Thurber M. Smith, Education for Democracy (1941)

[200] [Footnote attached to the article title: A paper read at a conference on educating in democratic principles at St. Louis University, October 1940. Presidents and representatives of forty-one institutions of higher learning attended. We are pleased to print this paper with its careful and scholarly analysis of a subject which is receiving foremost attention by the country's educators. A university president stated recently, "I am convinced that the schools of this country have not earnestly and intelligently considered the nature of their responsibility in the transmission of our (American) culture in its basic social, political, and moral ingredients."]

What the future holds none of us can foretell, but one need not be a prophet to see that in all probability the next five or ten years will be among the most vitally important in the history of our nation. The things to be done, the legislation to be adopted, the leadership to be developed, our response to the problems and events that lie ahead of us in the struggle between dictatorship and democracy will inevitably modify, if not fashion, a pattern of life for us all and for our children’s children.

We, who are charged with the responsibility of education, have a duty whose importance cannot be overestimated. To us has been given the opportunity, and to us has been entrusted the sacred duty of guiding and influencing others, during the formative period of their lives. Hence, our judgments, our words, and our actions must be based not upon the emotions but upon real understanding of the issues and problems with which we as a nation are confronted.

Today we are engaged in the preliminary stages of a program of national defense. The questions confronting us transcend the interest of any party, section, or group. They affect on the one hand our political, economic, and cultural relations with other peoples of the world, and on the other hand our very doctrines and traditional views concerning the scopes and functions of our government.

It is not without profit, therefore, that in these troubled times we recall to ourselves and to those who come under our influence some of the fundamental principles which if adhered to will preserve our American way of life.

During the past few years it has become clearer that the structure of the modern world is changing. These changes are perhaps more observable in the political and economic order, but there is no doubt that they have affected, or will in time affect, the foundations of the moral and religious order as well.

[201] One of the most striking features of this changing structure is the diminishing stature of the individual human being and the increasing importance of the group. No longer is the state conceived of as the mere umpire of disputes nor a policeman to suppress open discord. The modern state, whether it be looked upon as the organ of the proletarian class as in Russia, or a racial group as in Germany, or the incarnation of national and political aspirations and ideals as in Italy, is considered to be the one social reality which absorbs the individual and replaces all other forms of social organization. It is its own absolute end and knows no law higher than its own interests. Its claims embrace the whole life of the individual whom it insists upon moulding [sic] and guiding from the cradle to the grave, in order that it may make him the obedient instrument of its will.

This, of course, is one answer to the perennial problem which has confronted human beings from the beginning of social life—the problem, namely, of coordinating the forces of liberty and authority so as to attain the highest degree of social happiness. But it is an answer which is not acceptable; the answer of tyranny. A problem is not resolved by suppressing one of its terms. However vague and ill defined our concepts of authority and liberty may be we realize at once that they are at the same time complementary and opposed: opposed in the sense that they undoubtedly restrict each other; complementary because they really support and protect each other. Unrestricted liberty is abusive license; while unlimited authority necessarily implies the negation of both liberty and authority as well as the destruction of society. Liberty and license are as far apart as liberty and tyranny; indeed license breeds tyranny. It would be no exaggeration to say that the essential question for every social group is that of combining liberty and authority properly.

In all discussions concerning the relations of the individual and the state we find, I think, that the source of differences of opinion will be found in our varying ideas of what human nature is. As Aristotle warns us of the danger of a little error at the beginning of philosophical discussions so from this source momentous consequence can grow.

There are, I think, two fundamental positions which may be taken concerning the nature of man. According to one, man is the product of a material evolutionary process, or man, nature and that entity which some thinkers are pleased to call God are identified in the same reality which is undergoing a process of emergent evolution. If this is true, then, of course, the whole Christian point of view is a delusion. The human being is not the result of creation nor may he look forward to union with God. He has no inalienable rights resulting from his divine origin and destiny, but he is completely subordinated to the state or [202] organized group which is the highest manifestation of the emergent absolute. Right and wrong and the laws commanding the one and forbidding the other are no longer based on eternal plans but merely represent the exigencies of an ephemeral situation.

