snowflake liberal millennials. Was it a joke made in poor taste? Was it even particularly funny? Ok fine. But honestly, shameful behavior? If this is shameful behavior, then what would you call how Catholic prelates have dealt with the sex abuse scandals, going all the way to Pope Francis himself? What would you even call the behavior of actual celebrity priests like Fr. James Martin, SJ? Shouldn't we reserve words like "shameful" for behavior that is...well, actually shameful?
There's nothing unusual about Fr. R's tone here; he's speaking with the same cadence he always brings to his talks. Maybe that tone annoys you, but to each his own in that case.
Your first paragraph doesn't make much sense. You admit Harry Potter has witches, witchcraft, etc., and then say so does a lot of other children's books, thus repeating one of the objections Fr. R has already responded to—yet as if he hadn't responded to it.
There is a world of difference in the atmosphere that surrounds the use of magic between classical children's fables and literature and modern, post-New Age portrayals of magic. Even secular critics have pointed this out. It's not the result of navel-gazing, overly sheltered, tin foil hat wearing, conspiracy theorist types. Aside from Harry Potter, another clear example of this difference would be iterations of Sabrina the Teenage Witch. Now with the Netflix version, the dangerous use of magic is part and parcel of empowering women in the age of #MeToo. It is also tied explicitly to satanic practices. It's blatant propaganda and garbage with serious spiritual effects.
But where your paragraph is contradictory is that you end it by saying: "While talking about such a serious subject?" But you just dismissed the issue as non serious because of the presence of witchcraft in lots of literature. This is an obvious strawman. The issue isn't whether a witch is present; it is how the magic is portrayed that is problematic.
And this leads to the problem with your analogy: it's too weak. If witchcraft is indeed a serious issue as you somewhat suggest in your first paragraph, then it would be more correct to compare it to medical professionals discussing a very serious health issue, such as a life-threatening cancer. And if the vast majority of the medical profession, having studied the issue, concludes that the issue is serious and life-threatening in the vast majority of cases and give us a series of steps to prevent said issue and maintain good health, we the laity would be the worse off for ignoring them. If one such professional disagreed with the established majority, we would have to see if there is legitimately good reason to do so.
If magic is not a serious issue, then this is like doctors discussing the health impact of eating too many potato chips. In such a case, obviously for one doctor to accuse another doctor of "not being worth his weight in salt" would be a bit extreme and certainly unprofessional. Would that be a "rip"? Well, it depends on context, such as when and where and how the statement was made. Between two friends and colleagues, it might be a lighthearted jab, etc.
Is this really a way to disagree with a fellow exorcist? If the issue is serious, that is, may even affect salvation of souls, then YES. In fact, Fr. R could have been a lot more serious and heavy about it. Charity would demand it. In the context of the audio, and from how the audience responded, it's clear that Fr. R was not "ripping" (to make a bad pun off his name), but merely "ribbing." It was clearly a joke that charitably covered over the fact that, if this is a potential salvation issue practically for people, then Fr. R could have skipped the joke and stated the plain truth, as a serious and ethical medical professional would tell the plain truth about the seriousness of a life-threatening health issue.
As Aquinas says: The salvation of the multitude is to be preferred to the peace of any individuals whatsoever. Consequently, when certain ones, by their perverseness, hinder the salvation of the multitude, the preacher and the teacher should not fear to offend those men, in order that he may insure the salvation of the multitude (Summa Th. 3.42.2).
If Fr. R uses his "celebrity" status to promote the right view of the issue, we should praise his proper use of his reputation for promoting the truth and well-being of souls. I find it strange that you would call him a celebrity, importing very problematic secular notions into his ministry as a traditional priest. By any conscientious conservative analysis, celebrity culture and status are overwhelmingly negative and problematic. Even from a Marxist point of view, there is much to be criticized. Hence why would you attach that label to Fr. R? Or to any good priest for that matter? Rhetorically you seem to be implying an ad hominem here, that perhaps his celebrity status has gotten to his head, or that good theologians shouldn't be well known? I don't know what you're going for by calling him a celebrity, but I can't see where the charity is in that.
Fr. R says almost every exorcist he knows agrees that Harry Potter is dangerous and should be avoided. If this is a serious issue, if it is dangerous, and if the exorcists are in agreement, it seems incumbent on Fr. R to be as clear as possible on this issue. He is doing the public good by making this clear, especially for laity who need the authority and expertise of such priests. He would in fact be acting in an objectively shameful way if he HID the truth because he was embarrassed to point out that there are naysayers, even among exorcists, about the spiritual harm of magic.
