Wednesday, August 25, 2021

Francis Bredestege, "Relative Position of the School and the Other Agencies Affecting Character Development" (1929)

[455] We proceed in this chapter from the hypothesis that though the school is the first instrument that occurs to the mind when education is mentioned, it is not the first, neither in time nor in the sum of its effects nor effectiveness.

Historically, as well as to-day, the family is anterior to the school, and education in the general sense, begins in the home. The relation between parents and children is the most primitive form of learning, and also the first in which there is a union of intellectual and moral education. The first gift of the grown generation to the new, viz., the mother tongue, is named after the mother, and the next two vital intellectual gifts and most intelligible units of life, viz., the father's house and the fatherland, are named after the father.

Even now, however, we are not at the beginning of the chain. If science, and specifically psychology and biology are correct, we are far from the beginning in taking only the immediate family of the educand [sic; i.e. one to be educated] as the beginning point of the process of education. We must go far back beyond the formation of each individual unit of our social fabric. Even Emerson was only partially correct by claiming that we must begin with the child's grandfather. For a complete list of the complex array of the material we are to deal with antedates the bride and groom by several centuries. We need only point to the large amount of matter recently written on the relative importance of heredity and environment to stress the point, for this angle of the question will be brought out in extenso, before we separate after this meeting. Suffice it to say then, actually man begins his education centuries before as an individual [456] he begins his existence and his training in moral and social life. The psychological factors, the bodily conditions he will inherit, and the environment into which he will be born, these really make up agency number one.

Already conditioned then, the child meets his mother and his father, who then constitute agency number two. He steps into family life, and in the ordinary course of events, he will not be free from it, in one form or another, till he closes his eyes in his last long sleep. During at least the most malleable first six years his education is directed almost entirely either for good or for evil by this agency. Family life, then, in its widest sense, though in point of time not the first, is admittedly the most important and lasting educational instrument because as soon as life begins, and before the child has even the barest conceptions of responsibility, or an inkling of morality, there come into play the assimilations on which moral training is based, those subconscious factors of thought, desire, interest, suggestion and imitation, that arise from the intimate contacts established by the common life of the family group.

This is no place to enter into a rhapsody extolling what we carry into life from home. Sentiment has invested the home with a sanctity which under normal conditions amply justifies the verdict. Mother love and fatherly sacrifice are the miraculous commonplaces not only of all literature but equally of the savage too mentally poor to have a literature. The ties of family life are reckoned too sacred to bear rupture, "to love like a brother" is a banality in every language under the sun. In the family circles are planted and nurtured the seeds of those homely virtues that make up the warp and woof of every ordered life, reverence, love, sacrifice, faith. No matter what may be the final definition here of character, we are safe in saying that it will not depart far from this paraphrase of Bishop Ullathorne's: "Character is the natural temperament completely fashioned by the home; God makes our nature, our own home makes our character".

And still, like all things human, home can fail of its destiny. The school itself is but an extension, a corrective of the home; as such it has won its unchallenged place in our social economy. It [457] is possibly significant that equally universal with the failure of the home proclaimed by every sociological amateur and professional, is the cry regarding the failure of the school. That the home has failed must possibly be admitted. Just consider in addition to the school, the day nursery and kindergarten, the public playground and juvenile court placement, industrial home and reformatory, big brother and big sister leagues, vocational guidance movement and amusement park, the whole long list of twentieth century substitutes for the home that has failed. And the verdict of failure is supported by the attitude of the Church. In spite of the fact that she had schools of high efficiency long before the present-day omnipresent state began its career, and before the sociological meddler was abroad in the land, the Church is now the one middle-of-the-road organization, that is protesting against the continual spoliation of the home, of its sanctity, of its authority and of its place as the sun of our social solar system.

The spoliation does exist. Much of it may be due to causes with which no one can quarrel. The complexity of modern life and the scientific age in which we live have made necessary a division of labor, even in our relaxations. We presuppose that the average child spends a large part of his life in the home and we are probably correct. Still, it seems an anomaly that the modifications of family life in our complex modern civilization are such that he is not entirely a pessimist who declares that when the child is ready for school, he is already too spoiled to have the school do its best work with him. For as he begins to approach school age the child makes contacts with the corner butcher and grocer, with the movies; he has possibly been taken to see or rather endure, the local counterparts of adult interests like the Lindbergh reception, floods, possibly even murder trials; he has cultivated the acquaintance of his relatives and his parents' friends, and has even been in church on occasion; his play time with his toys and neighbor children or kindergarten group really making up the routine of his waking hours. According to Bird T. Baldwin, roughly fifty per cent of his time is taken up with sleep and about ten per cent goes for meals and other bodily necessities. From twenty-seven per cent the first year to about [458] eight per cent the sixth year, or an average of twenty per cent of his time is spent alone in physical or imaginative play. Of the balance, about fifteen per cent more goes into family and non-family play and mental contacts, and about four is taken up with the rudimentary business and social contacts that introduce him to the outside world. Supposing then, that one-half or three-fourths of the time spent alone or in personal contacts is contact with the home and the family group, and is given to mental absorptions and exercise of his growing faculties, his instincts, habits and will, we still can recognize that foreign interests, so to speak, have used up from twelve to twenty per cent of his life, or one-fourth of his waking hours. What he got from these domestic and foreign influences we shall see later. For the present it is enough to recall that they are all attributed to the home. He knows love and quarreling, selfishness and sacrifice, sickness and health, he has his code of ethics and his standards of values; in spite of his simplicity and candor, he is a calculating worldling, in spite of his baptismal innocence an adept in all the capital sins but lust and sloth. So stands the home indicted.

After school life begins, the child's use of time does not change much. Allowing ten to eleven hours of sleep at the age of seven, and eight hours at the age of sixteen, we find that thirty-eight per cent of his time is given over to sleep, and approximately ten per cent to meals and other necessities.

Of the remainder of his day, we imagine school to be the big interest. But as a matter of fact, the statistics say that between the ages of seven and sixteen, the average child spends only 186 days of the year in school and the average number of hours per day is only four and a fraction, or approximately sixteen per cent. In the case of our Catholic schools, this fraction may, perhaps, be raised to the next higher integer, in view of the close connection between church and school, through daily and Sunday Mass, first Holy Communion and Confirmation preparation, confessions, serving Mass, and in the other activities where the church character of our schools manifests itself. Supposing then that the formal aspects of his character training by the school last till sixteen years of age, it still remains that the "ten years of schooling" [459] become a small fraction of all his interests and activities from birth till the day he goes out into the world. To be exact, the school has him for sixteen per cent of ten years out of the total, and allowing another hour a day for "home study", we find that he is in school only nineteen per cent of his school life, and only twenty-two per cent of all his waking hours from infancy till his seventeenth birthday. In fairness, we may raise these figures a trifle by adding the growing office of the vacation school, the gymnasium class, the children's hour in the public library, and the reading of books from the school's circulating library. But even then, the percentage is still startlingly small.

The relative disposal of his time when he has reached the age of sixteen can be seen from the following article from the press (Cincinnati Times-Star, Mar. 19, 1929), and shows how his habits have "set" by then:

"The Industrial Education Bureau of the New York State Department of Education has been trying to find out (how boys spend their evenings), and to this end has questionnaired [sic] 75,000 boys attending the continuation schools. Of this number 12 per cent must have concluded that it was nobody's affair but their own, for they sent in no reply. Sixteen per cent said they were never at home in the evening, nine per cent said they were always at home, and 40 per cent said they remained at home for two, three or four evenings a week; night classes accounted for ten per cent.

"While Cincinnati boys have not been official quizzed, one can get a pretty fair picture of their nocturnal activities. After dinner every night the average lad leaves home for a space to foregather with other lads. At least twice a week he sees a picture in what is called the 'naborhood' movie house. Once a week he goes down town. One evening a week is spent with some group or club. When he returns late, he may turn on the radio for an interval, and then study, or at least, go through the motions thereof for a little while. He reads much more than you might think, glancing over the morning paper before he breakfasts, scanning the evening paper before the nocturnal exit, and somehow contriving to get through a novel or so a week. He is not much of a hand at cards.

"Obviously the modern lad is accumulating a far greater store of experiences, observations and social contacts than the lad of [460] a generation ago. Whether he ever mulls over this mass of raw material we shall not attempt to say."

But what we can say is that the home represents a small fraction of the average youth's guidance and character formation. Arbitrarily assuming that one-half of his play, non-theatrical recreation and other interests are in the home or its immediate environment, we have only an average of three and three-fourths hours of his waking day under home influence ,including newspaper reading, parental conversation, social and business visits, etc. We have already seen that the school gives very little more.

Greater than home and school, then, are the forces that make up agency number three, the greater group life. We have already seen that the growing child has thrust upon him fringes of social contacts, parts neither of home nor school, and ranging form his neighborhood playmate to the distant cities he visits with his vacationing parents. As he grows, there increase in number and power the common associations and forces of our institutional life, educational, religious, legal, political and economic, such as divorce, selfish individualism of public characters, the zeit-geist, organized philanthropy, organized sport, big business, etc.

Now there is still to be brought into the picture educational agency number four. We might call this group the non-professional educating agencies, to denote their indirect but formal participation in the school's function of giving information, health habits, economic training and a moral outlook on life. Specifically it is only necessary to mention as examples, the press with its variations, the lending and public library as avowedly educational, and the still more informally educational organizations like the boy scouts and girl scouts, and the large variety of well-intentioned and often well-endowed adult activities and leagues for the young, such as civic leagues, park and playground associations, civic theatres, etc. Besides them, potent for good or evil, stands the theatre, and its illegitimate half-brother, the movie.

In last place we shall mention the Church, not because its influence, at least with us is smallest, but because unfortunately its [461] influence is last with perhaps eighty-five per cent of our total population, and with a proportionate percentage of the school boys and girls of the land. With the total school population of our country (1926) in excess of 26,900,000, and with only 2,300,000 of them in private schools, we see the comparative place of the Church in its contacts on the growing mind of America. To the Church must then be added the growing influence of the weekday religious school, and of summer and vacation catechism classes. The temptation to disparage their importance as an adjunct of the Church is worth pointing out, as possibly half of our Catholic children are in public schools.

Thus then, do we group the character-building forces that surround the child: home, school, economic society, sociological agencies, and the Church. Now the chief fundamental in character-building is impression. Constancy and intensity of impression become the dominant factors in the formation of habits and ideals. Consider the stresses, the pushing and the pulling, the attractions and repulsions of this assembly of agencies all working for good or for evil in the development of the child's character. What a storm of impressions, what a crowd of examples, what a hurricane of correct and distorted attitudes, of genuine and sorry ideals rain down into the unanalyzing mind from these sources. We hear so much of the socially unfit, of the wave of youthful crime, of the bleak outlook for the future, and of the hopeless helplessness of the home, and the impotence of school and Church.

