Ironic Reviews of Two Magna Opera in Spiritual Theology

Fr. Jordan Aumann and Fr. Antonio Royo Marin were the successors to Fr. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange in systematic spiritual theology. While they were well-respected masters in the field, their works clearly betray a more theologically conservative bent that was almost completely rejected during the feverish explosion of wild theological fads in the aftermath of Vatican II. Both theologians incorporated Vatican II into their works (or later editions), but they sometimes received the accusation that this incorporation was more like paying lip service to the Council rather than using its spirit as a springboard into more radical and revolutionary thought. Aumann and Royo Marin were seen as theologically boring fuddy-duddies. An exception to this may be seen in Aumann's work on the lay apostolate and lay spirituality, On the Front Lines, making great use of the Vatican II document Apostolicam Actuositatem and other post-conciliar documents. One former seminary rector and diocesan vicar general I know who studied under Aumann at the Angelicum exclaimed to me, "He was the most boring professor I've ever had!!!" Nevertheless, they continued steadfastly and produced works that have stood the test of time and continue to be used at the Angelicum.

I meant to post these reviews a long time ago and have finally gotten around to them. Fr. Dubay is well known for his collection of books on the spiritual life, mostly published through Ignatius Press. His magnum opus is Fire Within (published 1989), which summarizes the teachings of Sts. Teresa of Avila and John of the Cross on the spiritual life. His reputation as a master of the spiritual life is rightfully held among conservative Catholics who are interested in these sorts of books. What is lesser known of Fr. Dubay is his quite harsh review in Theological Studies of Fr. Aumann's classic text Spiritual Theology, published in 1980, that betrays Fr. Dubay's high esteem for "contemporary theology," which Aumann seems to make a point of ignoring in much of his work. Or if Aumann quotes from contemporary authors, it is only to confirm the point he is already offering.

Yet in a twist of irony, only nine years later, Fr. Dubay's great work makes mention of only a few contemporary theologians, and the review of Dubay's work notes that it adheres to older interpretive frameworks and ignores certain trends in contemporary theology—in the very same theological journal in which Dubay had formerly critiqued Aumann! To be fair to Dubay, his work doesn't claim to be a synthesis of spiritual theology but only of the thought of the two great Carmelite mystic saints. Nevertheless its overall framework fits well into the traditional works on spiritual theology. It was nice to see that Dubay moved away from these fads somewhat as time went on and settled into a more balanced and holistic approach. I will note Dubay's criticism that Aumann's work would likely not be retained "as a ready reference" among his intended audience fortunately turned out to be false. 

So, I present below, with my snarky commentary interspersed, the two reviews, first of Fr. Aumann's Spiritual Theology, reviewed by Fr. Dubay, and second of Fr. Dubay's Fire Within, reviewed by Fr. Steven Payne, OCD.

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[163] SPIRITUAL THEOLOGY. By Jordan Aumann, O.P. Huntington, Ind.: Our Sunday Visitor, 1980. Pp. 456. $18.95.

This volume may be viewed as a case study of one of the central problems facing contemporary theology if it is to regain the position it once held in the mind of the general public: the fragmentation-polarization problem. On the one hand, A. [i.e. Aumann] considers his book to be a "response to numerous requests for a complete and definitive work on Christian spirituality" (11). On the other hand, it is safe to say that many of its intended audience will not retain it as a ready reference. Those who view this work as definitive can point to its being based mainly on the teaching of St. Thomas, St. John of the Cross, and St. Teresa of Avila. It therefore avoids pop theories such as psychologized horizontalism or creation-centered "spirituality." It is orderly and clear. As long as systematic theology remains heavily theoretical and moral theology continues to avoid the totality themes of Scripture, there will remain a need for what we call spiritual theology. The title of this book is well chosen, for it is what it says it is. Part 1 deals with doctrinal foundations: the nature and scope of spiritual theology, the goal of the Christian life, its Christic and Marian character, the "supernatural organism," perfection and mystical experience. Part 2 is concerned with growth in holiness: conversion, purification, sacraments, the virtues, prayer and its development, extraordinary mystical phenomena, and aids to growth such as spiritual reading and direction.

Why, then, is it unlikely that many others will not retain Spiritual Theology as a ready reference? The main problem is not that the volume [164] is only partially new. That much of it is a republication is indicated by the preface itself when it notes that "some sections are taken substantially" from Royo-Aumann's The Theology of Christian Perfection published in 1962. The main difficulty is that while Vatican II does get some attention, contemporary thinkers are quite completely left aside. The renewal of biblical studies in the last thirty years has yielded an immense enrichment to our understanding of the spiritual life. Specialized studies on prayer, community, discernment, virginity, poverty, freedom, and authority would have added a great deal to the Dominican and Carmelite synthesis offered by A. [One wonders if only the religious orders had also been aware of these specialized studies, then perhaps they would not have suffered so much attrition following the council! Sarcasm.] Reluctant though I be to record it, I found no hint in this stout volume that anything significant in spiritual theology has happened since the Council. While some recent contributions are flimsy and fanciful, others are rich, even brilliant. A contemporary synthesis must be tangibly influenced by the fresh insights of men like Balthasar, Congar, Galot, Rahner, Daniélou, Sheets, Legrand, Merton, Van Kaam, and Knight.

Some people will be put off, rightly or wrongly, by minor irritants. A. occasionally uses terms that sound foreign to our times: "the various faculties of the soul.. .exercises of piety.. .philosophically repugnant... the passive purgations.. .the efficient cause.. .the formal cause..." [How minorly irritating indeed.] He sometimes writes of what theologians hold and do not hold when actually his statement is true only in the past tense. For example, noting that St. Thomas responded affirmatively to the question as to whether the gifts of the Holy Spirit are habits or not, A. remarks that "theologians of all schools hold for the same response, with few exceptions" (91). I fear it would be closer to the truth to say that the exceptions today are those who even discuss the question at all. This fact may be lamentable, but it seems to be the case. On the next page we read that "it is commonly taught by theologians that the gifts are the perfection of the infused virtues." This may be true in the past tense, but what is common today is nondiscussion [sic] of the subject.