Is this "shameful" behavior? Even if it's granted that Harry Potter is not a serious source of harm, at most Fr. R is clearly making a passing joke that lasts less than five seconds. And what is the name of the priest mocked? I don't know from the audio you shared, which comes from several years ago. Who is seriously going to take the time to look that priest up and them continue a smear campaign? What have been the negative consequences of Fr. R's passing joke on this priest's ministry? Anything at all? But here you are publicly blowing up a passing joke Fr. R made several years ago? It's easy to find faults in the person in the limelight.
But regardless, what Fr. R said hardly counts as "ripping." To suggest so reminds me of the increasingly frequent clickbait titles one finds in the media and on Youtube of some person "ripping apart" some opponent, and the disappointment that half of these titles are greatly or fully exaggerated. Retract and publicly apologize? To whom? The priest in question? Then why does the apology have to be public? And how do you know that Fr. R hasn't apologized? Do you keep close tabs on his private and public life?
To repeat, if the matter is serious, it's best that we laity know about it since we are the ones raising families and determining what our children will be exposed to. If anything, it would be a shame if that one exorcist who said Harry Potter isn't dangerous led other parents and children into spiritual harm! So I say, good for Fr. R for warning us. This is serious stuff. We should firstly be disposed to listen to someone like Fr. R who has training and experience.
Finally, what seems shameful is to open up speculation in a relatively well-known blog about private matters, i.e. about Fr. R's exorcist society, especially based on one person's overly sensitive reaction to a passing joke made years ago! Isn't this a textbook example of gossip?
Update: It seems Okie Traditionalist has blocked me from accessing his blog and also not posted my response, despite claims that the comment box would be open for thoughts about this issue. Comments were welcome except the unwelcome ones such as the one below. Seems only a further proof of what I was saying: too sensitive. This isn't an ad hominem. I address each of his points with a reasoned argument. It's a response given in good will and intended for constructive consideration.
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I can't tell if this is a joke or serious, but will respond as if it is serious.
My opinion is you seem to be way too sensitive to Fr. R's comments. It was a joke, an obvious joke. Everyone in the recording took it as a joke—they laughed. Should they apologize too? Did it use hyperbole to make its point? Yes, but jokes often do that. Honestly, this type of reaction to a joke is what you see with stereotypical SJWs and snowflake liberal millennials. Was it a joke made in poor taste? Was it even particularly funny? Ok fine. But honestly, shameful behavior? If this is shameful behavior, then what would you call how Catholic prelates have dealt with the sex abuse scandals, going all the way to Pope Francis himself? What would you even call the behavior of actual celebrity priests like Fr. James Martin, SJ? Shouldn't we reserve words like "shameful" for behavior that is...well, actually shameful?
There's nothing unusual about Fr. R's tone here; he's speaking with the same cadence he always brings to his talks. Maybe that tone annoys you, but to each his own in that case.
Your first paragraph doesn't make much sense. You admit Harry Potter has witches, witchcraft, etc., and then say so does a lot of other children's books, thus repeating one of the objections Fr. R has already responded to—yet as if he hadn't responded to it.
There is a world of difference in the atmosphere that surrounds the use of magic between classical children's fables and literature and modern, post-New Age portrayals of magic. Even secular critics have pointed this out. It's not the result of navel-gazing, overly sheltered, tin foil hat wearing, conspiracy theorist types. Aside from Harry Potter, another clear example of this difference would be iterations of Sabrina the Teenage Witch. Now with the Netflix version, the dangerous use of magic is part and parcel of empowering women in the age of #MeToo. It is also tied explicitly to satanic practices. It's blatant propaganda and garbage with serious spiritual effects.
But where your paragraph is contradictory is that you end it by saying: "While talking about such a serious subject?" But you just dismissed the issue as non serious because of the presence of witchcraft in lots of literature. This is an obvious strawman. The issue isn't whether a witch is present; it is how the magic is portrayed that is problematic.
And this leads to the problem with your analogy: it's too weak. If witchcraft is indeed a serious issue as you somewhat suggest in your first paragraph, then it would be more correct to compare it to medical professionals discussing a very serious health issue, such as a life-threatening cancer. And if the vast majority of the medical profession, having studied the issue, concludes that the issue is serious and life-threatening in the vast majority of cases and give us a series of steps to prevent said issue and maintain good health, we the laity would be the worse off for ignoring them. If one such professional disagreed with the established majority, we would have to see if there is legitimately good reason to do so.
If magic is not a serious issue, then this is like doctors discussing the health impact of eating too many potato chips. In such a case, obviously for one doctor to accuse another doctor of "not being worth his weight in salt" would be a bit extreme and certainly unprofessional. Would that be a "rip"? Well, it depends on context, such as when and where and how the statement was made. Between two friends and colleagues, it might be a lighthearted jab, etc.