Are we justified in adopting pessimism? As Churchmen, we cannot consent to the proposition that the family, founded by nature and sanctified by God, has failed, much as individual families may fail. When we see the large number of young people passing into an efficiently and even heroically moral manhood and womanhood, we can see a new meaning in the trite proverb: There's a special Providence that watches over children.

And as school men we repudiate the statement that the school has failed. We must perhaps revise our estimate of the degree of influence the school may exercise in fact, but we must keep in mind, in the case of the school as well as of the home, that the [462] time element is not indicative of the relative weight of that influence. Home and school are still the first agencies that receive the child, and first impressions still are deepest. Much though encroachments on the past monopoly of these two educational agencies may be true, it should also be true that the power for good represented by home and school is first in possession of the child's soul, and should be able, with honest exertion, to hold it to its first conscious allegiance. Knowledge is power, and both these agencies must use their power with the knowledge that perhaps a majority of the educational instruments we enumerated above, are all but unfavorable to the work of character building and its conservation in the individual.

Another point that must be remembered is the fact, that even granted the handicap of relatively less time, the school is but the extension of the home, and that the alliance between the two is productive of a strength that is not the sum, but the product of the two. But an effective "union between the two is the first requisite for enduring success. There should be a continuous friendly understanding and cooperation, sanctified by the spirit of Christian faith and charity, and the earnest conviction of a common responsibility to God", says Monsignor Oechtering. However, when we come to analyze this union concretely, we find that there has in general not been an understanding of these reciprocal possibilities. We need only mention the Parent-Teacher movement as a belated recognition of the fact that teamwork could be improved. But in this alliance nothing will be gained by the pot calling the kettle black. The home admittedly has its faults to answer for. We have already seen the general nature of the indictment against it, namely, a surrender of its functions and prerogatives in general, and an inclination to "pass the buck" to the school in particular. And as education becomes more technical, the parent feels justified in a continuation of this policy on the score of inability to assist intelligently. Any one of our Sisters, to keep the question within our own system, can tell how much contact she has with parents in the course of the year, and how much of this precious little is due to parental wrath only. And on the other hand we know, too, how little [463] the average Sister knows the economic problems and domestic worries that result from our indoor sport of keeping up with the Joneses.

The school then, may in justice excuse itself from a great deal of the responsibility for the imperfect character building of the past, since it was handicapped by receiving no help from the home in trying to educate the already spoiled child deposited with a sigh of relief at its door. But the school, also, in its shortsightedness made a tactical error so to speak, and to this extent it cannot excuse itself. the error lay in the fact, that when the school saw that the home was not accomplishing its task in the dual work of character building, and perhaps was often not even appearing to attempt it, the school forgot its own limitations and volunteered to take over the major portion of the work, even that which was formerly the fully recognized work of the home. The nursery, the kindergarten, and the other infant interests that supplement the home, are in reality an independent unit, an ally if you will, but certainly not a legitimate part of the educational machinery as we knew it from tradition. But the school tried to make them an integral part of itself. The same thing is occurring at the other end of the elementary ladder even now. The matter of vocational guidance, and even vocational training is also an usurpation on the part of the school. These are really a successor of the apprentice system, also a character forming agency if you will, but even then a rather limited one, and an oblique one. With it the school ought to live in peace, of course, but not to make a part of the school system. Apprenticeship was originally in the home, and the advent of the factory system took it out of the home to give it to the factory master and the foreman. Nor does the fact that its original home form gave it some opportunity for character training become a reason for the school to annex it as soon as it leaves the home environment.

Now it is has only been in the very recent past that a cautious word of warning has been taken up here and there, that the school was attempting too much. Nor was the school very anxious to listen to that word, because of the implication that its over-ambition was foreordaining it to failure in its narrower and more [464] legitimate sphere, collective educational activity in the nobler sense. In that narrower sphere the school has a special opportunity of aiding the home by inculcating the domestic virtues. "It should ever strive to foster reverence, love and obedience by religious instruction and respectful deference to parental authority." But how can it inculcate for the home it has despoiled? As long as the skeleton of the home even remained, the whole process is but lost motion, if the inculcation is not based on a mutual understanding with the home as to complementary duties of inculcation and practice. So it would seem that perhaps the school as well as the home, did not understand its task in the alliance. Its ambitions outran its abilities, and in its vanity it saw not that the failures of its ally were being imputed to itself.

Another point that must be kept in mind is that it took the work of character building with woefully unfit tools. Historically, character building is not the first connotation of school life as we know it. The pedagogue of ancient Greece, and the educator of pagan Rome were but slaves who accompanied the pupil to a place where he was expected to acquire nothing more than literacy. And to-day to the man in the street, school means an intellectual relationship between a teacher and an ignorant person for the imparting of knowledge and skills. The relation between an educator and his pupil is a much later derivative, and is founded on the realization of a power for good in the educator that comes only by implication and in virtue of his personal contacts. Originally children were sent to school to learn arbitrary but necessary skills, the three R's, and it was not till the advent of Christianity, and in proportion to its vigor that the fourth R, religion, gave proof that the school also was baptized, and learned its higher destiny from the Church. Hear the average educational theorist outside of the fold to-day, and his theme will still be the same as the old pagan idea, social efficiency, not for the sake of the individual but for society, and if he mentions character at all, it is only the lubricant in the social friction. From this it follows then, that education, as a quantity production job, is possible only in so far as it is an intellectual job; as soon as you attack the moral angle you must descend to the individual. It is the scholastic [465] parallel to the pulpit supplemented by the confessional, and the blackboard supplemented by drill pad.

Parallel to this is the point that as the character training idea has been added to the function of the school, extra curricular activity has risen in the estimation of those responsible for educational practice. The inference is easy that the imparting of information, as an educational function was not able to enlist the individual as an individual, so the school has ben forced to take the educand out of the classroom into the football field, the office of the school paper, or the school traffic squad to give him the opportunity for moral training, because there he could really act as an individual and develop his character. Of a piece with this fact is also the increased emphasis on individual attention and needs in the classroom exercises themselves; as their training value was better perceived, these subjects were more and more given over to the pupil and taken away from the teacher.

What we need then is a restatement of the real place of the school in this work of character building, and a more humble recognition of its limitations. The limitation is first due to the fact that the school is primarily intellectual. And this must be borne in mind in spite of the fact that the school, just as any other agency that gives men the opportunity of thought and conduct, gives opportunity for the exercise and development of character, but it does so incidentally. Even the parochial school is only a tool in the hands of the teaching Church, and must not try to claim credit for what grace and the Church are accomplishing.

As an arbitrary institution with intellectual ends it follows that Dewey's famous statement that the school is society is only partially true, and to add to the difficulty the child coming to school is only a limited social being, both his objectives and his vision being still very narrow. Consequently the school can fulfill only partially Charter's demand to "require practice with satisfaction", because as an arbitrary and specialized agency it stops short of "generalized practice". It can go part of the way with the pupil, but the time comes when it must stop and allow the youngster to go farther in the company of the other agencies [466] we have listed above. It can instruct and warn what is to be awaited of them, but it cannot be there when the crisis of actual conduct occurs. In fact, even in school the teacher is limited by its narrow arc; as Lommen says, it can "secure an inventory of the positive conduct qualities", but only a fraction of them will be given sustained and healthy exercise in the school atmosphere; it an "build up a positive program of activities", but can oversee their realization only in a small fraction of the total opportunities; it can fall back on "an intensive reading program", "but already we are trespassing on the vicarious", and are actually calling a non-school agency to take our charge in hand. This vicarious nature of the school is then the central weakness of the school's position in the entire process of character building. 

On the other hand, the very formal character of school work is one of the factors for its power in the task. As an instructor, it gives man his moral vocabulary; it gives him an exact appreciation of moral worth and its gradations; it holds up to his gaze the great successes in moral development in the heroes of religion and history; it defines the canons of good conduct and sharpens his conscience for their better evaluation and supplies the motives for their prompt appearance in action at the fitting moment. It furnishes in this way the fundamental attitudes towards "such acts as spring from habits of diligence, frugality, economy, simplicity, contentment, punctuality, order, cleanliness and loyalty to the family circle". (Msgr. Oechtering, 1919) To these it adds very clear ideals as part of the mental equipment that will insure such action.

"The ideals fostered by Catholic Education", says the Hon. Pierce Butler in St. Paul in 1915, "elevate the importance of the individual, develop consciousness of the duty and the power of choice between right and wrong. Character, that is, morality based on religion, must be maintained and strengthened from generation to generation, respect for authority of government and for the teachings of religion, subordination of self in the interests of fellow men and loyalty to the laws, traditions and ideals of our country must continue to be inculcated as to become part of the life of every rising generation".

In second place, we must fashion a clearer idea of just what the school must put together as the constituents of the ideal character. [467] This has so far not been done, neither for nor by the school, nor has the next step, the careful grading of what is possible and desirable of the child both in his age relations, in his classroom relations and the out-of-school contacts. We can see the hodge-podge of alleged virtues and socially desirable qualities from a random selection of almost any standard volume. Witmer, for instance, (Psychological Clinic, Oct. 1922, p. 129) speaks glibly of the "six universal categories of behavior", and names "attendance and promptness, general attitude, initiative, cooperation, self-improvement, esthetic appreciation and rating in other moral qualities". Note this last pair in particular, and then try to follow the mental process by which the entire list is lumped as "citizenship qualities" under deportment, and required as a school mark on his ideal report card. Touton and Struthers, in Junior High School Procedure list as objectives of the guidance program a list which defies rational unity, namely, common sense, imagination, information, initiative, planning, reasoning, thoroughness, ambition, cheerfulness, helpfulness, honesty, industry, perseverance, self-control, self-reliance, loyalty, reliability, etc. Charters himself took a fling at the game (Journal of Education, May 29, 1924, p. 607) with a small list of cleanliness, leadership, democracy, honor, and independence.

But why continue? The one characteristic is vagueness of definition, and the lack of a reference back to a central controlling factor, what we theologians would term a cardinal or principal virtue. As a consequence, the parochial school, leaning on the infallible authority of the Church, ought to be able to blaze a clear trail here, and I understand that a beginning has already been made.