A. rightly insists that deep prayer, infused contemplation, is meant for all men and women, and he cites Vatican II to this effect. He does not notice, however, the most telling and explicit conciliar texts, texts that are incompatible with the two-way theory of reaching sanctity. This most recent of the councils has made it clear that mystical prayer is a normal development of our grace life, that it is not reserved to an elite, that it is not "extraordinary." [Here Dubay clearly misunderstands Aumann, who, like Garrigou-Lagrange, was staunch in arguing against the two-way theory.]

In the judgment of this reviewer, a definitive work must not only be solid, deep, clear, and orthodox. It must likewise reflect the best in contemporary approaches and insight, for we live in our age, not another. It seems to me that we still await the definitive work in spiritual theology. [This is obviously a contradiction in concepts; a work cannot be simultaneously definitive and contemporary since the latter is always evolving. Such a work can only mention the contemporary trends, but anything truly definitive, by definition, must stand the test of time and above all passing fads by adhering to unchanging principles applicable to all times and circumstances.]

Marist Center, Washington, D.C.    THOMAS DUBAY, S.M.

Source: Thomas Dubay, "AUMANN, J., O.P.: Spiritual Theology," Theological Studies 42, no. 1 (Mar. 1981): 163–164.

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[539] FIRE WITHIN: ST. TERESA OF AVILA, ST. JOHN OF THE CROSS, AND THE GOSPEL—ON PRAYER. By Thomas Dubay, S.M. San Francisco: Ignatius, 1989. Pp. vii + 358. $17.95.

With the growing popularity of Teresa of Avila and John of the Cross, this overview of their spiritual doctrine fills an urgent need. Nothing of comparable scope and quality has been available in English since E. W. Trueman Dicken's 1963 classic The Crucible of Love.

Dubay's approach is thematic and practical, intended "for all men and women in every way of life" (4). In an initial programmatic chapter he bases the contemporary relevance of John and Teresa on the universal call to holiness and contemplative prayer stressed by Vatican II, arguing that "the teachings of Teresa and John are nothing more or less than the integral Gospel," a claim he supports throughout by identifying corresponding NT passages for every crucial element in their doctrine. This scriptural component is a welcome feature, though D.'s [i.e. Dubay's] treatment of NT spirituality is developed in relation to Teresa and John rather than on its own terms, so that some themes (e.g., the communal dimensions of holiness) tend to be underrepresented. Still, the biblical citations are handled well, without manipulative "proof-texting."

Chapter 2 offers a brief introduction to the lives, writings, and personalities of the two Carmelite saints, while subsequent chapters provide a synthesis of their teaching on the major phases and elements of the spiritual life; here D. retraces the traditional journey from discursive meditation, through initial contemplation and both active and passive purifications, to transforming union. The final chapters deal with a variety of related topics, including distractions in prayer, discernment, extraordinary experiences, friendships, spiritual direction, wholeness, and freedom.

Since this is a popular rather than academic work, D. avoids technical questions and disputed points in Teresian and Sanjuanist scholarship. He makes virtually no mention of research from the past two decades, preferring (perhaps wisely) to remain in the older interpretive mainstream. [Remaining in the "older interpretive mainstream" is always bad.] Readers will have to look elsewhere for recent discoveries regarding the social, cultural, and economic implications of the Teresian program. [Thankfully. Does anyone really want to see contemporary theologians' analyses on the economic implications of the Teresian program?] Still, it would be hard to find a more lucid general introduction to the basic Teresian and Sanjuanist themes. D. does a masterful job of explaining the essential agreement and occasional differences between John and Teresa, in an engaging style that any sympathetic reader should easily follow.

Apparently some of this material originated in retreat conferences to contemplative religious communities, which may partly explain why D.'s most frequent examples of impediments to spiritual growth include idle [540] gossip and overexposure to TV and other media rather than, say, a lack of active concern for the poor. [Because religious orders in the past 50 years have shown much too much interest in TV and not enough concern for the poor? When was the last time you heard a religious order not emphasizing social justice?] D. likewise sees little value in prayer journals, "creation-centered" spirituality, and, especially, Oriental methods of meditation, which he repeatedly claims offer little more in themselves than "a brief, impersonal insight produced entirely by human technique" (54). [This is consistent with Dubay's views when he was critiquing Aumann.] Not until relatively late does he discuss the far more widespread Catholic temptation (which so preoccupied John of the Cross) toward vain credulity in private revelations, though he does lament, eloquently, that "most people would not even cross the street to witness an unobtrusive act of patience ..., but they will cross an ocean to visit the locale of an alleged apparition" (247) 

[While I understand the sentiment of being too attached to private revelation, the comparison is frankly awkward, and Dubay's discussion in this section is somewhat confused; the point of making an act of virtue unobtrusive is precisely to hide it. Further, the reviewer somewhat exaggerates Fr. Dubay's point here, who wrote, "Private divine communications are relatively unimportant." Dubay didn't accuse anyone of vain credulity or say that private revelations are always unimportant. He's placing them in their proper context in relation to personal spiritual growth, namely, people can easily become attached to the revelation, and this attachment to the sensible will hinder their purification on the path to union with God, who is above the sensible. On the other hand, Dubay by his comparison undervalues the sense of the faithful who "cross an ocean to visit the locale" of an apparition. The faithful go for many reasons, often stemming from their faith: the hope of healing for a serious or terminal illness, the desire to grow in devotion, to find some personal renewal, to receive light and graces, etc. Many experience stronger faith after the pilgrimage, and such pilgrimages have a long tradition in Catholic history. Such apparitions are often the sign of God's special intervention, and they almost demand public veneration by the affected community, e.g. Our Lady of Guadalupe. Dubay could have made a better nuanced discussion on apparitions versus extraordinary mystical experiences occurring in an isolated individual's spiritual life that is never meant to become public. But in conclusion, the exaggerated aspects of this discussion actually reflect a trend in theology, developing as early as the 1950s, that held a condescending view of private devotions among the "ignorant" laity in general.]