Is this really a way to disagree with a fellow exorcist? If the issue is serious, that is, may even affect salvation of souls, then YES. In fact, Fr. R could have been a lot more serious and heavy about it. Charity would demand it. In the context of the audio, and from how the audience responded, it's clear that Fr. R was not "ripping" (to make a bad pun off his name), but merely "ribbing." It was clearly a joke that charitably covered over the fact that, if this is a potential salvation issue practically for people, then Fr. R could have skipped the joke and stated the plain truth, as a serious and ethical medical professional would tell the plain truth about the seriousness of a life-threatening health issue.
As Aquinas says: The salvation of the multitude is to be preferred to the peace of any individuals whatsoever. Consequently, when certain ones, by their perverseness, hinder the salvation of the multitude, the preacher and the teacher should not fear to offend those men, in order that he may insure the salvation of the multitude (Summa Th. 3.42.2).
If Fr. R uses his "celebrity" status to promote the right view of the issue, we should praise his proper use of his reputation for promoting the truth and well-being of souls. I find it strange that you would call him a celebrity, importing very problematic secular notions into his ministry as a traditional priest. By any conscientious conservative analysis, celebrity culture and status are overwhelmingly negative and problematic. Even from a Marxist point of view, there is much to be criticized. Hence why would you attach that label to Fr. R? Or to any good priest for that matter? Rhetorically you seem to be implying an ad hominem here, that perhaps his celebrity status has gotten to his head, or that good theologians shouldn't be well known? I don't know what you're going for by calling him a celebrity, but I can't see where the charity is in that.
Fr. R says almost every exorcist he knows agrees that Harry Potter is dangerous and should be avoided. If this is a serious issue, if it is dangerous, and if the exorcists are in agreement, it seems incumbent on Fr. R to be as clear as possible on this issue. He is doing the public good by making this clear, especially for laity who need the authority and expertise of such priests. He would in fact be acting in an objectively shameful way if he HID the truth because he was embarrassed to point out that there are naysayers, even among exorcists, about the spiritual harm of magic.
Is this "shameful" behavior? Even if it's granted that Harry Potter is not a serious source of harm, at most Fr. R is clearly making a passing joke that lasts less than five seconds. And what is the name of the priest mocked? I don't know from the audio you shared, which comes from several years ago. Who is seriously going to take the time to look that priest up and them continue a smear campaign? What have been the negative consequences of Fr. R's passing joke on this priest's ministry? Anything at all? But here you are publicly blowing up a passing joke Fr. R made several years ago? It's easy to find faults in the person in the limelight.
But regardless, what Fr. R said hardly counts as "ripping." To suggest so reminds me of the increasingly frequent clickbait titles one finds in the media and on Youtube of some person "ripping apart" some opponent, and the disappointment that half of these titles are greatly or fully exaggerated. Retract and publicly apologize? To whom? The priest in question? Then why does the apology have to be public? And how do you know that Fr. R hasn't apologized? Do you keep close tabs on his private and public life?
To repeat, if the matter is serious, it's best that we laity know about it since we are the ones raising families and determining what our children will be exposed to. If anything, it would be a shame if that one exorcist who said Harry Potter isn't dangerous led other parents and children into spiritual harm! So I say, good for Fr. R for warning us. This is serious stuff. We should firstly be disposed to listen to someone like Fr. R who has training and experience.
Finally, what seems shameful is to open up speculation in a relatively well-known blog about private matters, i.e. about Fr. R's exorcist society, especially based on one person's overly sensitive reaction to a passing joke made years ago! Isn't this a textbook example of gossip?
Friday, December 28, 2018
Thurber M. Smith, Education for Democracy (1941)
[200] [Footnote attached to the article title: A paper read at a conference on educating in democratic principles at St. Louis University, October 1940. Presidents and representatives of forty-one institutions of higher learning attended. We are pleased to print this paper with its careful and scholarly analysis of a subject which is receiving foremost attention by the country's educators. A university president stated recently, "I am convinced that the schools of this country have not earnestly and intelligently considered the nature of their responsibility in the transmission of our (American) culture in its basic social, political, and moral ingredients."]
What the future holds none of us can foretell, but one need not be a prophet to see that in all probability the next five or ten years will be among the most vitally important in the history of our nation. The things to be done, the legislation to be adopted, the leadership to be developed, our response to the problems and events that lie ahead of us in the struggle between dictatorship and democracy will inevitably modify, if not fashion, a pattern of life for us all and for our children’s children.
We, who are charged with the responsibility of education, have a duty whose importance cannot be overestimated. To us has been given the opportunity, and to us has been entrusted the sacred duty of guiding and influencing others, during the formative period of their lives. Hence, our judgments, our words, and our actions must be based not upon the emotions but upon real understanding of the issues and problems with which we as a nation are confronted.
Today we are engaged in the preliminary stages of a program of national defense. The questions confronting us transcend the interest of any party, section, or group. They affect on the one hand our political, economic, and cultural relations with other peoples of the world, and on the other hand our very doctrines and traditional views concerning the scopes and functions of our government.