The other fundamental point of view can, I think, be summed up in the memorable words of the Declaration of Independence, "We hold these truths to be self-evident—that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and pursuit of happines [sic]. That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it and to institute a new government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.” In this passage, I think, we find, to a large extent, the gist of our philosophy of government. First of all, our attention is called to the fact that we are children of God, created by Him and endowed with certain inalienable rights; rights which are given to us as so many means of returning to Him. We are brought face to face with two basic truths, our own human dignity and our divine destiny, and in these truths lie the explanation of all rights.

We are made by God in His own image and likeness and are destined to be happy with Him for all eternity. Indeed we are given life in order that we may freely pursue and attain everlasting happiness. In other words there are at least three basic rights which man may rightly claim in virtue of a divine heritage. They are life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness.

This is the doctrine that our Declaration of Independence sets forth. It asserts, moreover, that governments (in God’s plan at least) are not instituted for their own selfish ends, but that they are instituted by men under the influence of a natural urge which impels them to live in society in order to secure and protect their rights and to attain their safety and happiness.

In other words the objective of man’s existence, although it means personal individual effort, is not to be attained by him in isolation from his fellows. By means of mutual assistance and cooperation with his fellowmen, man can arrive at a fuller actualization of his powers and capacities than would ever be possible by his own unaided efforts. His needs cannot be met or safeguarded except in the broader frame-work of civil or political society. Hence, civil society or the state is a normal postulate of man’s nature and destiny, an institution whose very raison [203] d'etre is the procuring of those advantages which correspond to the social nature of man, and hence to the intentions and plans of the Author and Creator of that nature.

The question, however, which concerns us more directly at the present moment is that of the limits of the authority of the state or organized group, or more generally the relations between the individual human being and the group of which he is a part. Admitting the evident difficulty of fixing the limits to civil authority in many specific cases, still there are some principles that may help as guides to their solution.

In the first place it is true that the human being is an individual and as such is a part of the group, but the human being is something more than an individual—he is a person, that is, an individual of a free, rational nature and, as such, self-directing and master of his own acts. His dignity comes from the fact that he is a person, not from the fact that he is an individual.

The state, on the other hand, is not a mere collection of identical irresponsible individuals; it is an organism involving the mutual dependence and responsibility of its members. It does not exist merely as an instrument to serve man’s needs and desires. It is an order, a sacred order if you will, in which and by which human activities are conformed to the Law of God. It is, in other words, a social expression of God’s will.

The end or purpose of the state is, of course, the attainment of the temporal felicity of all its members by the cooperation of all. By temporal felicity is meant peace and prosperity or, to use the Scholastic expression, the "bonum commune,” that ensemble of conditions necessary for its members’ or subjects’ well-being and happiness. Now this common good in the temporal order is not only material but moral in its scope. While it has a distinctive character and integrity of its own arising from its temporal end, it must not be forgotten that such an end in the Christian view is not final but intermediate. It is true that the function of the state is not precisely to guide men to Eternal Life, still its function is essentially subordinate to that ultimate end and, hence, in a very true sense it does foster the beginnings of something which transcends its own nature. It may be said, therefore, quite correctly that its purpose is to aid men to arrive at the perfection of which they are capable and not merely to aid them but to direct them and direct them authoritatively.

It seems obvious that no society, whatever its character, can accomplish its task unless it possesses authority to repress abuses and direct its members to the ends for which its was instituted. There can be no society without authority; and since human nature and the Author of [204] nature demand society, they require also the authority. Without attempting a complete analysis of the functions of authority we may describe it according to the common concepts as a moral power or right residing in a person to issue commands which are to be taken as rules of conduct by the free will of other persons.

It is to be noted: (1) That authority is not an impersonal necessity; it resides in a lawgiver. (2) It is not to be confused with physical force or coercion. Coercion may become an instrument of authority (as may persuasion) but it is not to be identified with authority as such. Such an identification leads logically to the conclusion that "might makes right." (3) Authority is not a mere substitute for deficiencies on the part of those ruled by it so that if deficiences [sic] were to disappear authority would vanish. Indeed if this were so, then theoretically anarchy would be the best government.

The essential function of authority is to provide a fixed principle assuring unity of action in a social group. Even supposing a group of adults, all intelligent and of perfect good will, that is, not handicapped by deficiencies, authority would still have its place. The group is aiming at some objective which will be a common good for all. That is part of the very concept of society. Such an object obviously demands common action arising from some decision which binds all the members. Such a decision obviously may be the unanimous agreement. But there can never be any guarantee of unanimity of judgment; it is always precarious and casual. Any member can disagree with the others. Hence the unity of action required by the pursuit of the common good will be ceaselessly jeopardized unless all agree to follow one decision and only one, whether issued by a single individual or a selected part of the group. To submit to the legitimate and reasonable requirements of civil society is to obey the order of human nature in the same sense that it is obeying the law of man’s nature to put into practice the essential duties of family life and to respect the property and rights of others.