Curiously, D. criticizes "minimalism" in moral theology, its divorce from systematic and mystical theology, and the "latecomer" theory of two paths (ordinary and extraordinary) to Christian perfection as if these were recent inventions by contemporary theologians of dubious loyalty. Indeed, he often warns against "the pitiable self-assurance of a dissenting mind" (253), stressing obedience to the magisterium and one's superiors as a crucial sign of authentic spirituality, sometimes (though certainly not always) seeming to rank it even before charity in the list of essential virtues (108 f.). One wishes D. were equally adamant against the evils sometimes wrought in the name of religious observance, to which the Gospels and the Carmelite tradition also clearly testify. It is worth remembering, further, that both John and Teresa were sometimes considered "disobedient" by their superiors; while we now recognize the error of such accusations, this should perhaps give us pause before judging too quickly which of our contemporaries are, or are not, truly faithful to the gospel. [Careful, both of you, your biases are showing. Notice how the reviewer must take the time to imply the goodness of the radical and probing work of contemporary theologians vis-à-vis an exaggerated conservative obedience that supposedly closes the mind. After all, points out the reviewer, look at the example of Sts. Teresa and John, two disobedient revolutionaries within whose trailblazing lineage people like Hans Küng and James Martin proudly stand! No, we mustn't ever suggest some contemporary theologians are "of dubious loyalty," Fr. Payne, lest we potentially prompt some slight feelings of personal guilt, perhaps?]

Such observations, however, have more to do with emphasis than substance; this reviewer would have preferred a more balanced admission that not all spiritual dangers today come from the theological left. [Lest we mistakenly think Fr. Dubay was a far-right conspiracy theorist.] Still, D. offers an excellent resource for spiritual reading and group study, highly recommended.

De Sales School of Theology, D.C.    STEVEN PAYNE, O.C.D.

Source: Steven Payne, "DUBAY T. Fire Within (S. Payne)," Theological Studies 51, no. 3 (Dec. 1990): 539–540.

Fr. Jordan Aumann, "Beauty and the Esthetic Response"

[489] Proceeding from metaphysical principles and the data of psychology, we shall attempt to respond to some of the questions and problems proposed in the area of esthetics. Is beauty an objective or purely subjective quality of being? Does the definition of the beautiful necessarily imply a relationship between the beautiful object and the percipient of beauty? Is beauty a transcendental quality of being? Which human faculties are involved in the experience of the beautiful? What is the primary element in the esthetic response to beauty? We shall attempt to answer these questions by applying the principles of St. Thomas Aquinas, whose basic teaching has been variously interpreted by different authors, although in recent times there has been a greater effort to reach a consensus.

It is generally admitted today that the role of esthetics is to determine the nature and laws of the beautiful, wherever it is found, and to specify the human faculties involved in the creation and appreciation of the beautiful. Accordingly, there are three parts or aspects to esthetic investigation: metaphysics of the beautiful, psychology of the beautiful, and philosophy of art. Our investigation will be limited to the metaphysical and the psychological aspects, and to avoid the errors of subjectivism, we shall begin with a definition of beauty and a description of its essential properties.

[490]

A sampling of the descriptive definitions of the beautiful offered by classical and modern authors will illustrate the divergence of opinion concerning this quality of being. It will also give some indication of the precision and distinctions required in order to formulate an acceptable definition. Thus, beauty is "the splendor of truth" (Plotinus); "resplendent order" (Horace); a species of the good, with the distinctive qualities of "clarity and proportion" (pseudo-Dionysius); "the splendor of order" (St. Augustine); "splendor of form shining through proportioned parts of matter" (St. Albert the Great); "the aggregation of all the sensed qualities of an object" (Scotus); "multiple equality" (St. Bonaventure); "unity amid variety" (Mendelssohn and Cousin); "finality without an end" (Kant); "expression of an idea by a form" (Hegel); "the infinite presented as finite" (Schelling); "the goodness of an object so far as it delights the mind when known" (Kleutgen).

The best known definition offered by St. Thomas Aquinas is that "the beautiful is that which pleases when seen" (Pulchra enim dicuntur, quae visa placent).[1] However this is a descriptive definition of the effect (per effectum) of the beautiful; it is a psychological rather than an ontological definition. Fortunately, there are numerous other references to beauty in the works of Aquinas, and they provide an ontological basis for formulating a real definition of the beautiful:

Three things are required for beauty: first, integrity or perfection; ... and proper proportion or consonance; and finally clarity.[2] 

Beauty and goodness are identical objectively because they have the same basis in reality, namely, the form of a thing, and in this respect the good is esteemed as beautiful. But they differ logically, because goodness (being what all things desire) relates to the appetite, and therefore has the aspect of an end (since appetite is a kind of movement toward a [491] thing). Beauty, on the other hand, has a relation to the cognitive faculty, because things are said to be beautiful when the mere sight of them gives pleasure. Therefore beauty consists in proper proportion, because the senses delight in rightly proportioned things as similar to themselves... Now, since knowledge proceeds by way of assimilation and the likeness has to do with the form, beauty properly pertains to the notion of the formal cause.[3] 

The beautiful and the good are identical; they differ only logically. Since the good is that which all things desire, it is of th essence of goodness that the appetite be satisfied in it. But it is of the essence of the beautiful that the appetite is satisfied in the mere knowledge or vision of it. ... Beauty therefore adds to goodness a relation to the cognitive faculties, and hence that is said to be good which simply satisfies the appetite, while that is said to be beautiful, the mere vision of which pleases.[4]

St. Thomas thus perfects the teaching of pseudo-Dionysius, who had simply identified beauty and goodness. For the Angelic Doctor, however, beauty and goodness are objectively identical, so far as they inhere in the same being, but there is a logical distinction between the two so far as they relate to different faculties or powers (per respectum ad aliquid). To appreciate the Thomistic distinction it will be helpful to review the metaphysical principles of the good.

The essence of the good consists in the fact that it is something desirable, and a thing is desirable so far as it is perfect.[5] Therefore, concludes St. Thomas, goodness bespeaks perfection, and hence anything that has ultimate perfection is said to be good simpliciter.[6] Perfection is therefore the root and basis of goodness, and since a thing is perfect (and hence good and desirable) so far as it exists,[7] it follows that perfection and goodness are identical with the reality of actual [492] being. Nevertheless, in accordance with the statement of Boethius, "I perceive that in nature the fact that things are good is one thing; that they are is another," St. Thomas affirms that if a thing be considered in its primal actuality, it simply exists or has being; but if considered in its complete actuality, it is good simpliciter.[8] Hence it is clear that goodness, perfection, and being are objectively identical, but perfection bespeaks a given degree of actuality, and goodness refers to the aspect of desirability. Ontologically we would have the following priority: first, the form whereby the existing thing is a being; secondly, the effective power whereby the existing thing has perfection; thirdly, the aspect of goodness or desirability that follows upon the perfection of the existing being.[9]