It is not without profit, therefore, that in these troubled times we recall to ourselves and to those who come under our influence some of the fundamental principles which if adhered to will preserve our American way of life.
During the past few years it has become clearer that the structure of the modern world is changing. These changes are perhaps more observable in the political and economic order, but there is no doubt that they have affected, or will in time affect, the foundations of the moral and religious order as well.
[201] One of the most striking features of this changing structure is the diminishing stature of the individual human being and the increasing importance of the group. No longer is the state conceived of as the mere umpire of disputes nor a policeman to suppress open discord. The modern state, whether it be looked upon as the organ of the proletarian class as in Russia, or a racial group as in Germany, or the incarnation of national and political aspirations and ideals as in Italy, is considered to be the one social reality which absorbs the individual and replaces all other forms of social organization. It is its own absolute end and knows no law higher than its own interests. Its claims embrace the whole life of the individual whom it insists upon moulding [sic] and guiding from the cradle to the grave, in order that it may make him the obedient instrument of its will.
This, of course, is one answer to the perennial problem which has confronted human beings from the beginning of social life—the problem, namely, of coordinating the forces of liberty and authority so as to attain the highest degree of social happiness. But it is an answer which is not acceptable; the answer of tyranny. A problem is not resolved by suppressing one of its terms. However vague and ill defined our concepts of authority and liberty may be we realize at once that they are at the same time complementary and opposed: opposed in the sense that they undoubtedly restrict each other; complementary because they really support and protect each other. Unrestricted liberty is abusive license; while unlimited authority necessarily implies the negation of both liberty and authority as well as the destruction of society. Liberty and license are as far apart as liberty and tyranny; indeed license breeds tyranny. It would be no exaggeration to say that the essential question for every social group is that of combining liberty and authority properly.
In all discussions concerning the relations of the individual and the state we find, I think, that the source of differences of opinion will be found in our varying ideas of what human nature is. As Aristotle warns us of the danger of a little error at the beginning of philosophical discussions so from this source momentous consequence can grow.
There are, I think, two fundamental positions which may be taken concerning the nature of man. According to one, man is the product of a material evolutionary process, or man, nature and that entity which some thinkers are pleased to call God are identified in the same reality which is undergoing a process of emergent evolution. If this is true, then, of course, the whole Christian point of view is a delusion. The human being is not the result of creation nor may he look forward to union with God. He has no inalienable rights resulting from his divine origin and destiny, but he is completely subordinated to the state or [202] organized group which is the highest manifestation of the emergent absolute. Right and wrong and the laws commanding the one and forbidding the other are no longer based on eternal plans but merely represent the exigencies of an ephemeral situation.
The other fundamental point of view can, I think, be summed up in the memorable words of the Declaration of Independence, "We hold these truths to be self-evident—that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and pursuit of happines [sic]. That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it and to institute a new government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.” In this passage, I think, we find, to a large extent, the gist of our philosophy of government. First of all, our attention is called to the fact that we are children of God, created by Him and endowed with certain inalienable rights; rights which are given to us as so many means of returning to Him. We are brought face to face with two basic truths, our own human dignity and our divine destiny, and in these truths lie the explanation of all rights.
We are made by God in His own image and likeness and are destined to be happy with Him for all eternity. Indeed we are given life in order that we may freely pursue and attain everlasting happiness. In other words there are at least three basic rights which man may rightly claim in virtue of a divine heritage. They are life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness.
This is the doctrine that our Declaration of Independence sets forth. It asserts, moreover, that governments (in God’s plan at least) are not instituted for their own selfish ends, but that they are instituted by men under the influence of a natural urge which impels them to live in society in order to secure and protect their rights and to attain their safety and happiness.
In other words the objective of man’s existence, although it means personal individual effort, is not to be attained by him in isolation from his fellows. By means of mutual assistance and cooperation with his fellowmen, man can arrive at a fuller actualization of his powers and capacities than would ever be possible by his own unaided efforts. His needs cannot be met or safeguarded except in the broader frame-work of civil or political society. Hence, civil society or the state is a normal postulate of man’s nature and destiny, an institution whose very raison [203] d'etre is the procuring of those advantages which correspond to the social nature of man, and hence to the intentions and plans of the Author and Creator of that nature.
The question, however, which concerns us more directly at the present moment is that of the limits of the authority of the state or organized group, or more generally the relations between the individual human being and the group of which he is a part. Admitting the evident difficulty of fixing the limits to civil authority in many specific cases, still there are some principles that may help as guides to their solution.
In the first place it is true that the human being is an individual and as such is a part of the group, but the human being is something more than an individual—he is a person, that is, an individual of a free, rational nature and, as such, self-directing and master of his own acts. His dignity comes from the fact that he is a person, not from the fact that he is an individual.