There is however still another angle to this question. After the list is made, it must be rearranged to meet the mental development of the child and his opportunities for practice as well as of appreciation. Patriotism, for instance, for him can be little more than a laying of foundations for his later life, and a building out of indefinite ideals, which can come to definiteness and fruition only as circumstances dictate, as when he has assumed the responsibilities of cheerful tax-paying, of choosing between two [468] dubious candidates for office, and of giving equal attention to the Volstead Act and the traffic laws, and of the other homely virtues that are being disguised as patriotism in our civic texts. A beginning has also been made in this. Parker, for instance (Types of Elementary Teaching and Learning, p [sic] 502) to mention only one, clearly indicates that some civic-moral training may be through actual behavior, and some that can be only through discussion. Coupled with a frank religious tie-up, such as is possible in our parochial schools, results based on an understanding of the limitations of school procedure ought to be genuine, granted a real teacher. Outside our own system, the real difficulty has always been, to make religious instruction an integral part of the subject-matter, a blessing we do not always advert to. The lack of a dogmatic foundation and an adamant sanction can have no substitutes, for "the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom". (Ps. 112)

In conclusion then, it would seem that with home and school separated there is not hope for final success, between them they ought to dominate the field, if not in time at least in effectiveness. But they must be a unit, in their outlook, in their cooperation, and in a candid acknowledgment of the forces that are allied against them, because the mathematical factors make them a minority. The exact mathematical proportions cannot be given in decimals, of course, probably never will be, for it is in another guise the old problem of heredity and environment. The final results between home and school on the one side and the non-school agencies on the other, are a problem of the sum result of concomitant factors. Suffice it to say then, that ,granted the best possible contribution by the school, the number of exponents of the highest type of character must increase, because the average is affected by the individual items, and the school as the ex professo determiner of the knowledge element of character composition and development can give us the truth regarding virtue, and the "truth shall make you free" to exemplify it and realize it in life and in action.

[469] Bibliography

School and Society, May 9, '25, p. 543: School not the cause of the Present Immorality.

School and Society, June 13, '25, p. 695: Importance of Attention to Character Development in Pre-School Children.

Educational Review, Nov. '26, p. 180: Faults of Children are Due to their parents.

Mental Hygiene, Oct. '26, p. 735: Effect of Home Environment on Children's Conduct.

School Review, Oct. '26, p. 594: Data on Extent to which Vocational Schools Prepare for Vocations.

Religious Education, Feb. '27, p. 148: Correlating Church and Home.

Religious Education, p. 176: Defects of Character Education in the Public Schools.

Religious Education, May. '27, p. 477: Religious Education and Catholic Schools.

Journal of Educational Method, Mar. '27, p. 291: Educating for Desirable Attitudes in Conduct (Lommen).

Bird T. Baldwin: The Pre-School Child. Riverside Press.

Baldwin and Wallace: The Nursery School. Ibid.

Elementary School Journal, Dec. '24, p. 264; [sic] Two Factors in the Teaching of Ideals. (W. W. Charters)

W. W. Charters: The Teaching of Ideals.

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Source: Francis J. Bredestege, "Relative Position of the School and the Other Agencies Affecting Character Development," National Catholic Educational Association Bulletin 26, no. 1 (Nov. 1929): 455–469.

William Lawlor, "The School in Society" (1929)

[450] The services of financial experts need not be requisitioned to have us realize that society has spent fabulous sums in an honest effort to educate her citizens. In her endeavors to provide suitably for the physical, mental, aesthetic and moral wants of youth she erects and maintains at tremendous expense, schools not only for normal children but for the sub-normal and the abnormal ones—the physically handicapped: the blind, the deaf, the under-nourished, the mal-nourished, the crippled and the speech defectives. It is interesting to recall that many hundreds of years ago Plato, in his famous work, The Republic, wrote: "It is by education that ideal society once established is to be maintained"—a sentiment practically re-echoed by H. G. Wells' recent declaration that, "Education is the one instrument by which civilization can forestall catastrophe". Modern society feels strongly that her preservation and advancement will be effectively accomplished if the schools will but succeed in inculcating in their human charges not only a vivid appreciation of society's needs but also the definite realization of the obligation which rests upon adolescents of appropriately equipping themselves to the end that these needs may be adequately fulfilled. There is nothing new in this philosophy. Man has ever tried to adapt himself to the problems arising out [451] of the peculiar circumstances of his environment. The difficulty, however, is and always has been to determine precisely what it is that constitutes society's greatest needs. The varied conclusions which have been arrived at on this point by the peoples of all nations and through all ages have been the direct resultants of the diversified ideas and ideals which peoples have entertained concerning life's values. Primitive man acutely feeling the need of self-preservation concerned himself primarily with securing food and personal protection. His training was simple and individualistic. To the Spartan military prowess was supreme—hence Spartan boys were trained solely for the state. The Athenian held that culture and beauty were the great desiderata of life; and he educated his progeny accordingly. The epicurean with his hedonic [sic] notions of things and the stoic clinging to an entirely different philosophy sought, each in his own way, to accomplish his pet objectives. Were you to-day to ask a mechanic, a merchant, a professional man and a scholar to indicate present society's greatest needs, each being dominated by his personal appreciation of life's real meaning would undoubtedly proffer an answer quite at variance with those submitted by other members of the group. Secular educators to-day, however, appear to be in perfect agreement that man's greatest need is "social adaptation". In up-to-the-minute educational books and periodicals, the much used expressions: "Trained for social efficiency", "Educate children for social service", "Education seeks the harmonious adjustment between the individual and society", "Socialize the individual", plainly show that present-day school leaders believe that the chief objective in the educative process is the felicitous adjustment of man to his social environment. Irving E. Miller in his book, Education for the Needs of Life, very categorically states that: "It is the function of education to assist pupils in the attainment of right judgment, appreciation and control of social values".

As Catholics we cannot but disagree with the dictum that social functioning is the chief purpose of the educative process. Though in no sense underestimating the important part which social values play in the scheme of things human, nevertheless, [452] we know that man's greatest need in life is that which vitally concerns his immortal soul, namely, the attainment of eternal salvation. For this was man created; for this was he redeemed. Now it is the duty of the Church, and especially through the instrumentality of her Catholic school to assist the human soul, in every way possible, to realize its destiny. It is well to note, however, that this soul-saving educative scheme of ours very specifically embraces other objectives—social, cultural and vocational. In training a child to love God and his neighbor, to be honest, chaste, and obedient to lawfully constituted authority, we feel that we are contributing to society a service than which there is no greater. Realizing that "Knowledge is power", we aim to impart solid intellectuality, not by attempting to stock youthful minds with a host of cold and unrelated facts, but by presenting to children a well-organized curriculum of fundamental subjects on which alone it is possible to erect the superstructure of genuine culture. Our educational intent, vocationally, is not to fit pupils for specific trades or professions, but rather to awaken an appreciation for vocational activities and to train children so that they may be prepared to make speedy and efficacious adjustment to whatever occupation they may choose to make their lifework. Our general method of approach to the maintaining of pupil discipline in the classroom is along traditionally rigid and straight-laced lines.

But a world preponderatingly [sic] non-Catholic cares little about our educational philosophy and still less about our pedagogical methods of exemplifying it. Being in no way constrained to concern themselves with professedly moral or spiritual considerations in their teaching work, secular educators distinctly visualize the existence of an ever-increasing materially-minded civilization and simply do what they can to meet its urgent demands. Nor is it an easy task which besets them. We live in a country as plastic as it is mobile. New factors are constantly arising and functioning, while old ones recede, disintegrate or disappear. Nothing has contributed so much to the growing complexities of our social order as has industrialism. The home, at one time, was the industrial center. When  machine power was introduced, however, the industrial center shifted from the home to small mills. Nor [453] has power machinery confined itself to the factory—it has found its way into practically every avenue of business, and is accomplishing with marvelous accuracy the work of brawn and brain alike. Increased land, sea and air facilities of transportation became necessary to handle the ever expanding volume of machine products, and almost over night, have these agencies sprung into being. By reason of these available means of quick communication peoples from all quarters of the globe have been brought into close relationship with one another; and a higher standard of living has made what was considered a luxury yesterday a necessity to-day. To keep abreast with such dynamic conditions, Kilpatrick, in his Education for a Changing Civilization makes a strong plea for such an educational policy as will correct what he terms "The intellectual-moral lag behind material advance". And the school, he maintains, must grapple with the problem alone; because the home and the community have ceased to be contributing elements. In other words we are told that the only possible solution of this vexing problem is to work on the principle that "the school is life and not a preparation for it. And as such it is our solemn duty to have children live actual life experiences in the process of which there will be formed habits, attitudes and skills which are essential to adult life in a forward looking nation." To this end there is recommended a rather flexible curriculum; and it is almost needless to say, that ardent advocates of some phase or other of the "life experience" idea have succeeded in somewhat crowding, if not confusing the scholastic program. Subjects formerly regarded as ideal for sharpening the intellect and the memory are often taboo now—the argument being that mere faculty training gained in one subject too frequently is incapable of being carried over into other fields or experiences. The watchword of the moment, therefore, is "nothing in the curriculum that holds forth no actual life value". Pupil passivity, as it is commonly referred to, is no longer in good form. Seething activity on the part of school children is the thing that is now called for. The newer notions of things educational demand that pupils walk about, talk, whisper, etc.—the inference being that [454] when children are noisy they are profitably busy, and that when they are huddled together in whispered conversation they are de facto discussing vital subjects. Perhaps they are. The teacher, on the other hand, is supposed to play a far less conspicuous part in classroom affairs than was her wont in times gone by. The children are not expected to take her "say so", nor for that matter, any one else's; they are to think for themselves and draw their own conclusions. The suggestion sounds well enough but the plan is not without its difficulties especially when we consider that adolescent minds are involved. Kilpatrick says that authoritarianism or the practice of yielding submission to traditional authority, has been steadily on the wane, and that consequently, educational changes are positively demanded. It is recommended that pupils govern themselves without the aid of magisterial direction. But is there not danger that this business of self-activity and self-efficiency may produce self-centered creatures—children feeling that they are a law unto themselves—and thus defeat the purpose of our experiment to socialize the individual? To sum up then, let it be stated that there is and always will be honest differences of opinion as to the best manner in which schools may discharge their obligations to society. That there is room for improvement in present policies and management of schools nobody with even a slight acquaintanceship with the matter will attempt to deny. Of course, we Catholics, if for no other reasons than financial ones, are absolutely constrained from adopting educational practices which the State may deem expedient to put into use. But what about other things which, to many, may appear to be merely matters more or less fantastic? How far can we or should we go with them? Perhaps a middle course would be best to follow.


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Source: William F. Lawlor, "The School in Society," National Catholic Educational Association Bulletin 26, no. 1 (Nov. 1929): 450–454.