But beauty is likewise identified objectively with being, perfection, and goodness; therefore beauty cannot be distinguished from goodness ex parte subjecti, but must be distinguished extrinsically. That is why St. Thomas states: "Pulchrum et bonum in subjecto quidem sunt idem, quia super eamdem rem fundantur, scilicet super formam, et propter hoc, bonum laudatur ut pulchrum. Sed ratione differunt."[10] To be more precise, beauty and goodness are distinguished from one another "per respectum ad aliquid,"[11] so that the concepts of goodness and of beauty necessarily imply some sort of relationship. As regards the good, St. Thomas clearly states that the precise relationship that constitutes goodness is a relationship to the appetite:

The essence of goodness consists in this, that it is in some way desirable.[12] 

Goodness properly relates to the appetite (goodness being what all things desire).[13]

[493]

For everything is good so far as it is desirable and is a term of the movement of the appetite.[14]

Beauty, however, does not relate simpliciter to the appetite or desire, but to the cognoscitive [sic] faculty, and it is precisely on the basis of this relationship that beauty is distinguished from goodness.

But beauty relates to the cognoscitive power, since things are said to be beautiful when the mere sight of them gives pleasure.[15] 

Beauty adds to goodness a relationship to the cognoscitive faculty.[16] 

Beauty therefore adds to goodness a relation to the cognoscitive faculties, and hence that is said to be good which simply satisfies the appetite, while that is said to be beautiful, the mere vision of which pleases.[17] 

The object that arouses the appetite is the good as apprehended, but if in the very apprehension it is seen as beautiful, it is received as both delightful and good. And so Dionysius says: "The beautiful and good object is beloved by all."[18]

Although beauty is distinguished from goodness by reason of the fact that beauty relates to the cognitive faculty while goodness relates to the appetite, this should not lead one to think that beauty is a quasi-truth, since truth also relates to the cognoscitive powers. In the expression, id cujus apprehensio placet (or the similar expression, pulchra enim dicuntur quae visa placent), St. Thomas is saying that while the beautiful does satisfy the appetite, it does not do so simpliciter and immediately but by means of the vision or apprehension of the beautiful. "Ad rationem pulchri pertinet quod IN EJUS ASPECTU SEU COGNITIONE quietetur appetitus.... Et sic patet quod pulchrum addit supra bonum quemdam ordinem ad vim cognoscitivam."[19] Thus, Maritain has stated that to delight by [494] means of apprehension is not only a property of the beautiful but it is the formal constitutive of beauty.[20]

We have already seen that beauty and goodness are objectively identical and ta the basis of the good, namely perfection, is likewise the basis of the beautiful. But the beautiful is directly and immediately ordained to the cognitive power, while the good is ordained to the appetitive power; therefore we now investigate the particular properties or characteristics of the beautiful which make it possible for the mere apprehension of beauty to provide delight.

As an entitative habit in the species of quality, beauty follows upon the form of an object, according to the Scholastic axiom: "Quantitas sequitur materiam et qualitas formam" [Trans. Quantity follows upon matter, and quality follows upon form.] It is therefore rooted in the substantial form of a being as in its subject, although in beings composed of matter and form it will be manifested chiefly in the accidental forms of that being. For this reason St. Thomas frequently speaks of the relationship of beauty to the formal cause and likewise of proportion and splendor or clarity as the properties which immediately relate to the cognitive power.

We thus arrive at the three properties or characteristics of objective beauty: perfection, wherein the beautiful is identical with the good; proportion and splendor, whereby the beautiful relates to the cognitive power. And since it is of the essence of the beautiful tat it delights the percipient through mere apprehension, it follows that two notions must be included in the definition of beauty: apprehension and delight. Yet, the apprehension of the beautiful must be seen as something distinct from the apprehension of truth; and the delight in the beautiful must be distinguished from the complacency of the appetite in the good. We may therefore define beauty as the perfection of being, shining through its proportioned parts and giving delight in the mere apprehension of it.

[495]

Perfection

St. Thmas states that anything is perfect so far as it is in act and imperfect so far as it is in potency.[21] In his commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics, he says that there are different ways of using the term "perfection": when a thing lacks none of its due parts; when there is neither excess nor defect in its powers of operation; and when it has attained its proper end or goal.[22] He further clarifies this division when in the Summa Theologiae he states that perfection is threefold: when a thing is constituted in its proper being (perfectio in esse); when it also possesses the faculties necessary for its perfect operation (perfectio in operatione); and when it attains to something else as its end (perfectio in assecutione finis).[23] Again, in the Summa, he speaks of perfection in slightly different terminology, specifying as first perfection (perfectio prima) that according to which a being is substantially perfect by reason of its form, and as second perfection (perfectio secunda) the attainment of the end, which may be either an operation as such (as the perfection of the harpist is to play the harp) or something distinct that is effected by an operation (as the end of the builder is to construct a house). But the first perfection is the cause of the second, because the form of a thing is the principle of its operation.[24] Finally, we note that in the treatise De Perfectione Vitae Spiritualis, St. Thomas divides perfection into perfectio simpliciter and perfectio secundum quid.[25] The first pertains to substantial perfection, as when an animal possesses all that is due to it as a member of its species, while the second pertains to the accidental aspects of the animal such as color, size, weight, etc.

The perfection of a being is the basis of its goodness[26] and since the good and the beautiful are identical in object [496] (secundum rem), both goodness and beauty can be attributed to a being in any of the grades of perfection; perfectio in esse, perfectio in operatione, perfectio in assecutione finis, perfectio simpliciter and perfectio secundum quid. Nevertheless, a being is good simpliciter only when it is fully actualized by reaching its ultimate perfection; prior to that, it is good in some respect (quodammodo bonum); and the same would be true of the beautiful[27]. Consequently, a being that possesses only perfectio prima is said to be beautiful in some respect or relatively; a being that possesses perfectio secunda is said to be beautiful simpliciter. And since beauty and goodness differ logically, it should be noted that the perfection of a being plays a different role in each case. As the basis of goodness, the perfection of a being attracts the appetite or desire to attain the goal or end, which is the good; as the basis of the beautiful, the perfection of a being stimulates the cognoscitive power to a contemplation of the perfection of the being, without any note of teleology or utility.