The state, on the other hand, is not a mere collection of identical irresponsible individuals; it is an organism involving the mutual dependence and responsibility of its members. It does not exist merely as an instrument to serve man’s needs and desires. It is an order, a sacred order if you will, in which and by which human activities are conformed to the Law of God. It is, in other words, a social expression of God’s will.
The end or purpose of the state is, of course, the attainment of the temporal felicity of all its members by the cooperation of all. By temporal felicity is meant peace and prosperity or, to use the Scholastic expression, the "bonum commune,” that ensemble of conditions necessary for its members’ or subjects’ well-being and happiness. Now this common good in the temporal order is not only material but moral in its scope. While it has a distinctive character and integrity of its own arising from its temporal end, it must not be forgotten that such an end in the Christian view is not final but intermediate. It is true that the function of the state is not precisely to guide men to Eternal Life, still its function is essentially subordinate to that ultimate end and, hence, in a very true sense it does foster the beginnings of something which transcends its own nature. It may be said, therefore, quite correctly that its purpose is to aid men to arrive at the perfection of which they are capable and not merely to aid them but to direct them and direct them authoritatively.
It seems obvious that no society, whatever its character, can accomplish its task unless it possesses authority to repress abuses and direct its members to the ends for which its was instituted. There can be no society without authority; and since human nature and the Author of [204] nature demand society, they require also the authority. Without attempting a complete analysis of the functions of authority we may describe it according to the common concepts as a moral power or right residing in a person to issue commands which are to be taken as rules of conduct by the free will of other persons.
It is to be noted: (1) That authority is not an impersonal necessity; it resides in a lawgiver. (2) It is not to be confused with physical force or coercion. Coercion may become an instrument of authority (as may persuasion) but it is not to be identified with authority as such. Such an identification leads logically to the conclusion that "might makes right." (3) Authority is not a mere substitute for deficiencies on the part of those ruled by it so that if deficiences [sic] were to disappear authority would vanish. Indeed if this were so, then theoretically anarchy would be the best government.
The essential function of authority is to provide a fixed principle assuring unity of action in a social group. Even supposing a group of adults, all intelligent and of perfect good will, that is, not handicapped by deficiencies, authority would still have its place. The group is aiming at some objective which will be a common good for all. That is part of the very concept of society. Such an object obviously demands common action arising from some decision which binds all the members. Such a decision obviously may be the unanimous agreement. But there can never be any guarantee of unanimity of judgment; it is always precarious and casual. Any member can disagree with the others. Hence the unity of action required by the pursuit of the common good will be ceaselessly jeopardized unless all agree to follow one decision and only one, whether issued by a single individual or a selected part of the group. To submit to the legitimate and reasonable requirements of civil society is to obey the order of human nature in the same sense that it is obeying the law of man’s nature to put into practice the essential duties of family life and to respect the property and rights of others.
The human mind, however, seems to find it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to face an antinomy without worshipping one or the other of its terms. Unfortunately there is a tendency among many to overemphasize the antinomic character of liberty and authority, while overlooking their complementary character. There seems to be a widespread acceptance of the assumption that growth of freedom and the decay of authority are synonymous terms; that we can have one only at the expense of the other but not both. That is why the world has oscillated between the extremes of apotheosizing the individual and deifying the group. It is not and cannot be true that we are doomed to fluctuate between tyranny and unbridled license.
[205] The exercise of authority is not necessarily an unreasonable invasion of personal liberty. The end of social life is not merely to preserve and extend freedom of choice. Freedom is not really an end in itself but a means to something else—happiness.
On the other hand, if all individual autonomy, all individual freedom of choice, is completely merged and lost in the autonomy of the state, then the person becomes a mere sacrifice to social utility. Nor do I see how this sacrifice can be logically avoided if one remains on the plane of pure naturalism. Without ultimate reference to God it seems to me impossible to rescue the individual from complete immersion in the group because on the naturalistic assumption that the community is the absolute, the highest good, man is necessarily and totally subjected to the community. Today unfortunately many states, even some who try to reject the label totalitarian, seem to think that man is made for the state and derives all his good from the state. This is totalitarianism however labeled, and I must confess it is a perfectly logical consequence of the assumption of a humanity without God.
The Christian interpretation of man and society is based on the fact that reality transcends the material, the temporal, the purely natural; and that the whole temporal order is subordinated to spiritual ends. This does not mean that the temporal and material is of no importance—much less evil, nor does it mean that matter and spirit, time and eternity, nature and supernature are identifiable. But it must never be forgotten that the common good in the temporal order is not the ultimate end of man’s activities. The temporal order is essentially subordinated to the extra-temporal and the goods of this life to the eternal interests of human personality. It is only when we appreciate this alternating rhythm of subordination that we perceive the true status of the individual human being. Considered as an individual or a part of the temporal order he is properly subordinate to the order as a whole. That is why it may be perfectly right and just that he should surrender his temporal goods and, if necessary, even his life for the welfare of the community. That is why the community may and perhaps should impose upon him, as a part of the whole, many restraints and sacrifices. But there is a limit beyond which the state or community cannot go. They cannot infringe upon the eternal interests of those human beings who are subordinate to them only from one aspect. States and nations are creatures of time. They have existed and passed away, but the souls of those men and women who once lived in them will exist for all eternity.