Thursday, May 20, 2021

Eugene Devlin, SJ, "Character Formation in the Ratio Studiorum" (1953)

[213] In the words of Fr. Martín the Ratio's distinction lies in its spirit and method.[1] If spirit may be taken in the sense of animating principles then a characteristic principle of the Ratio is that mind and will be trained in one relation. The Ratio considered development of intellectual capacity inadequate and unrealistic unless the will was at the same time strengthened in good. The end product of training in such a system was not only an educated man but a man of virtue and character as well. Hence, as Farrell states, "a theology of sanctification and salvation is intrinsic to the system."[2]

St. Ignatius no less pointedly expressed the purpose of the Society in the direction of schools.

Let these schools be conducted in such a way that the students are solidly formed in Christian doctrine . . . and let care be taken, that while learning literature they also learn to act in a way worthy of a Christian.[3]

And further on he writes:

Every effort should be made to ensure that those who frequent our schools in search of learning should at the same time acquire a knowledge of what is rightly expected of a gentleman and a Christian.[4] 

It was clear that the framers of the Ratio did not intend to formulate a detailed and specific program for character development from the psychological viewpoint. Only in one edition, the Ratio of 1586, was particular mention made of the psychological content underlying its directives. Consequently, it was necessary to infer principles valid for a psychological approach to character formation from various rules covering organization, curriculum and method. The problem of the investigation [214] was, therefore, to discover whether there were in the Ratio Studiorum certain distinctive psychological principles which effectively contribute to a school program of character development.

Psychological principles were understood to be certain fundamental sources of human activity flowing from man's nature as a composite being. Such principles included imagination, memory, intellect, emotions, and will. Character formation was defined as a directed and purposeful training of the student's intellectual and volitional powers to assist him to acquire worthwhile ideals, self-control through a disciplined will, suitable moral habits, emotional control, and moral integrity. An objective character program is one which takes into account the demands of the student's psychological nature in its supernatural as well as natural aspects. 

The procedure used in the present investigation was that of documentary analysis. The rules of the Ratio were analyzed in the light of fundamental psychological principles of Scholastic philosophy. the material for the analysis was taken principally from the official edition of the Ratio Studiorum of 1599. The editions of 1586, 1591, 1832, and the works of Jesuit educators of the past and present were used as supplementary guides for interpretation.

At the outset certain definite factors of a psychological nature were accepted as basic for an objective school character program. These factors were moral instruction; development of worthy ideals; will training; acquisition of correct moral habits; and constructive school discipline. The basis for accepting these particular elements was a survey of representative contributions of contemporary Catholic and secular authorities to the field of character education. These factors constituted the guiding norms for the investigation of the Ratio's character program.

Moral instruction. In the Ratio moral principles were taught primarily through the medium of the religion class. The aim of religious instruction was to awaken in Jesuit students a just pride in the heritage of their Faith and at the same time to equip them with the intellectual ability to solve for themselves the social, moral, and religious problems of life. Religious instruction was authoritative and practical. It sought to establish strong personal convictions about the teachings of Christian faith which would result in conscious and deliberate application to conduct. The aim of the program was, in short, to produce men who as a result of informed convictions would be able to contribute through influence, service and example to the upbuilding of God's kingdom on earth.[5]

Religion was meant to be a vital force cutting across every aspect of [215] student activity. At his entrance into the school the student accepted a double responsibility, namely, to tend to intellectual and moral perfection. Ambition, desire, social prestige and material advancement were to be regulated by religious principles.[6] Consequently, a systematic attempt was made to develop the spiritual side of the student's character. Religious practices included regular attendance at Mass, sermons, the reception of the Sacrament of the Eucharist and regular confession.[7] The framers of the Ratio were conscious of the importance of the role of divine grace in building firm moral character and found these practices and effective means to secure it.

In addition to formal instruction the environment of the Jesuit school was a powerful indirect force for religious training. It was intended to create an encouraging background for transforming Catholic thought and culture in the practice of virtue and religious perfection. The example of teachers was enlisted to intensify the religious outlook of students by showing them a concrete and living expression of adherence to Christian moral principles. Care was taken to make the formation of religious habits natural and spontaneous rather than forced and artificial.[8]

Another characteristic of the Ratio was its insistence on the ancient classics as a medium for imparting abiding and universal values. The framers of the Ratio realized that one of the first steps in the Christianization of youth is to make it human and spiritual. From an intimate contact with the classical culture carried out under Christian auspices they hoped to give students a true appreciation of the spiritual values which are the foundation of realistic moral training.[9]

The study of the Latin and Greek classics was a practical means for providing students with a first-hand account of the virtues and failings of pagan culture. Teachers were encouraged to make every reasonable effort to compare the life, philosophy and morals of ancient civilization with the supernatural and eternal values of Christian teachings. Early Christian writers and selections from the Latin and Greek Fathers were recommended to express simply and forcefully the intrinsic nobility and superiority of Christian living.[10] Contact with the classics was considered a practical method for developing in students the ability to evaluate on a sound moral basis the ways of men, to approve the punishment of the wicked, to appreciate the wisdom of the wise.[11]

[216] Development of ideals. Training for character begins with knowledge of true and worthy ideals of conduct. These ideals are types of excellence, spiritual values, duties, obligations of life, incentives to moral conduct which are meant to be actualized through the activity of intellect and will. The Ratio provided the student with a picture of what he should be and how he should act. Its rules pictured for him a practical ideal type of gentleman and Christian.[12] The early Jesuit educators were convinced that religion was the richest source of compelling ideals and worthy moral examples. The religious ideal was considered essential. The rules mentioned it frequently as the primary source of all ideals and the guiding norm for the process of character formation.[13]

The teacher was given an important and direct role in the process of communicating worthy ideals. The Ratio expected him to find occasion, in the ordinary teaching process, to instill in his students love for God, respect for authority, devotion to the virtues of Christian life. Outside the classroom he was urged to find frequent opportunity to encourage a spirit of practical piety and a desire for religious ideals.[14]

In a variety of ways the Jesuit student was reminded that the practice of virtue was an integral part of his social life. School regulations were intended not only as a corrective but also to direct external actions according to a pattern which proved to be an accurate reflection of Christian moral and social ideals. Virtue and integrity in conduct was considered no less important than achievement in literature and learning.[15]

The communication of worthwhile ideals has a direct influence on the evolution of correct moral habits. The essential thing in forming habits of conduct is not just the repetition of an act but the assimilation of an ideal value. This principle was recognized in the Ratio.[16] The work recommended to the Jesuit teacher was to unveil those values which are basic to the concept of an educated, Christian gentleman. The curriculum itself was a practical medium for bringing students into contact with spiritual values such as the true, the good, the beautiful. The particular aspect under which these appear in a given subject need not prevent the teacher from linking them in the minds of his students with their supreme and perfect fulfillment, God. This is to make the aim of [217] learning to rethink the thoughts of God. In and out of the classroom the Ratio sought to provide the social-divine atmosphere in which such ideals could flourish.[17]

One of the chief values the Ratio strove to build up in students was a right sense of personal dignity. The framers of the Ratio realized that as self is at the core of human actions a balanced sense of personal dignity is an essential requirement for right conduct. In its disciplinary directives, in provision for emulation and rivalry in the classroom the Ratio kept the ideal of personal dignity before the student and expected him to make it a chief rule of conduct.[18] Through the medium of the drama, from carefully staged pageants to informal class dialogs, the concept of personal dignity received forceful expression in the lives of worthy men and women of classical times, in the saints of the Christian era, and in the life of Jesus Christ the perfect model.[19]

Will training. To actualize high  moral principles a necessary condition is a strengthened and developed will. The rules of the Ratio contained the essential elements for a systematic procedure of successful will training. As is clear form its directives for external conduct, study, and religious exercises, the Ratio took the realistic view that intelligent appreciation of moral principles and ideals must be reinforced by effective volitional practice.

Whatever is voluntary is done on account of some good to be derived from the action. The first motive of the will is its tendency to happiness. The special objective proposed by the Ratio was to train students to distinguish happiness from mere pleasure, to realize that utility and mere temporal happiness are by no means ultimate tests of what is good and honorable.[20] Consequently, the student was encouraged to act deliberately and in conformity with the moral principles which he had learned to accept.

Class and extra-curricular experiences, in particular, gave wide scope to the practice of virtue, responsibility, and self-control.[21] In addition, the scholarship requirements of these early Jesuit schools made severe and exacting demands on student perseverance. Penalties for inaccuracy and lack of effort were made purposely severe to act as an effective deterrent to unscholarly attitudes. Recitations and class exercises were [218] carried out in a high spirit of rivalry which provided a constant incentive to individual application and initiative.[22]

An important element in the process of will training is motivation. Character motivation in the Ratio was both natural and supernatural. Normal healthy desire for success and reputation was used to good effect. Students were encouraged to observe school regulations from the motive of honor and hope of reward than from fear of punishment. Honor and praise were judged practical and proper means to encourage the practice of virtue. Such motives, however, were to be used in moderation and always in due subordination to the demands of justice and religion.[23]

The most highly regarded motivation was centered on religion. Precept, example, suggestion and private conversations were some of the practical methods used to impress on the student the importance of religion as a realistic and central value for life conduct. The work of the classroom was consecrated to God by prayer. The class teacher was urged to follow up instruction in Christian doctrine by personal contact whose object was to instill practical piety and devotion. The religious motive was given prominence in ordinary school experiences wherever possible—in the practice of public and private devotion, in devoted reception of the Sacraments, in the exercise of virtue and the elimination of faults.[24] In this connection mention should be made of the practice of the daily examination of conscience which was recommended to all students. As a spiritual and psychological device for checking bad habits and building habits of virtue its worth has long been recognized.[25]

Another realistic outlet for will training was the Sodality with its several academies. The Sodality was the principal extra-curricular activity recommended by the Ratio.[26] These honor societies in the Jesuit school served to effectively integrate intellectual and volitional aspects of student development by encouraging high spiritual ideals and by intensifying activity in intellectual and moral fields.[27] While satisfying the normal adolescent tendency for group activity they were at the same time a practical medium for translating religion into action.