Proportion

Having seen how beauty and goodness are immediately based on the perfection of a being, we shall now investigate proportion as an element of beauty, and in so doing we shall see that proportion is related to the unity of a being and is in a special way related to truth.[28] Note also that the element of proportion is also connected to the good, as St. Thomas asserts: "Although beauty and goodness are identical in the subject, because both clarity and consonance are contained in [497] the notion of the good, they nevertheless differ logically."[29] As regards proportion itself, Aquinas has this to say:

There is a twofold consonance in things. The first is in the ordination of created things to God, and [pseudo-Dionysius] touches this when he says that God is the cause of consonance so far as he ordains all things to himself as their end. ... For this reason the Greek word for beauty is kallos, which is taken from the word to call or to summon. Secondly there is consonance in things according to their relationship to each other.[30] 

Proportion is twofold. In one sense it means a certain relation of one quantity to another, according as double, treble, and equal are species of proportion. In another sense every relation of one thing to another is called proportion. And in this sense there can be a proportion of the creature to God, inasmuch as it is related to him as the effect to its cause, and as potentiality to its act; and in this way the created intellect can be proportioned to know God.[31]

Proportion therefore has to do with the relation of the parts of a being to one another, the parts to the totality, or the relation of the being to something else (ad aliud). In the first two senses St. Thomas speaks of the beauty of a body that is properly proportioned as regards its members[32], but since beauty consists essentially in a relation to something else (per respectum ad aliquid), the intrinsic proportion of a being constitutes its beauty only materially and predicamentally. Moreover, insofar as
beauty adds to goodness an ordination to the cognitive power, so it also adds to unity the ordination or extrinsic proportion of something else. Among the ancients the element of proportion was usually taken to refer to the objective, intrinsic proportion of being; St. Thomas, however, has added a new perspective by insisting that the proportion of the beautiful is to be understood in a psychological sense [498] as the relation of the beautiful object to something else, namely, the cognitive power. Hence, as the perfection of a being is the root of its goodness and beauty, and therefore of its desirability, so the intrinsic proportion of a being is an element that is common to both beauty and unity and is the root of the cognoscibility of a being.[33]

As a property of being, unity presents the being as undivided in itself, but the intrinsic proportion adds something to the note of unity, namely, the totality of the being and the proper disposition of its parts. For this reason there have been some who preferred to see "unity amid variety" as the essential characteristic of beauty. But this intrinsic proportion is more of a material and dispositive element of the beautiful, because the role of intrinsic proportion is to allow the splendor of unity to shine through the proportioned parts.[34]

As we have said, St. Thomas introduced the distinction between intrinsic or ontological proportion and extrinsic or psychological proportion.[35] The latter, existing between the beautiful object and the percipient, is objectively rooted in the object as such, but effectively it is in the percipient of the object, who perceives the totality of the being which is proportioned to the cognoscitive power. Evidently this extrinsic proportion presupposes the intrinsic proportion, which bespeaks a relation to the artist or the divine creator as efficient and exemplar cause; but the extrinsic proportion is teleological so far as it bespeaks a relation to the intellect of the percipient.

But the note of proportion, like that of perfection, is a relative and analogical concept, and hence St. Thomas speaks of "due proportion" (debita proportio), i.e., the intrinsic proportion that is due according to time and condition.[36] Nor can it be said that the extrinsic or psychological proportion [499] necessarily requires an actual relationship to a cognitive power in order that an object fulfill the requirements for the beautiful. This would lead to pure subjectivism, enunciated in the axiom: "A thing is beautiful because it pleases." In objects that are intrinsically proportioned there is at least the potentiality of giving delight on being seen, and this suffices for the proportion needed to classify the object as beautiful. Thus, St. Thomas says: "Beauty relates to the cognitive faculty, for beautiful things are those which please when seen. Hence beauty consists in due proportion, for the senses delight in things duly proportioned, as in what is after their own kind; because even sense is a sort of reason, just as is every cognitive faculty."[37]

Proportion is therefore an essential element of beauty; first, because all beings somehow express the unity that flows from intrinsic proportion of a thing, and secondly, because all duly proportioned things, as such, bespeak a relationship to the cognitive power, which delights in duly proportioned beings. Thus, extrinsic proportion leads to the delight of the cognitive power, while intrinsic proportion is the disposition of a thing's parts that enables the splendor of the form to shine forth.

Splendor

The third element of beauty, which is splendor or clarity, is the formal or principal element of the beautiful. It is indeed the end or goal of all artistic production and creation.

Perfection and proportion, though they have an objective value as the manifestation of the goodness and unity of a being, are the dispositions for the clarity or splendor of a being. It should be noted that practically all the authors have mentioned clarity or splendor as an element of the beautiful: Plotinus: "splendor of truth"; St. Augustine: "splendor of order"; St. Thomas: "clarity is of the essence of the beautiful." Again, St. Thomas says: "Hence bodily beauty consists in this, that a [500] man has well-proportioned bodily members with a certain clarity of proper coloring. And similarly, spiritual beauty consists in this, that a man's conversations and actions are well proportioned in accordance with the spiritual splendor of the intellect."[38]

Splendor, like perfection and proportion, can be considered as a property of being in an objective or ontological sense or as an attribute of being that relates to something else (per respectum ad aliquid). Taken in the first sense it can apply to the substantial form of a being or to the accidental forms, whether entitative (color, size, etc.) or operative (human acts reflecting the light of reason). Radically, of course, splendor pertains to the substantial form, which is the source of all the accidents in a being,[39] but this ontological splendor does not necessarily imply a conceptual clarity on the part of the percipient, since many beautiful objects are not readily perceived by all.[40] It should also be noted that the degree of splendor in a being will depend to a great extent on the aspects of time and the condition of a being, as is the case with the elements of perfection and proportion. Hence the statement of St. Thomas regarding perfection likewise applies here: "Nothing prevents a thing that is not perfect simpliciter from being perfect in regard to time; thus, a boy is said to be perfect, not simpliciter, but with regard to the condition of time."[41]

The splendor that applies to the accidental qualities of a being is closely related to its perfection (perfectio secunda) and its intrinsic proportion, and all of these attributes can be considered as dispositions for the splendor of the substantial form to shine through the accidents. On the other hand, since the substantial form a being is known through the mediation of the internal and external senses of the percipient, a certain degree of perfection, proportion and splendor is required in the accidental characteristics through which the percipient apprehends [501] the beautiful being in its totality.[42] The splendor of a being does not refer exclusively to the substantial form nor does it apply only to the accidents, as some moderns would assert, placing the esthetic form of a being in the accidental qualities. Pertaining as it does to all the aspects of a being, the quality of splendor is an analogical concept and hence applies to a being in different degrees.