This concept of the state as an institution, complementing the individual powers of man, offering him a proper environment for the fuller development of his personality and a safeguard for the rights which [206] flow from his nature, protects him from the extremes of both state absolutism and exaggerated individualism. There are many today who, like Hobbes and his leviathan or "mortall [sic] God,” look upon the state, the civil power, as the sole source of man’s rights and duties, who make temporal welfare the exclusive object of all laws and the standard of all morality. It is this absolute subordination of the whole personality of its citizens which marks the absolute state as an inhuman despotism. Either the state is omnipotent and can do everything or it cannot. If it can, you have despotism under the dictatorial, oligarchic, or democratic form, benevolent or not as may be, but despotism for all that. If it cannot, then there is something beyond its power.
The dilemma which confronts the modern man is not merely a choice between rival economic or political systems. The question is much deeper and more complex. The choice, as Christopher Dawson says, is between the mechanized order of the absolute or totalitarian state (whether it be nominally Communist or Fascist or something else) or a return to that order which asserts the primacy of the spiritual, that is the subordination of the state and of the whole temporal order to spiritual ends; a return to that concept of humanity as a great community or republic in which all work out their final destinies under the rule of God. However fantastic a dream this may appear to the modern mind, it is a concept which was once accepted without question as a principle of the European social order and the foundation upon which our western culture has been built.
---
Source: Thurber M. Smith, S.J., "Education for Democracy," Jesuit Educational Quarterly 3, no. 4 (March 1941): 200–
What the future holds none of us can foretell, but one need not be a prophet to see that in all probability the next five or ten years will be among the most vitally important in the history of our nation. The things to be done, the legislation to be adopted, the leadership to be developed, our response to the problems and events that lie ahead of us in the struggle between dictatorship and democracy will inevitably modify, if not fashion, a pattern of life for us all and for our children’s children.
We, who are charged with the responsibility of education, have a duty whose importance cannot be overestimated. To us has been given the opportunity, and to us has been entrusted the sacred duty of guiding and influencing others, during the formative period of their lives. Hence, our judgments, our words, and our actions must be based not upon the emotions but upon real understanding of the issues and problems with which we as a nation are confronted.
Today we are engaged in the preliminary stages of a program of national defense. The questions confronting us transcend the interest of any party, section, or group. They affect on the one hand our political, economic, and cultural relations with other peoples of the world, and on the other hand our very doctrines and traditional views concerning the scopes and functions of our government.
It is not without profit, therefore, that in these troubled times we recall to ourselves and to those who come under our influence some of the fundamental principles which if adhered to will preserve our American way of life.
During the past few years it has become clearer that the structure of the modern world is changing. These changes are perhaps more observable in the political and economic order, but there is no doubt that they have affected, or will in time affect, the foundations of the moral and religious order as well.
[201] One of the most striking features of this changing structure is the diminishing stature of the individual human being and the increasing importance of the group. No longer is the state conceived of as the mere umpire of disputes nor a policeman to suppress open discord. The modern state, whether it be looked upon as the organ of the proletarian class as in Russia, or a racial group as in Germany, or the incarnation of national and political aspirations and ideals as in Italy, is considered to be the one social reality which absorbs the individual and replaces all other forms of social organization. It is its own absolute end and knows no law higher than its own interests. Its claims embrace the whole life of the individual whom it insists upon moulding [sic] and guiding from the cradle to the grave, in order that it may make him the obedient instrument of its will.
This, of course, is one answer to the perennial problem which has confronted human beings from the beginning of social life—the problem, namely, of coordinating the forces of liberty and authority so as to attain the highest degree of social happiness. But it is an answer which is not acceptable; the answer of tyranny. A problem is not resolved by suppressing one of its terms. However vague and ill defined our concepts of authority and liberty may be we realize at once that they are at the same time complementary and opposed: opposed in the sense that they undoubtedly restrict each other; complementary because they really support and protect each other. Unrestricted liberty is abusive license; while unlimited authority necessarily implies the negation of both liberty and authority as well as the destruction of society. Liberty and license are as far apart as liberty and tyranny; indeed license breeds tyranny. It would be no exaggeration to say that the essential question for every social group is that of combining liberty and authority properly.
In all discussions concerning the relations of the individual and the state we find, I think, that the source of differences of opinion will be found in our varying ideas of what human nature is. As Aristotle warns us of the danger of a little error at the beginning of philosophical discussions so from this source momentous consequence can grow.