Habits. The formation of worthwhile volitional habits is also basic to the psychological process of character formation. As Castiello has [219] confirmed experimentally, habits of this type will not be effectively reduced to action unless the student has assimilated appropriate intellectual or moral ideals.[28] The contribution of the Ratio with respect to such ideals has already been determined. The same experimenter adduced another important conclusion. Moral habits, as essentially interior forms, are greatly determined by the kind of environment in which they are evolved. An environment which is forced, artificial, and incapable of arousing the immanent powers of will and intellect will not prove a satisfactory milieu for the evolution of lasting moral habits. The whole spirit and atmosphere of the early Jesuit school was opposed to the formation of habits which were the result of mere repetition of externally imposed acts. Instead, it encouraged action which was the result of spontaneous, deliberate choice according to previously adopted ideals.[29]

The regulations of the Ratio covering individual conduct were directed toward the cultivation of habits of responsibility and self-mastery. The principle behind these directives implied intelligent, free obedience from reasonable motives rather than mechanically or through fear.[30] Habits of devotion were formed by daily attendance at Mass, regular reception of the Sacraments, prescribed prayers and continual encouragement to the practice of virtue.[31] The Jesuit classroom also had its role in forming intellectual and moral habits. through exacting class regulations and teaching procedures students were trained to face problems and assignments in logical and orderly fashion. Teachers were admonished to promote good study habits and to provide opportunities to acquire habits of industry and perseverance.[32]

The activity of the classroom was considered a practical outlet for exercising responsibility. Students were chosen to handle much of the routine work of the classroom. Individual responsibility was also exercised in the organization and conduct of scholastic contests. The spirit of rivalry which was promoted between classes and different sections of the same class was a dynamic and practical exercise for building habits of self-control and virtue.[33] The direction and government of the Sodality and the literary academies was left substantially to the control of student officers and members. These organizations had prescribed [220] objectives and their activity was regulated by a definite set of rules which revealed a realistic and well-balanced outlook toward the development of student self-mastery.[34]

The role of the teacher in encouraging the development of habits received emphasis in the Ratio. Its directives to teachers take account of the natural tendency of adolescents to imitate the actions of their instructors. Jesuit teachers by profession and religious training were expected to furnish a high degree of the inspiration needed to make the practice of virtue appealing to adolescents. Their personal influence and the example of their religious life was meant to evoke in students a generous impulse to acquire the same habits and to practice the same virtues. The character of the Jesuit teacher was intended to reflect a well-balanced combination of natural and supernatural virtue and worthy social and moral habits.[35]

Constructive discipline. The Ratio recognized the value of discipline as a constructive force in the formation of character. It found no justification for the theory that the student should be permitted to follow impulses and inclinations without restraint. Consequently, its disciplinary legislation was intended to exercise a moderate but realistic restraining force on student conduct.

It was characteristic of the Ratio's outlook on discipline to encourage a reasoned, deliberate response to school regulations. The advantages to be gained from external order and uniformity did not justify rigid and mechanical enforcement of rules. In discipline as in studies the Ratio sought to make emulation and hope of honor the practical corrective.[36] Teachers were admonished to avoid the use of fear as a motive for securing obedience. They were encouraged, instead, to become acquainted with their students in order to win their conformity from respect and devotion.[37] Where punishment had to be assigned for some offense the teacher was recommended to impose literary tasks. If such methods did not prove sufficient, and, as a last resort corporal punishment was judged necessary, he was never to administer it himself but send a boy to the Corrector, a non-religious officer appointed for the purpose.[38] By this moderate policy the Ratio sought to teach the naturally impulsive adolescent the need for restraint in the use of individual liberty without at the same time arousing resentment for all authority.

The Ratio's disciplinary legislation was entrusted to the principal, or, [221] where necessary, to an administrative assistant, the prefect of discipline, and to the class teacher. The principal was charged with the obligation of governing the school in such a way that students might attain the Society's double education goal, intellectual and moral perfection. With respect to discipline this meant the general supervision of order and regularity in the school. He was to be especially vigilant for discipline during periods of recreation, time of Mass, confessions and public exercises. Teachers were also expected to be acquainted with the rules of the school and they shared in the responsibility for exact enforcement. Infractions of school and class order were to be referred daily to the proper authority.[39]

the first of fifteen rules governing student conduct centers attention on the supernatural and natural aim of their school training To reinforce this high aim, the third, fourth, fourteenth and fifteenth rules, which are corollaries of the first, provide for regular attendance at Mass, devout reception of the Sacraments, diligence and attention in learning Christian doctrine and faithful practice of Christian virtues. Other directives were concerned with external conduct in the classroom, study activity, the choice of reading material, and worthwhile use of leisure time.[40]

In its informal aspect the discipline of these early Jesuit schools was intended to encourage in students an attitude of mature deliberation and a sense of responsibility toward the duties of school life. School experiences were not meant to be part of an artificial conditioning process for future life but a realistic participation in social and moral activity which is an integral part of all normal human living. The discipline of the Ratio with its multiple appeal to reason and worthy example was an effective and practical means toward the attainment of the ultimate goal—an educated Christian and gentleman.

Conclusions

The present study dealt with the provisions of the Ratio Studiorum with respect to development of character in the Jesuit student. A basic program for effective character structure was found to underlie a wide variety of regulations governing organization, curriculum, and method. As a result of the findings it was possible to draw certain general conclusions which indicate the attitude of the Ratio with respect to character [222] formation and the demands which its character program makes on teachers and students in the Jesuit school.

Despite the fact that the directives of the Ratio touched on a wide variety of elements which had a psychological bearing on the formation of character a definite unity of procedure was evident. This unity was an internal one which stemmed from a fundamental unity of purpose. Thus, to achieve the aims of its character program the Ratio insisted on close integration of intellectual and moral training. This integration of intellectual and moral elements was to be extended to all aspects of the school's instructional and disciplinary activities.

The second conclusion of this investigation was that in all its character forming activity the Ratio demanded a realistic and objective approach. The Jesuit school sought to provide an effective medium for the transition from the subjective and emotional instability of adolescence to the mature and responsible outlook of Christian manhood. The Ratio was not concerned with providing an easy or effortless way to character. It required of the student persevering effort and the sacrifice of subjective impulses to the objective claims of morality.

The Ratio placed exacting demands on the vocational ethos of the teacher. It presupposed a supernatural outlook combined with a deep sense of responsibility and a practical devotion to the profession of Christian educator. The teacher was in a real sense the center and spirit of the Ratio system since it was largely through his initiative and directive influence that the Ratio goal of formation rather than mere information would result.

The Ratio also made exacting demands on the student. He was expected to assume his share of responsibility for mental and moral growth. The natural and supernatural motivation of the Ratio presupposed a high degree of generous, unrestrained cooperation. Regularity and perseverance were required in the practice of supernatural obligations as in the performance of routine class work. Self-mastery was neither an effortless objective nor one to be accomplished over night. It was an essentially active process calling for sustained effort to keep conduct in conformity with a variety of directives covering individual and group action.

Finally, the Ratio made a distinctive contribution to the field of character education by the inherent and natural adaptability of its method. There was no need to make character training a formal subject of the curriculum. Through the medium of everyday teaching, disciplinary and organizational activity, the influence of the Ratio's program communicated itself naturally and without strain to the character of the Jesuit student.

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Footnotes:

1. Luis Martín, S.J., "Adhortatio de Studendi Ratione, ad Scholasticos in Collegio Exaaten," Woodstock Letters 22:105–7, 1893.

2. Allan P. Farrell, S.J., The Jesuit Code of Liberal Education (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1938), p. 403.

3. Constitutiones Societatis Jesu Latinae et Hispanicae cum earum declarationibus (Madrid: 1892), IV, c. 7, n. 2.

4. Ibid., c. 16, n. 1.

5. Ratio of 1599, Reg. Prov. 40; Rector 1; Comm. Cl. Inf. 1, 4; Edward A. Fitzpatrick, St. Ignatius and the Ratio Studiorum (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.), pp. 137; 195–6.

6. Farrell, op. cit., p. 422.

7. Ratio of 1599, Comm. Cl. Inf., 3–9; Fitzpatrick, op. cit., pp. 195–97.

8. Josephus Juvencius, S.J., De Ratione Discendi et Docendi (Paris: Delalain, 1809), II, cap. 1, art. 1–2.

9. Juvencius, op. cit., I, cap. 2, art. ii.

10. Juvencius, op. cit., I, cap. 2, art. ii–iii.

11. Loc. cit.

12. Ratio of 1599, Comm. Cl. Inf. 1, 5; Reg. externorum 1–7; Fitzpatrick, op. cit., pp. 1995–6; 240–42.

13. Ratio of 1599, Comm. Cl. Inf. 1, 3, 5–6; Reg. Externorum 14–15; Fitzpatrick, op. cit., pp. 195–96; p. 243.

14. Ratio of 1599, Comm. Cl. Inf. 6, 8; Fitzpatrick, op. cit., p. 196; Juvencius, op. cit., II, cap. 1, art. i–iii.

15. Ratio of 1599, Reg. Externorum 1–15; Fitzpatrick, op. cit., pp. 241–43.

16. Juvencius, op cit., II, cap. 1, art. i–iii.

17. Loc. cit.

18. Ratio of 1599, Reg. Externorum 1, 6–15; Comm. Cl. Inf. 31–4; Fitzpatrick, op. cit., pp. 241–43; 203–4; Juvencius, op. cit., II, cap. 2, art. iii, n. 3.

19. Juvencius, op. cit., I, cap. 2, art. ii.

20. Juvencius, op. cit., I. cap. 2, art. i, no. x.

21. Ratio of 1599, Comm. Cl. Inf. 31, 35–36; Acad. 7–11; Fitzpatrick, op. cit., pp. 203–05; 241–46.

22. Ratio of 1599, Comm. Cl. Inf. 41–43; Fitzpatrick, op. cit., pp. 206–7; Juvencius, op. cit., II, cap. 2, art. i–ii, v.

23. Juvencius, op. cit., II, cap. 3, art. i–ii.

24. Ratio of 1599, Comm. Cl. Inf. 1–10; Fitzpatrick, op. cit., pp. 195–7.

25. Ratio of 1599, Comm. Cl. Inf. 5; Fitzpatrick, op. cit., p. 196.

26. Farrell, op. cit., p. 357.

27. Ratio of 1599, Rector 23; Acad. 2; Fitzpatrick, op. cit., pp. 142–3; 243–4.

28. Jaime Castiello, S.J., Geistesformung, Beitrage zur experimentellen Erforschung der formalen Bildung (Berlin, 1934).

29. Juvencius, op. cit., II, cap. 1, art. ii; cap. 3, art. i–ii.

30. Ratio of 1599, Comm. Cl. Inf. 39–40; Praef. Stud. Inf. 11, 38, 41; Fitzpatrick, op. cit., pp. 205–6; 191–88.

31. Ratio of 1599, Comm. Cl. Inf. 1–9; Fitzpatrick, op. cit., pp. 195–6.

32. Juvencius, op. cit., I, cap. 3, art. 2.

33. Ratio of 1599, Comm. Cl. Inf. 19–22, 31, 36; Fitzpatrick, op. cit., pp. 199–200, 203–5; Juvencius, op. cit., II, cap. 2, art. iii.