There are also correlations with the other elements of the beautiful when we consider the splendor of a being as related to something else (per rsepectum ad aliud). Perfection, as the manifestation of the goodness of a being, relates to the appetitive powers; proportion, as the manifestation of the unity of a being, relates to the cognitive powers; and splendor or clarity, which is an attribute of truth, likewise relates to the cognitive powers. Thus, perfection is the common basis for goodness and beauty; proportion links beauty with unity; and clarity joins the beautiful to the true, with the result that beauty is truly the manifestation of the plenitude of being. And it is precisely because beauty embraces the totality of a being that it is so difficult to distinguish it from the other transcendental qualities of being.

The importance of splendor as an element of the beautiful can be seen from the fact that while the perfection of a being bespeaks a relation to the percipient, this relation is to the appetitive powers, so that considered simply in its perfection, a being is in the species of the good. But the beautiful adds something to the good: the relation to a cognitive power.[43] Consequently, splendor or clarity is the point of distinction between the good and the beautiful, for the splendor of a being is a manifestation of its intelligibility and it also provides that special esthetic type of cognition that pertains to the apprehension of the beautiful (pulchrum autem dicatur, id cujus apprehensio placet).[44]

[502]

Beauty as a Transcendental

Some philosophers, especially among the moderns, place beauty among the transcendental properties of being, distinct from the other transcendentals. Others wish to list beauty as a quasi-bonum or at most a quasi-transcendental that flows from the good and the true. For Thomists there is a special problem because St. Thomas nowhere lists beauty as a transcendental property, nor does he expressly exclude it.[45]

Basically there are three ways in which beauty can be seen as having a transcendental quality, without positing it as a distinct transcendental property of being: 1) as a transcendental relationship between being and the cognitive powers; 2) as an actual and necessary relationship between all created being and the intellect and will of God; 3) as the relationship or adequation of beauty with the divine exemplar in which beauty exists formally and eminently. There is no difficulty whatever in asserting the transcendental aspect of beauty in the second two senses, for St. Augustine has stated that everything created by God has beauty.[46]

Our question, however, is whether beauty can be classified as a distinct transcendental property of being, that is, as a modality that immediately follows from every being, whether considered in itself or in relation to something else. In his [503] early writings, i.e., in his Commentary on the Book of Sentences, his treatise On Truth, and his Exposition on the Divine Names, St. Thomas faithfully follows the esthetic teaching of St. Albert the Great,[47] identifying the beautiful with the good to the extend [sic] that he stated: "Hence, whoever desired the good, by that very fact likewise desires the beautiful."[48]

However, later, in the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas distinguishes the beautiful from the good by reason of its ordination to the cognitive power, while good is related to the appetitive power.[49] In the sense that the good and the beautiful are identical objectively, in the subject of inhesion, it is true to say that "whoever desires the good, by that very fact desires the beautiful"; but so far as the good and the beautiful are distinguished logically, by reason of their being ordained to different faculties or powers in the percipient (the good to the appetite and the beautiful to the cognitive power), it will have to be in that respect of a relation to the cognitive power that beauty would classify as a distinct transcendental. The reason for this is that all the transcendental qualities of being are identical in the subject of inhesion; they are distinguished by something that they add to the concept of being. Thus, being, considered as good, relates to the appetite simpliciter and the modality of being under this aspect is called a tendential mode; being, under the aspect of truth, relates to the intellect simpliciter and the modality of being under this aspect is called intentional mode; but being, considered as beautiful, relates to both the cognitive power simpliciter and to the appetite secundum quid and consequenter and the modality of being under this aspect would be called the esthetic mode.[50].

[504]

By way of summation, let us consider again the relationship and the difference between the good, the true, and the beautiful. The good and the beautiful are identical in the subject of inhesion but they differ logically, so that the beautiful adds to the good a relation to the cognitive power. The good pertains to the final cause, while beauty pertains to the formal cause. But the beautiful is necessarily contained in the notion of the good, because "the perfection and end of every other power is contained in the object of the appetitive power, as the proper is contained in the common... Hence the perfection and end of each power, insofar as it is a good, belongs to the appetitive power. Wherefore the appetitive power moves the other powers to their ends, and itself realizes the end, when each of them reaches the end."[51] But in seeking the good, the appetite seeks possession of the good, while it is satisfied with the mere apprehension of the beautiful.

As regards truth and beauty, it should be noted that truth is defined as the adequation between the intellect and its object, so that the truth of a being consists essentially in a relation to other (per respectum ad aliud). Yet the relation is such that there is a threefold terminus to the actual adequation between the object known and the intellect knowing: the act of intellection, the formal concept in the intellect, and the object as known (esse cognitum) in the intellect.[52] Hence, the intellect becomes or is intentionally identified with the object known.[53] And the delight of knowledge consist [sic] in the very operation of the intellect and not in the object as such, as is the case of the delight in the good. Now beauty relates to the cognitive faculty, for which reason it is defined as that which pleases on being seen; but unless we want to identify beauty and truth, we shall have to verify a distinction between them and precisely in the adequation or relationship to the cognitive power. The following citations from the Summa Theologiae provide an excellent basis for the necessary distinction between [505] truth and beauty as related to the cognitive power:

Just as the good signifies that to which the appetite tends, so the true signifies that to which the intellect tends. However, there is this difference..., knowledge means that the object is in the knower, whereas desire means that the one who desires goes out to the thing itself which he desires. Thus the end or term of the desire, which is the good, is in the thing desired; whereas the end or term of knowledge, which is truth, is in the mind. Now just as good is in the thing in its relation to desire (so that the notion of goodness passes over from the desirable thing to the desire, in that the desire is called good when it is desire for good), so also since truth is in the mind as conformed to the thing understood, the notion of truth must pass over from the mind to the thing understood, so that the latter is also said to be true in that it has a relation to the mind. ... We conclude that truth is primarily in the intellect and secondarily in things, by virtue of a relation to the intellect as to their origin.[54]

The act of knowing is not an action going forth to something external, but remains in the agent as its actuation and completion.[55]