There are, I think, two fundamental positions which may be taken concerning the nature of man. According to one, man is the product of a material evolutionary process, or man, nature and that entity which some thinkers are pleased to call God are identified in the same reality which is undergoing a process of emergent evolution. If this is true, then, of course, the whole Christian point of view is a delusion. The human being is not the result of creation nor may he look forward to union with God. He has no inalienable rights resulting from his divine origin and destiny, but he is completely subordinated to the state or [202] organized group which is the highest manifestation of the emergent absolute. Right and wrong and the laws commanding the one and forbidding the other are no longer based on eternal plans but merely represent the exigencies of an ephemeral situation.
The other fundamental point of view can, I think, be summed up in the memorable words of the Declaration of Independence, "We hold these truths to be self-evident—that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and pursuit of happines [sic]. That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it and to institute a new government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.” In this passage, I think, we find, to a large extent, the gist of our philosophy of government. First of all, our attention is called to the fact that we are children of God, created by Him and endowed with certain inalienable rights; rights which are given to us as so many means of returning to Him. We are brought face to face with two basic truths, our own human dignity and our divine destiny, and in these truths lie the explanation of all rights.
We are made by God in His own image and likeness and are destined to be happy with Him for all eternity. Indeed we are given life in order that we may freely pursue and attain everlasting happiness. In other words there are at least three basic rights which man may rightly claim in virtue of a divine heritage. They are life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness.
This is the doctrine that our Declaration of Independence sets forth. It asserts, moreover, that governments (in God’s plan at least) are not instituted for their own selfish ends, but that they are instituted by men under the influence of a natural urge which impels them to live in society in order to secure and protect their rights and to attain their safety and happiness.
In other words the objective of man’s existence, although it means personal individual effort, is not to be attained by him in isolation from his fellows. By means of mutual assistance and cooperation with his fellowmen, man can arrive at a fuller actualization of his powers and capacities than would ever be possible by his own unaided efforts. His needs cannot be met or safeguarded except in the broader frame-work of civil or political society. Hence, civil society or the state is a normal postulate of man’s nature and destiny, an institution whose very raison [203] d'etre is the procuring of those advantages which correspond to the social nature of man, and hence to the intentions and plans of the Author and Creator of that nature.
The question, however, which concerns us more directly at the present moment is that of the limits of the authority of the state or organized group, or more generally the relations between the individual human being and the group of which he is a part. Admitting the evident difficulty of fixing the limits to civil authority in many specific cases, still there are some principles that may help as guides to their solution.
In the first place it is true that the human being is an individual and as such is a part of the group, but the human being is something more than an individual—he is a person, that is, an individual of a free, rational nature and, as such, self-directing and master of his own acts. His dignity comes from the fact that he is a person, not from the fact that he is an individual.
The state, on the other hand, is not a mere collection of identical irresponsible individuals; it is an organism involving the mutual dependence and responsibility of its members. It does not exist merely as an instrument to serve man’s needs and desires. It is an order, a sacred order if you will, in which and by which human activities are conformed to the Law of God. It is, in other words, a social expression of God’s will.
The end or purpose of the state is, of course, the attainment of the temporal felicity of all its members by the cooperation of all. By temporal felicity is meant peace and prosperity or, to use the Scholastic expression, the "bonum commune,” that ensemble of conditions necessary for its members’ or subjects’ well-being and happiness. Now this common good in the temporal order is not only material but moral in its scope. While it has a distinctive character and integrity of its own arising from its temporal end, it must not be forgotten that such an end in the Christian view is not final but intermediate. It is true that the function of the state is not precisely to guide men to Eternal Life, still its function is essentially subordinate to that ultimate end and, hence, in a very true sense it does foster the beginnings of something which transcends its own nature. It may be said, therefore, quite correctly that its purpose is to aid men to arrive at the perfection of which they are capable and not merely to aid them but to direct them and direct them authoritatively.
It seems obvious that no society, whatever its character, can accomplish its task unless it possesses authority to repress abuses and direct its members to the ends for which its was instituted. There can be no society without authority; and since human nature and the Author of [204] nature demand society, they require also the authority. Without attempting a complete analysis of the functions of authority we may describe it according to the common concepts as a moral power or right residing in a person to issue commands which are to be taken as rules of conduct by the free will of other persons.
It is to be noted: (1) That authority is not an impersonal necessity; it resides in a lawgiver. (2) It is not to be confused with physical force or coercion. Coercion may become an instrument of authority (as may persuasion) but it is not to be identified with authority as such. Such an identification leads logically to the conclusion that "might makes right." (3) Authority is not a mere substitute for deficiencies on the part of those ruled by it so that if deficiences [sic] were to disappear authority would vanish. Indeed if this were so, then theoretically anarchy would be the best government.