34. Juvencius, op. cit., II, cap. 1, art. i–iii.

35. Ratio of 1599, Acad. 1–12; Fitzpatrick, op. cit., pp. 243–6.

36. Ratio of 1599, Comm. Cl. Inf. 39; Fitzpatrick, op. cit., pp. 205–6.

37. Loc. cit.; Juvencius, op. cit., II, cap. 3, art. i.

38. Ratio of 1599, Comm. Cl. Inf. 40; Fitzpatrick, op. cit., p. 206.

39. Ratio of 1599, Praef. Stud. Inf. 1–2, 43–46; Comm. Cl. Inf. 39, 41; Fitzpatrick, op. cit., 176, 188–9; 205–6.

40. Ratio of 1599, Reg. Externorum 1–15; Fitzpatrick, op. cit., pp. 241–3.

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Source: Eugene J. Devlin, S.J., "Character Formation in the Ratio Studiorum," Jesuit Educational Quarterly 15, no. 4 (March 1953): 213–222.

Miguel Bernad, The Class of "Humanities" in the Ratio Studiorum (1953)

[197] *

Three things are noteworthy in the Jesuit system of education: its plan, its content, and its spirit. Its content may be briefly summarized as the synthesis of classical humanism with Christian theology and philosophy. Its spirit may be described as the resultant of two forces: the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius Loyola, and that magnificent spirit which was dominant in Europe when Jesuit schools were in their infancy and which produced the Renaissance and the Age of Baroque. But it is the plan of the Jesuit studies that we are here concerned.

Of that plan, or pattern, the fundamental structural principal was that of progression by graded stages. For want of a better term, let us call this principle "grading." Grammar came before rhetoric, rhetoric before philosophy, philosophy before theology and the other university faculties of medicine and law.[1] Even the study of grammar itself was arranged into graded stages: the student progressed from the class called infima grammatica through media to suprema. No one was to be promoted to a higher class who had not mastered the subject-matter of the lower, and on the other hand when he had mastered the subject-matter of the lower class, he was to be promoted to the upper class even at mid-year.[2] The "grade" (scope and objective) of each class was so sharply defined as to leave no room for doubt, and each succeeding class built on the work of the proceeding.

Thus, the aim of infima grammatica was a "perfect mastery of the rudiments of language, and an initial knowledge of syntax." (rudimentorum [198] perfecta, syntaxis inchoata cognitio). The class of media grammatica aimed at "total, though not yet exhaustive, knowledge of grammar" (totius quidem grammaticae, minus tamen plena cognitio). Finally, the student in suprema was expected to strive after absolute mastery of grammar (Gradus huius scholae est absoluta grammaticae cognitio).[3]

It is in the light of this principle of "grading" that we should examine the nature of the class called "humanities" in the Jesuit pedagogical system. This class[4] occupied a strategic position in the Jesuit plan of studies: midway between grammar and rhetoric, perfecting the one, preparing for the other.

The "grade" of the class of humanities is thus defined in the Ratio Studiorum:

Gradus huius scholae est, postquam ex grammaticis excesserint, praeparare veluti solum eloquentiae; quod tripliciter accidit, cognitione linguae, aliqua eruditione, et brevi informatione praeceptorum ad rhetoricam spectantium.[5]

Translated freely, this means that student was expected to gain mastery of language, greater than that achieved in the grammar classes, and that in doing so, he was to prepare the "groundwork" for the study of eloquence to be undertaken in the next class, that of rhetoric. This twofold aim, furthermore, was to be achieved through a threefold [sic] means: cognitio linguae, aliqua eruditio, brevis informatio praeceptorum ad rhetoricam spectantium.

It is this writer's opinion that this three-fold [sic] means (just mentioned) is the key to the understanding, not only of the class of humanities, but also of the entire literary and linguistic phase of Jesuit studies—the so-called studia inferiora.[6]

It is therefore important to determine the precise meaning of each of these three phrases. Let us try to do so by a closer inspection of the text of the Ratio Studiorum,[7] as well as of the wider context of Jesuit documents.

[199] Cognitio Linguae

This phrase could not have meant a mere "reading" (or even a "speaking") knowledge of a language (primarily Latin). This kind of knowledge was presupposed before a student was admitted to the class of humanities: postquam ex grammaticis excesserint. Perfect mastery of "grammar" was the aim of the suprema grammatica class—absoluta grammaticae cognitio—an ideal, incidentally, which implied much more than a ready knowledge of grammatical rules.[8]

Cognitio linguae in this context, therefore, must mean a deeper knowledge of a language, a penetrating insight into its genius. Such a knowledge implied familiarity with the peculiarities of idiom of a given tongue, its patterns of thought, its way of viewing the world, its nuances, its idiosyncracies [sic], its elegances, its characteristic rhythms. Only he may be said to have mastered a language who has made these qualities his own.

This interpretation, based on the context of the rule, would seem, at first sight, to be contradicted by the text itself of the rule in which the phrase occurs, namely the first rule for the professor of humanities: for there, the phrase cognitio linguae is explained as quae in proprietate maxime et copia consistit. It would be possible, apart from the context, to understand copia as meaning merely a wide vocabulary, and proprietas as meaning merely the correct use of idioms. But the words must be understood in the light of the context; and the word proprietas, moreover, has been used by the best classical authors in a more refined sense than that just given.[9]

The term cognitio linguae invites comparison with a silver term in that [200] standard manual of Jesuit spirituality, the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius, where the term interna cognitio never means any ordinary knowledge, but a profound insight which moves the soul to the depths of its being.[10]

Thus, considered in the light of its context (both the more immediate context of the Ratio Studiorum and the wider context of standard Jesuit usage), the term cognitio linguae would seem to mean the kind of linguistic mastery which involves penetrating insight into the very nature of a language, into its "inscape"—to borrow a word from a Jesuit poet.

How is this linguistic mastery to be obtained? The first rule for the professor of humanities gives the answer: it is to be obtained by the careful reading of the classical authors (orators, poets, and historians), and by that method of teaching the authors which is called "prelection."

The list of authors prescribed for study in the class of humanities was much longer than that prescribed for the ordinary (undergraduate) Latin classes of today. The list included, first, the "historians": Caesar, Sallust, Livy, and similar authors (et si qui sunt similes). Second, the "poets": Horace, the "elegies, epigrams, and other poems of the great poets of antiquity"—provided duly expurgated (modo sint ab omni obscaenitate expurgati), but principally Virgil, all of whose works were read except the Eclogues (which formed part of the subject-matter for suprema grammatica)[11] and the fourth book of the Aeneid (not considered proper class reading for a class of young adolescents).[12] Thirdly, there were the orators, but only one of these was to be "prelected" in class, namely Cicero. Since his Letters had been studied in the grammar classes and his Orations would form the bulk of the student's reading in the class of [201] rhetoric, his philosophical works were chosen for study in the class of humanities.[13]

In Greek, the list of authors was shorter as Greek always held a subordinate (though important) position to Latin in the Jesuit educational system. In the first semester, some "easier" (ex facilioribus) were read, v.g. St. John Chrysostom, St. Basil, Isocrates, Plato, Synesius, and selections from Plutarch, all prose works. In the second semester, Greek poetry was read: Phocylides, Theognis, Synesius, St. Gregory Nazianzen, et horum similes.[14]

The study of the vernacular authors was naturally not as extensive, or as formal, as it is now. The importance accorded to the vernacular was one of the chief differences between the Ratio Studiorum of 1599 and that of 1832.[15]

So much for the authors studied. The method of teaching was of at least equal importance. It consisted principally of three elements: the prelection, the repetition, and the various exercises in linguistic composition both oral and written. We need here say only a word about the prelection.

Just as the classes were "graded," so the prelection was graded. The manner of prelecting an author in the class of infima grammatica was considerably different from the manner of prelecting a Ciceronian oration in the class of rhetoric.[16] The difference stemmed not so much from the differences of subject-matter, as from the difference in objectives and in emphases: the professor of grammar was interested in getting across to his students the meaning of a passage and its idiomatic excellence; the professor of rhetoric was interested in the marshalling of ideas (dispositio), the adroitness of the arguments, their force, their relevance, etc.

The professor of humanities, in like manner, was to conduct his prelections in a manner suited to the scope and objectives of the class. In explaining a passage, he was to call attention to the niceties of language, the exact force of the words, their etymology—basing his observations on these points upon the practice of the best authors. He should note the [202] elegant turn of phrase, and the versatility of expression which the author commands. He should compare the Latin with the original, drawing attention to the peculiar genius of each language. He should also show the student how to imitate the author's style. All this while, his explanation would be interspersed with interesting facts and comments and explaining the allusions which the passage contains. If the passage under study was an oration or part of one, he was to explain the rhetorical artistry, and cite the rhetorical rules exemplified in it. Finally, when all this explanation was completed, the professor might, if he so desired, translate the entire passage into the vernacular, taking care, however, to produce a flawless translation, the elegance of the latter rivaling that of the original.[17]

It was by these means—wide and careful reading of the classical authors, and the appropriate method of prelections (to say nothing of the frequent and varied exercises in oral and written composition)—that mastery of language was obtained, a necessary groundwork, certainly, to eloquence (praeparare veluti solum eloquentiae).

Aliqua Eruditio

There are several ways of studying the classics. One way is to study them as historical, sociological, archaeological, or other scientific documents. Another way is to study them in search of biographical and psychological data regarding their authors. A third way is to study them merely as examples of grammatical or rhetorical precepts, or as sources for linguistics and philology. A fourth way is to study them as masterpieces of literature, to be understood, appreciated, evaluated, interpreted, and imitated.[18] In the first two of the above-named approaches, the emphasis would naturally fall on factual information—what the Ratio Studiorum calls eruditio. Thus, the sentence "Non in campo, non in foro, non in curia, non denique intra domesticos parietes, etc.," would be [203] explained in such a way as to bring foward as much archaeological and othe rinformation regarding Campus, Forum, Curia, and the Roman home. Since the approach of the Ratio Studiorum is a combination of the third and fourth approaches mentioned above, the emphasis naturally was placed on the literary qualities of the classics, rather than on the factual information to be gleaned from or about them.

The strictly subordinate position accorded to "erudition" by the Ratio Studiorum is easily understood when it is remembered that the students in the studia inferiora were boys in their teens preparing for philosophy and the "higher" (i.e. professional) faculties of theology, medicine, and law; they were not students in a modern graduate school, specializing in some branch of philology. 