It is not the substance of the thing known that is the completion of the knower, but its likeness, by which it is in the intellect as the latter's form and completion.[56]

Although truth in our mind is caused by the thing, it does not follow that the notion of truth is to be found primarily in the thing... It is not the thing's truth but its being that produces truth in the intellect.[57]

The sensible actualized is the sense in activity, and the intelligible actualized is the intellect in activity. We have actual sensation or actual knowledge because our intellect or our senses are informed by the species or likeness of the sensible or intelligible object.[58] As good adds to being the notion of desirability, the true adds to being a relation to the intellect.[59]

[506]

We conclude from the foregoing that since goodness and beauty are identical in the object and only notionally distinct by reason of their relation to desire and to cognition respectively, the distinction between truth and beauty lies in the fact that beauty is in the object whereas truth is in the mind of the knower. Secondly, as regards the delight in the truth and in the beautiful, the delight in knowing is in the very act of cognition, whereas the delight in the beautiful is radically a delight in the perfection and goodness of the object and formally a delight in the natural appetite of the cognitive power. And this leads us to a consideration of the nature of the esthetic response to the beautiful.

Psychology of the Esthetic Experience

Having considered beauty in its ontological aspect, we shall now study the esthetic experience, which is to investigate the beautiful psychologically. Pulchra sunt quae visa placent,[60] but what are the cognitive faculties that apprehend the beautiful and what is the pleasure that follows upon this knowledge? It would seem that even if one admits that all things are objectively beautiful in some respect or other, either as a whole or in part, it does not follow that everything is capable of producing an esthetic response. This in itself poses no great problem, however, for it is also true that although all beings are good and in some respect desirable, not all beings are actually desired; and even among those things actually desired, some may stimulate a minimal and others a maximum degree of orexis [NB: The affective and conative character of mental activity as contrasted with its cognitive aspect; the appetitive aspect of an act; desire, appetite. (source: Wiktionary.org)].

It would seem, therefore, that the esthetic experience requires a certain degree of perfection, proportion, and splendor in the beautiful object and that it also presupposes certain dispositions [507] on the part of the percipient; e.g., proper functioning of the psycho-physical faculties that apprehend and delight in the beautiful, and the cultivation of esthetic taste, especially as regards the fine arts. Moreover, it would seem that the proper object of the esthetic experience is the beauty of objects perceptible to the external and internal senses, not only because the creation of the fine arts (which are of the sensible order) are directly ordained to an esthetic reaction, but also because the so-called esthetic faculty comprises all the cognitive powers. Thus, the intellect has the formal and principal role in the esthetic experience; the internal and external senses are instrumental and secondary; the volitional appetite functions as an effect of the apprehension of the beautiful; the sensitive appetite is stimulated by way of overflow or redundance. Each of these propositions needs a brief explanation.

Esthetic Knowledge

According to the Thomistic axiom, "Pulchra sunt quae visa placent," the esthetic experience involves two elements: vision (knowledge) and pleasure (appetitive delight). As regards knowledge or vision, St. Thomas states: "Two things are required for both sensible and intellectual vision, namely, the power of sight, and union of the thing seen with the sight. For vision is made actual only when the thing seen is in a certain way in the percipient."[61] Now, all naturally acquired knowledge begins with the actuation of one or another of the external senses, since nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu.[62] But not all the external senses concur equally in the perception of the beautiful; only sight and hearing can directly and immediately perceive sensible beauty because these [508] two senses are especially related to intellectual cognition.[63] Of the four internal senses (imagination, memory, common sense, and cogitative power), the common sense (sensus communis), the cogitative power (vis cogitativa) and the imagination play a special role in the perception of the beautiful because the common sense is the focal point of all sensible cognition, and the cogitative power is the link between sense knowledge and intellectual apprehension, and the imagination receives the phantasm of the singular being.[64]

It should be noted, however, that esthetic knowledge differs greatly from purely speculative or abstract knowledge, which produces, by abstraction of exclusion, the form of the being known. Esthetic knowledge would seem to be the result of abstraction by inclusion, similar to that used in attaining the concept of ens ut ens in metaphysics. The reason for this is that esthetic knowledge does not regard simply the quiddity or form of a being, but the plenitude of the being and precisely in its individuality. The beautiful object is known both in its totality and in its singularity, so that the union between the beautiful object and the cognitive power is the assimilation of the object by way of an informing union (unio per informationem). But here a difficulty airses, because St. Thomas teaches that the human intellect cannot know the singular primarily and [509] directly;[65] the object of the intellect is to know the form existing in matter, but not precisely as in that particular matter.[66] The intellect therefore always knows the quiddity of material things as immaterial and universal, yet esthetic knowledge consists precisely in the apprehension of the beautiful object in its totality and in its individuality.

We have already given an indication of a solution to this problem when we stated that there is a difference between speculative knowledge and esthetic knowledge, just as there is a difference between speculative knowledge and the practical knowledge required for the exercise of art and prudence. Recalling what we have said about the function of the external and internal senses in the apprehension of beauty, it follows that these senses suffice for a knowledge of the singular, as St. Thomas asserts in various places.[67] But how does the intellect know the singular as such? St. Thomas explains as follows:

The proper object of the human intellect, which is united to a body, is a quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter; and through such natures of visible things it rises to a certain knowledge of things invisible. Now it belongs to such a nature to exist in an individual, and this cannot be apart from corporeal matter. For instance, it belongs to the nature of a stone to be in an individual stone, and to the nature of a horse to be in an individual horse, and so forth. Wherefore the nature of a stone or any material thing cannot be known completely and truly except when it is known as existing in an individual. Now we apprehend the individual through the senses and the imagination. Therefore, for the intellect actually to understand its proper object, it must necessarily revert to the phantasms in order to perceive the universal nature in the individual.[68]

 [510]

John of St. Thomas[69] further explains the knowledge of singulars by distinguishing the two types of intellectual reflexion: in the strict sense, when the intellect reflects on its own operation, and in a wider sense when the intellect reflects on the singular object represented in the imagination. Hence, in the knowledge of the beautiful, the intellect has as its term the phantasm, and through the phantasm it knows the singular. Thus the esthetic knowledge differs from the speculative knowledge, wich [sic] has as its term the universal concept and is a discursive type of knowledge; it also differs from practical knowledge, which sees being as operable, under the aspect of morality or utility (prudence and art). Esthetic knowledge is therefore experimental, reflexive, and intuitive.[70]