The essential function of authority is to provide a fixed principle assuring unity of action in a social group. Even supposing a group of adults, all intelligent and of perfect good will, that is, not handicapped by deficiencies, authority would still have its place. The group is aiming at some objective which will be a common good for all. That is part of the very concept of society. Such an object obviously demands common action arising from some decision which binds all the members. Such a decision obviously may be the unanimous agreement. But there can never be any guarantee of unanimity of judgment; it is always precarious and casual. Any member can disagree with the others. Hence the unity of action required by the pursuit of the common good will be ceaselessly jeopardized unless all agree to follow one decision and only one, whether issued by a single individual or a selected part of the group. To submit to the legitimate and reasonable requirements of civil society is to obey the order of human nature in the same sense that it is obeying the law of man’s nature to put into practice the essential duties of family life and to respect the property and rights of others.
The human mind, however, seems to find it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to face an antinomy without worshipping one or the other of its terms. Unfortunately there is a tendency among many to overemphasize the antinomic character of liberty and authority, while overlooking their complementary character. There seems to be a widespread acceptance of the assumption that growth of freedom and the decay of authority are synonymous terms; that we can have one only at the expense of the other but not both. That is why the world has oscillated between the extremes of apotheosizing the individual and deifying the group. It is not and cannot be true that we are doomed to fluctuate between tyranny and unbridled license.
[205] The exercise of authority is not necessarily an unreasonable invasion of personal liberty. The end of social life is not merely to preserve and extend freedom of choice. Freedom is not really an end in itself but a means to something else—happiness.
On the other hand, if all individual autonomy, all individual freedom of choice, is completely merged and lost in the autonomy of the state, then the person becomes a mere sacrifice to social utility. Nor do I see how this sacrifice can be logically avoided if one remains on the plane of pure naturalism. Without ultimate reference to God it seems to me impossible to rescue the individual from complete immersion in the group because on the naturalistic assumption that the community is the absolute, the highest good, man is necessarily and totally subjected to the community. Today unfortunately many states, even some who try to reject the label totalitarian, seem to think that man is made for the state and derives all his good from the state. This is totalitarianism however labeled, and I must confess it is a perfectly logical consequence of the assumption of a humanity without God.
The Christian interpretation of man and society is based on the fact that reality transcends the material, the temporal, the purely natural; and that the whole temporal order is subordinated to spiritual ends. This does not mean that the temporal and material is of no importance—much less evil, nor does it mean that matter and spirit, time and eternity, nature and supernature are identifiable. But it must never be forgotten that the common good in the temporal order is not the ultimate end of man’s activities. The temporal order is essentially subordinated to the extra-temporal and the goods of this life to the eternal interests of human personality. It is only when we appreciate this alternating rhythm of subordination that we perceive the true status of the individual human being. Considered as an individual or a part of the temporal order he is properly subordinate to the order as a whole. That is why it may be perfectly right and just that he should surrender his temporal goods and, if necessary, even his life for the welfare of the community. That is why the community may and perhaps should impose upon him, as a part of the whole, many restraints and sacrifices. But there is a limit beyond which the state or community cannot go. They cannot infringe upon the eternal interests of those human beings who are subordinate to them only from one aspect. States and nations are creatures of time. They have existed and passed away, but the souls of those men and women who once lived in them will exist for all eternity.
This concept of the state as an institution, complementing the individual powers of man, offering him a proper environment for the fuller development of his personality and a safeguard for the rights which [206] flow from his nature, protects him from the extremes of both state absolutism and exaggerated individualism. There are many today who, like Hobbes and his leviathan or "mortall [sic] God,” look upon the state, the civil power, as the sole source of man’s rights and duties, who make temporal welfare the exclusive object of all laws and the standard of all morality. It is this absolute subordination of the whole personality of its citizens which marks the absolute state as an inhuman despotism. Either the state is omnipotent and can do everything or it cannot. If it can, you have despotism under the dictatorial, oligarchic, or democratic form, benevolent or not as may be, but despotism for all that. If it cannot, then there is something beyond its power.
The dilemma which confronts the modern man is not merely a choice between rival economic or political systems. The question is much deeper and more complex. The choice, as Christopher Dawson says, is between the mechanized order of the absolute or totalitarian state (whether it be nominally Communist or Fascist or something else) or a return to that order which asserts the primacy of the spiritual, that is the subordination of the state and of the whole temporal order to spiritual ends; a return to that concept of humanity as a great community or republic in which all work out their final destinies under the rule of God. However fantastic a dream this may appear to the modern mind, it is a concept which was once accepted without question as a principle of the European social order and the foundation upon which our western culture has been built.
---
Source: Thurber M. Smith, S.J., "Education for Democracy," Jesuit Educational Quarterly 3, no. 4 (March 1941): 200–
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