Like most things in the studia inferiora, the imparting of factual information was "graded." In the grammar classes, it was to be done sparingly, and only when necessary for the understanding of the text.[19] In the class of humanities, a much greater place was to be accorded to "erudition"; not only what was needed for the understanding of the text, but also such as would enliven the class, excite intellectual curiousity [sic], or (perhaps even) create a laugh.[20] In the class of rhetoric, finally, erudition comes into its own. The professor of rhetoric was to draw from every available source—ex historia, ex moribus gentium, ex auctoritate scriptorum, et ex omni doctrina—for material to illustrate and enliven his prelections.[21]

Thus, though held strictly subordinate, "erudition" was given its due importance. For erudition is important, not only for the understanding of literature, whether classic or modern (how much erudition, for instance, is needed to understand Milton or T. S. Eliot!), but also for the specific purpose of the class of humanities—praeparare veluti solum eloquentiae. And on the need that the orator has for vast stories of learning, none has spoken more emphatically than Cicero himself.[22]

Brevis Informatio Praeceptorum

The student of humanities was expected to read literature not only with an eye to language (cognitio linguae) and factual information (aliqua eruditio), but also with an eye to technique. Hence, the direction [204] praecepta artis exploret: let the professor of humanities, in prelecting an author (particularly of oratorical prose), draw attention to the author's rhetorical technique.[23]

To this end, (and also to serve as an introduction to the more detailed study of rhetorical art in the next class), the precepts of rhetoric were to be explained briefly in the class of humanities: brevis informatio praeceptorum ad rhetorican spectantium. The textbook for this was that of Father Cyprian Soarez, based on Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian.[24] It should be noted that by praetepta ad rhetoricam spectantia were probably meant not only rhetorical precepts strictly so-called, but also other precepts de arte dicendi, for instance those concerning prosody and the genres of poetry.[25]

Two things might be noted before we leave the subject. One was the emphasis, in the Ratio Studiorum, on prose rather than verse, on oratory rather than poetry. This had its practical as well as its historical reasons. From the practical standpoint, the Jesuit colleges were designed to educate not recluses but men of affairs, in both the clerical and the lay state, and in both the republic of affairs as in that of letters—and men of affairs, whether they be professors or politicians, diplomats or preachers, usually speak in prose and not in verse. From the historical standpoint, the emphasis on prose was a characteristic of the Renaissance, with its enthusiasm for Cicero—an enthusiasm, incidentally, which was shared in no small degree by the Jesuits.[26] There was also the spirit of the times—the zeitgeist—of the Renaissance and the Age of Baroque—the age of public buildings and public spectacles, the age not so much of ornateness as of exuberance, an exuberance (on the Continent at least) more conducive to the displays of oratory than to the quiet meditativeness of poetry. Whatever the source, the emphasis was on prose rather than on verse; and in this respect (among others), the class of humanities of the Ratio Studiorum [205] differed from its modern counterpart in present-day American Jesuit colleges, where the class of humanities is generally known as the "class of poetry."

The second thing to be noted was the emphasis, throughout the Ratio Studiorum on composition, both written and oral. The classes of humanities and of rhetoric were not theoretical courses in literary criticism. They were formative courses in which the student's powers of thought, emotion, imagination, memory, and expression were exercised and developed. In reading the authors, the student was expected not only to understand, appreciate, interpret, and judge, but also, as much as possible, to attempt to rival them.

Conclusion

The Jesuit system of studies was a system with a plan, a pattern, of which the fundamental structural principle was that of "grading." It was this principle that enabled the authors of the Ratio Studiorum to define with precision the level, scope, objectives (gradus) of every class. And it was this principle which enabled the student to advance in his studies, mastering one thing at a time in ordered progression.

In this pattern, the class of humanities occupied a strategic position, midway between the classes of grammar on the one hand, and that of rhetoric on the other. The class of humanities, therefore, had a twofold function to perform: on the one hand, to put the finishing touches to the work of the grammer [sic] classes; on the other, to prepare the soil for the class of rhetoric.

This twofold function was performed by placing before the student three objectives for his endeavors: cognitio linguae, aliqua eruditio, brevis informatio praeceptorum ad rhetoricam spectantium.

Whatever accusations might be hurled against Jesuit pedagogy (and there have been many), it cannot be accused of being vague in its aims, or of wanting system in its methods.

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Footnotes:

* Adapted from the introductory chapter of a doctoral dissertation presented to the Graduate School of Yale University, 1951.

1. The principle of "grading" was part of the heritage which the first Jesuits, Masters of Arts of the University of Paris, inherited from their Alma Mater. St. Ignatius insisted that the "method of Paris" be followed in Jesuit schools. See Allan P. Farrell, The Jesuit Code of Liberal Education, (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1938), pp. 30–27 and elsewhere passim.

2. "Generalis solemnisque promotio semel in anno post anniversarias vacationes facienda est. Si qui tamen longe excelant, atque in superiore schola magis quam in sua profecturi videantur . . . nequaquam detineantur, sed quocumque anni tempore post examen ascendant. Quamquam a suprema grammatica ad humanitatem, et ab humanitate ad rhetoricam vix patet ascensus." Ratio Studiorum (1832; cf. 1599), Reg. praef. stud. inf. 13.

3. Reg. prof. inf. gram. 1; med. gram. 1; sup. gram. 1. Unless otherwise indicated all references to the Ratio Studiorum will be to the 1599 edition, cited simply as R. S.

4. "Class in American university language," says Professor Morison, "means the persons who enter college the same year, and presumably graduate at the same time." (Development of Harvard University Since the Inauguration of President Eliot, Cambridge, Mass. 1930, p. xl). In the Jesuit system of studies, "class" is equivalent to "grade" and refers primarily to the grade itself, not to the persons in it.

5. R. S., Reg. prof. hum. 1.

6. The Jesuit college had ordinarily two "faculties": the "lower" (grammar, humanities, rhetoric) and the "higher" (philosophy, theology).

7. The term Ratio Studiorum is ambiguous. It refers both to the principles and methods of Jesuit pedagogy, and to the books in which these principles and methods have been codified. There have been five such codifications: 1586, 1591, 1599, 1832, and the partial codification of 1941. Of these, only the codification of 1599 was definitive, and it enjoyed the force of law in the Society of Jesus from that date till the Society's suppression in 1773. The texts of the editions of 1586, 1599, and 1832 have been edited by G. M. Pachtler, Ratio studiorum et institutiones scholasticae Societatis Iesu per Germaniam olim vigentes, (4 vols., Berlin: 1887–1894), Vol. II These four volumes are parts of the series, Monumenta Germaniae Paedagogica, ed. Karl Kehrbach. The Ratio of 1591 is reprinted in part in T. Corcoran's Renatae litterae saeculo a Christo XVI in scholis Societatis Iesu stabilitae, (Dublin 1927).

8. The term "grammar" as used in the Ratio Studiorum should be understood in its classical sense. Cf. Cicero, De oratore, I. 42. 187; Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, II, 1. 4. See also the six "parts" of "grammar" according to Dionysius Thrax, apud J. E. Sandys, A History of Classical Scholarship, Vol. I (2nd ed., Cambridge, 1906), pp. 7–8.

9. Forcellini defines the sensus proprius of proprietas as: "propria vis et natura cuiusque rei, quialitas facultas, quae ab aliis differt." The term proprietas verborum he defines as "conjunctio illorum ati et apta cum rebus ipsis, quas significant." He cites Quintilian, 8. 2. 1. (Lexicon totius Latinitatis, ed. Corradini et Perin, Patavii, 1864–1890, reprinted 1940, Vol. III, p. 923). Harper's Latin Dictionary cites a passage which is probably more to our point: Quintilian 5. 14. 33–35.

10. For instance, in the Third Exercise of the First Week: "para que sienta interno conoscimiento de mis peccados y aborrescimiento dellos." This is translated by the Versio Vulgata as: "ut internam criminum nostrorum cognitionem ac detestationem sentiamus," by the Versio Prima as "ut habeam sensum internum. . . ," (Exercitia spiritualia sancti Ignatii de Loyola el eorum directoria, "Monumenta Historica Societatis Iesu," Monumenta Ignatiana, series secunda, Madrid 1919, pp. 290–291). It is significant that the exercitant prays for this "interior knowledge" after he has presumably obtained a considerable amount of knowledge in the three previous Exercises.

11. Cf. R.S., Reg. prof. sup. gram. 1 and passim.

12. In the European educational system, then as now, the student of humanities or rhetoric would be considerably younger than his modern American counterpart. Jose Rizal, the Filipino national hero, was a student of humanities at the age of thirteen, of rhetoric at fourteen, and of philosophy at fifteen, at the Jesuit Ateneo Municipal de Manila (now the Ateneo de Manila, at present under the direction of American and Filipino Jesuits). He attended that college from 1872 to 1877, graudating in the latter year with the B.A. degree before his sixteenth birthday. See J. Rizal, Memorias de Un Estudiante de Manila, Spanish text and English translation by Leon Ma. Guerrero, (Manila 1950), pp. 36–40.

13. ". . .  in quotidianis praelectionibus explicetur ex Oratoribus unus Cicero, iis fere libris, qui philosophiam de moribus continent. . ." Reg. prof. hum. 1 (1599). Compare however, the same rule in the 1832 edition.

14. Loc. cit.

15. "In lingua vernacula ediscenda, eadem fere methodo procedatur ac in linguae latinae studio." R.S. (1832), Reg. com. prof. class. inf. 12, sect. 2. Although no formal provision was made for the vernacular in the 1599 edition, it was sufficiently implied in those prescriptions concerning translation. On the vernacular in the Ratio, see R. Schwickerath, Jesuit Education: Its History and Principles (2nd. ed., St. Louis 1904), pp. 351–360 and elsewhere passim.

16. Cp. Reg. prof. inf. gram. with those for the professor of rhetoric.

17. "Praelectio eruditionis ornamentis leviter aspersa sit, quantum loci explicatio postulat: se totum potius Magister effundat in latinae et vernaculae linguae observationes, in vim etymologiamque verborum, quam ex probatis petet auctoribus; in locutionum usum ac varietatem, in collationem indolis utriusque linguae, in auctoris imitationem. Quando autem orationem explicat, praecepta artis exploret. Ad extremum licebit, si videatur, omni patrio sermone, sed quam elegantissimo vertere."—R.S. (1832), Reg. prof. hum. 5.

18. This is true not only of the study of the Greek and Latin classics, but of all literature. It is only recently that the study of English literature has veered away from the biographical and historical approaches, and has tended to concentrate on literary criticism proper. See for instance, Rene Wellek and Austin Warren, Theory of Literature, (New York 1949), chapters I, VII–XX. See also Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren, Understanding Poetry, revised ed., (New York 1950), pp. xi–xxvi.

19. ". . . et quae ad eruditionem pertinent, si qui incidant, brevi expediat." Reg. prof. sup. gram. 5.