The human mind, however, seems to find it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to face an antinomy without worshipping one or the other of its terms. Unfortunately there is a tendency among many to overemphasize the antinomic character of liberty and authority, while overlooking their complementary character. There seems to be a widespread acceptance of the assumption that growth of freedom and the decay of authority are synonymous terms; that we can have one only at the expense of the other but not both. That is why the world has oscillated between the extremes of apotheosizing the individual and deifying the group. It is not and cannot be true that we are doomed to fluctuate between tyranny and unbridled license.

[205] The exercise of authority is not necessarily an unreasonable invasion of personal liberty. The end of social life is not merely to preserve and extend freedom of choice. Freedom is not really an end in itself but a means to something else—happiness.

On the other hand, if all individual autonomy, all individual freedom of choice, is completely merged and lost in the autonomy of the state, then the person becomes a mere sacrifice to social utility. Nor do I see how this sacrifice can be logically avoided if one remains on the plane of pure naturalism. Without ultimate reference to God it seems to me impossible to rescue the individual from complete immersion in the group because on the naturalistic assumption that the community is the absolute, the highest good, man is necessarily and totally subjected to the community. Today unfortunately many states, even some who try to reject the label totalitarian, seem to think that man is made for the state and derives all his good from the state. This is totalitarianism however labeled, and I must confess it is a perfectly logical consequence of the assumption of a humanity without God.

The Christian interpretation of man and society is based on the fact that reality transcends the material, the temporal, the purely natural; and that the whole temporal order is subordinated to spiritual ends. This does not mean that the temporal and material is of no importance—much less evil, nor does it mean that matter and spirit, time and eternity, nature and supernature are identifiable. But it must never be forgotten that the common good in the temporal order is not the ultimate end of man’s activities. The temporal order is essentially subordinated to the extra-temporal and the goods of this life to the eternal interests of human personality. It is only when we appreciate this alternating rhythm of subordination that we perceive the true status of the individual human being. Considered as an individual or a part of the temporal order he is properly subordinate to the order as a whole. That is why it may be perfectly right and just that he should surrender his temporal goods and, if necessary, even his life for the welfare of the community. That is why the community may and perhaps should impose upon him, as a part of the whole, many restraints and sacrifices. But there is a limit beyond which the state or community cannot go. They cannot infringe upon the eternal interests of those human beings who are subordinate to them only from one aspect. States and nations are creatures of time. They have existed and passed away, but the souls of those men and women who once lived in them will exist for all eternity.

This concept of the state as an institution, complementing the individual powers of man, offering him a proper environment for the fuller development of his personality and a safeguard for the rights which [206] flow from his nature, protects him from the extremes of both state absolutism and exaggerated individualism. There are many today who, like Hobbes and his leviathan or "mortall [sic] God,” look upon the state, the civil power, as the sole source of man’s rights and duties, who make temporal welfare the exclusive object of all laws and the standard of all morality. It is this absolute subordination of the whole personality of its citizens which marks the absolute state as an inhuman despotism. Either the state is omnipotent and can do everything or it cannot. If it can, you have despotism under the dictatorial, oligarchic, or democratic form, benevolent or not as may be, but despotism for all that. If it cannot, then there is something beyond its power.

The dilemma which confronts the modern man is not merely a choice between rival economic or political systems. The question is much deeper and more complex. The choice, as Christopher Dawson says, is between the mechanized order of the absolute or totalitarian state (whether it be nominally Communist or Fascist or something else) or a return to that order which asserts the primacy of the spiritual, that is the subordination of the state and of the whole temporal order to spiritual ends; a return to that concept of humanity as a great community or republic in which all work out their final destinies under the rule of God. However fantastic a dream this may appear to the modern mind, it is a concept which was once accepted without question as a principle of the European social order and the foundation upon which our western culture has been built.

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Source: Thurber M. Smith, S.J., "Education for Democracy," Jesuit Educational Quarterly 3, no. 4 (March 1941): 200–