20. "Praelectio eruditionis ornamentis leviter aspersa sit, quantum loci explicatio postulat. . . . Eruditio modice usurpetur, ut ingenium excitet ac recreet. . . ." Reg. prof. hum. 1.

21. Reg. prof. rhet. 1.

22. De oratore, I. 4 and 5. Also Brutus, 93 and 94.

23. Reg. prof. hum. 1

24. Cf. Reg. prof. hum. 8. Father Cyprian Soarez (also spelled Suarez) was born in Spain 1524 and died 1593. He taught Humanities and Rhetoric first, then, for twenty years Sacred Scripture. His book was entitled, De Arte Rhetorica Libri III ex Aristotele, Cicerone et Quintiliano deprompti. First published at Coimbra in 1560, it went through more than twenty editions. It was ordinarily printed in octavo, of some 200 pages. See A. Astrain, Historia de la Compañia de Jesus en la Asistencia de España, Vol. IV (Madrid 1913), pp. 112–113.

25. A standard Jesuit textbook of rhetoric is J. Kleutgen's Ars dicendi priscorum potissimum praeceptis et exemplis illustrata, 12th. ed., (Turin and Rome, 1935). This work was first published at Rome in 1847.

26. See, for instance, Blessed Edmund Campion's treatise, De imitatione rhetorica, written at Prague (1577 or 1578), and included in the posthumous collection of his works: Beati Edmundi Campiani e Societate Iesu Martyris in Anglia Opuscula, Barcinone: Excudebat Franciscus Rosalius, 1888, 333 pp. The De imitatione occupies pp. 264–282.

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Source: Miguel A. Bernad, S.J., "The Class of 'Humanities' in the Ratio Studiorum," Jesuit Educational Quarterly 15, no. 4 (March 1953): 197–205.

Monday, December 7, 2020

The Disconnect Between Catholic Academics and Daily Living

One of my personal complaints against Catholic philosophy and theology for the past 100 years or so has been its increasingly academic, specialized nature and consequently its lack of immediate application to daily Catholic living. Of course, there are many counterexamples to this sentiment, but even in many of those counterexamples, one will find the same specialized, technical handling hindering its consumption by a wider, literate lay audience.

For example, take the notion of the universal call to holiness, promoted officially in Lumen Gentium, ch. 5. Bishop Sheen famously said we have entered the age of the laity. Paul VI and John Paul II promoted the same notion when they advocated repeatedly for evangelization efforts to be taken up by the lay faithful, which is tied up with the universal call to holiness since the soul of the apostolate is sanctity and the end point of evangelization is sanctity. In this ongoing academic discussion, what have we instead witnessed? Decades and decades (if not over a century) of theological disagreements over the exact nature of the development of the spiritual life and its application to apostolic work, all under the heading of spiritual theology. These are necessary debates, to be sure, but what certain, concrete conclusions may be drawn from them and given to the layman for use? Instead, many will find it much easier and more practical to read one of the classic works of spirituality, such as the Introduction to the Devout Life or the Spiritual Combat or a book of meditations by St. Alphonsus. In other words, the theological battles of the 20th century that led to the promotion of this idea that we are in the age of the laity and that the laity have a newfound responsibility to promote the causes of Our Lord through the sanctification of the world have no palpable application for actual laypeople living in the world. They must return to older works by the Saints and Doctors who had no such theological concerns in order to begin to live in a manner that the 20th century theologians have called for. Hence the disconnect between academic, specialized life and concrete lay life. 

Or take another example, the case of aesthetics. Especially in the past few decades, we have heard touted the famous line, "Beauty will save the world." Bishop Barron has been an ardent proponent of this approach to evangelization--we draw people in by beauty. Peter Kreeft has mentioned that he was partly converted by the beauty of older Catholic Churches (never mind that he was also converted by a serious reading of the Church Fathers). Yet when one skims through the academic literature conducted by Catholic philosophers and theologians on aesthetics, one is left scratching his head whether we stand on firm ground by upholding such an approach or what such a pithy phrase even means metaphysically, let alone in its concrete application to a methodology for evangelization. In the conversation between Bp. Barron and the Protestant philosopher and apologist William Lane Craig, Craig almost scoffed at the idea that we can merely evangelize through beauty. Craig's experience (and his reference to sociological data to support his experience) is that people leave the faith or question the faith because they perceive it to be intellectually bankrupt. The moral bankruptcy of ecclesiastical figures then "seals the deal" on their leaving the practice of religion. In Craig's estimation (and many of his colleagues who have spent decades in Christian philosophy and evangelization work), people need the assurance and proof that the Christian faith has deep, intellectual anchors, and that these anchors have real application to daily living. While beauty might appeal and draw a person in, that intuitive attraction needs to be fleshed out conceptually if the person is to stay since intuitions, like emotions, are fleeting, but convictions rest on habits of thinking.

Hence in Barron's approach, one can see that a "Catholic" commentary on culture and the arts is interesting and provides much food for thought, it doesn't actually explain why the Catholic faith is true or how the Catholic conception of religious life applies to daily living. A commentary on a movie or a song may serve a springboard for an interesting conversation and may open one's aesthetic appreciations, it is hard to perceive that such an approach would have anything close to the corrective effects that Craig's and other apologists' approach has been, which directly addresses the errors of thinking in modern society and how these errors in turn trickle down into wider culture.

To be fair, the approaches of Barron and Craig are not mutually exclusive, and these two men are approaching their goals based on their very different experiences. It is conceivable that some complementary, third way or tiered method of evangelization that makes use of both approaches may be conceived and developed, but this very need to do so, and the technical precision with which it must be done for philosophical and theological accuracy, affirm my initial contention: the theology of evangelization is fundamentally disconnected from the practice of it.

The Church in fact had encountered this difficulty with Catholic Action. Fervent Catholic men and women leading political causes on behalf of Christ the King ended up being more political than Catholic, and the Church was often pressed into the difficult decision of how to support these movements in the midst of very difficult political maneuvering from the 19th century and on. Reflecting on the role of Catholic Action, perhaps one may say that the multifaceted causes that feed political and social movements are almost impossible to fully analyze especially in the moment, and an apostolic effort to steer or influence those movements, to avoid getting lost in the uncertainty of the present, must remain firmly grounded on the supernatural foundation of prayer, trust in God, and sacrifices. And the fruits of one's efforts may not be seen in one's lifetime since these movements were centuries in the making.

And for a third example, it has often been remarked that Catholic morality has nothing to do with daily life. What this sentiment typically means is something twofold: 1) the Church has nothing to do with how I conduct my private or public life; and 2) the convoluted, casuistic reasoning of theological writings has little application for my daily living since there is no one to translate that reasoning into concrete norms suitable for a lay audience.

Of course, the first half of the sentiment is completely wrong and predicated on the success of post-Enlightenment liberalism + the way of life made possible by industrial, technical, medical advances (=modernity), but the second half is often reflecting a truth. The moral reasoning that upheld Catholic living increasingly not only disagreed with modern moral sentiments, but it also increasingly had nothing to do with how modern moral frameworks conceived and articulated themselves and hence nothing to do with how people went about their daily moral decision-making once those frameworks trickled down into popular culture. These are points far better articulated and discussed by Alasdair MacIntyre in his works for the past 40 years. 

In other words, the arguments of Humanae Vitae literally have nothing to say to the "modern man" (whatever that means). It is inconceivable to a modern person how metaphysical and theological arguments around the nature of the marital act could have conclusions against acts like contraception since the marital act is not even conceived as reserved to marriage, and certainly not with any outdated metaphysical or theological accoutrements.

Pro-life arguments often take a mostly secular line of reasoning and not even from natural law considerations but arguments from the science/biology of conception, the application of a liberal society's conception of human rights and dignity, etc. One can retroactively or anachronistically apply natural law "tailoring" to those argumentative approaches, but for the pro-life movement to have such widespread support, it must fundamentally appeal to modern sentiments: liberalism, science, dignity, rights, etc. These all make the most sense within a Catholic metaphysics, but they cannot be articulated as such by the widespread; otherwise we would lose the support of the Evangelicals and pro-life secularists, and the movement would most likely fall apart. Hence one even has the paradox that abortion is conceivable as a "right" only within a liberal paradigm and yet one argues against that right using the same paradigm that makes it possible. Within a Catholic milieu, there would be no possible way of thinking that one had a "right" to abortion and hence no need to argue against it using the same conceptual framework.

But regardless, moral arguments from the Catholic tradition are stereotypically caricaturized as debates on "how many angels dance on the head of a pin." To summarize: they are useless, impractical, academic, convoluted, etc.

This all of course being a long-winded preface to my next consideration, the morality surrounding the Covid vaccine. To be continued...

Thursday, November 5, 2020

N.M. Wagner on Secular Orchestral Masses (1909)

 [92] Why are the Masses composed by Jos. Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, Weber, Cherubini, Bruch and Gounod not true church music?

We admit that the musical composition as such is of artistic value; however, the Masses of these masters are not true church music because the spirit of the decrees issued by the Church on church music is wanting in them, either because of

(a) their form (concert-like, soli, duetts [sic], superfluous repetition of words, incorrect text or misplacement of words or omission of words) or because of

(b) their style of musical composition (which is worldly, theatrical, distracting instead of edifying; while the composition is not suited to the words, but the words are forced to suit the music). For instance, do we not notice in Mozart's "C" Mass motives similar to those in the opera Cosi Fan Tutti? Does the Gloria in Gounod's Paschal Mass not spontaneously remind us of passages in his Faust? In the style of musical composition employed, these men did not, therefore, distinguish between music for the stage and music for the church. Again, I find a Sanctus in one of Bruch's Masses the rendition of which would take about as long as a Credo of one of the Cecilian Masses, not to mention the ridiculously long Masses of Beethoven and Haydn; e.g., Beethoven's Missa Solemnis.

The impossibility of rendering the classical compositions of these masters [Beethoven, Haydn, Mozart] with correctness and fidelity, because of their difficulty, prompted imitators like Wiegand, Lambillotte, Millard, Giorza, Diabelli, Dachauer, La Hache, Mercadante, Novello, Farmer, Stearn, etc., etc., to produce diluted substitutes. These imitators would obviate the difficulties while retaining the attractive form of the others, and their results are found in the compositions which, in abundance of repititon of words and mutilation of text, go beyond the classical authors, and in their attempt to give musical value merely become vulgar.

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Source: Excerpt of an address by Rev. N. M. Wagner (trans. from German) in St. Peter's Church, Newark, NJ in "Notes," Church Music: A Magazine for the Clergy, Choirmasters and Organists 4, no. 2 (Jan. 1909): 92.