To complete our consideration of esthetic knowledge, it is necessary to say a word about intuitive knowledge, characteristic of the apprehension of the beautiful. Hugon points out[71] that not any kind of knowledge suffices for apprehension of the beautiful, but it requires a vision or intuition by which the beautiful object is, as it were, comprehended. Now intuitive vision or knowledge can be considered under two aspects: as regards the comprehension of the vision and as regards the presence or union of the object with the cognitive power. St. Thomas affirms that the human intellect is capable of an intuitive comprehension when it grasps a truth without investigation or discursus, and this is possible in regard to both speculative and practical truth.[72] On the other hand, knowledge is intuitive [511] by reason of presence when the object known is united with the cognitive power by informing the faculty (per informationem), as happens in the case of the external senses.[73]

Applying these distinction [sic] to esthetic knowledge, we may say that esthetic apprehension is intuitive by reason of its comprehension because it contemplates the singular object in all its totality. It is likewise intuitive by reason of presence or union when the beautiful object is of the sensible order, because the external senses receive the sense impressions directly and immediately and also because the phantasm is immediately presented to the intellect.[74] Indeed, it is largely because of the intuitive character of esthetic knowledge that the beautiful is able to afford such delight, for we experience delight in any operation that is done with facility and in regard to an object that is properly proportioned to the percipient, as in the beautiful.

Esthetic Delight

Pleasure or delight in the beautiful is an integral part of the esthetic experience, and since delight is an operation of the appetitive faculty, we shall first consider thee [sic] division of the appetites and then the species of delight.

In general, an appetite may be described as the inclination to a desired good, although in a wider sense appetite can be attributed to all things, to all the faculties of the soul and to all the organs of the body, insofar as everything has an inclination to that which is proper to it according to its nature.[75] Thus, St. Thomas states that as natural things have existence by their form, everything has an aptitude towards its natural form, so that when it doesn't have it, it tends towards [512] it, and when it has it, it is at rest therein.[76] Therefore, the natural form of at hing is followed by a natural inclination which is called the natural appetite.[77] Accordingly, the division of appetites will be based on the types of inclination found in created things:

There is an appetite arising from an apprehension existing, not in the subject of the appetite, but in some other, and this is called the natural appetite. Because natural things seek what is suitable to them according to their nature, by reason of an apprehension which is not in them, but in the Author of their nature, as stated in the First Part (q. 6, a. 1 ad 2; q. 103, a. 1 ad 1 and 3). And there is nother [sic] appetite arising from the apprehension in the subject of the appetite, but from necessity and not from free will. Such is, in irrational animals, the sensitive appetite, which, however, in man, has a certain share of liberty, insofar as it obeys reason. Again, there is another appetite following freely from an apprehension in the subject of the appetite, and this is the rational or intellectual appetite, which is called the will.[78]

What is of interest as regards the delight in the beautiful are the sensitive appetite (passions or emotions) and the intellectual appetite (the will) and precisely so far as they follow upon the apprehension of the beautiful. Concerning the sensitive appetite, the following statement of St. Thomas is of primary importance for understanding the role of the emotions in the esthetic experience and, indeed, in human life:

Although some of the sensitive powers are common to us and to brute animals, in us they have a certain excellence through being united to reason; thus we surpass animals in the sensitive part by possessing the cogitative power and reminiscence, as stated in the First Part (q. 78, a. 4). In the same way our sensitive appetite surpasses that of the brute animals by reason of a certain excellence which consists in its natural aptitude to obey reason, and in this respect it can be the [513] principle of a voluntary action, and consequently the subject of sin.[79]

In order to understand in what manner the act of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason, we must consider in what way it is in our power. Now it should be noted that the sensitive appetite differs from the intellectual appetite, which is called the will, in the fact that the sensitive appetite is a power of a corporeal organ, whereas the will is not. Moreover, every act of a power that uses a corporeal organ depends not only on a power of the soul but also on the disposition of the corporeal organ... Consequently, the act of the sensitive appetite depends not only on the appetitive power but also on the disposition of the body.

Now, whatever part the power of the soul takes in the act, follows apprehension, and the apprehension of the imagination, being a particular apprehension, is regulated by the apprehension of reason, which is universal... Therefore, in this respect the act of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason. On the other hand, the condition or disposition of the body is not subject to the command of reason, and consequently in this respect the movement of the sensitive appetite is hindered from being wholly subject to the command of reason.

It also happens sometimes that the movement of the sensitive appetite is aroused suddenly in consequence of an apprehension of the imagination. Such movement occurs without the command of reason, although reason could have prevented it, had it foreseen.[80]

The sensitive appetite is also subject to the will: in execution, which is accomplished by the motive power. For in other animals movement follows at once the concupiscible and irascible appetites... On the contrary, man is not moved at once by the concupiscible and irascible appetites, but he awaits the command of the will, which is the superior appetite. For wherever there is an order among a number of motive powers, the second only moves by virtue of the first; hence the lower appetite is not sufficient to cause movement unless the higher appetite consents.[81]

 In man, therefore, the sensitive appetite is meant by its nature to be subject to the rule of reason and the command [514] of the will. As regards the particular passions of the sensitive appetite, it would seem that not all of them pertain to the esthetic experience, although we hasten to admit that in the fine arts it does frequently happen that the artist may arouse passions such as anger, hatred, sadness, etc., thus causing a catharsis or pathetic experience in the percipient. This raises the question of whether the scope of the fine arts is wider than that of the beautiful, but this question lies outside the field of our present investigation.

The beautiful as such, since it is identical with the good in the object but adds the notes of proportion and splendor, does not relate to the irascible passions,which pertain to the arduous good or evil, nor does it relate to the concupiscible passions of hatred, aversion, and sadness, for these latter are stimulated by the apprehension of evil. There remain the following passions as specifically esthetic passions: love, desire, and delight. How these three passions relate to each other is explained by St. Thomas:

The order of the concupiscible passions can be considered either in the order of intention or in the order of execution. In the order of execution, the first place belongs to that which takes place first in the thing that tends to the end. Now it is evident that whatever tends to an end has, in the first place, an aptitude or proportion to that end...; secondly, it is moved to that end; thirdly, it rests in the end after attaining it. And this very aptitude or proportion of the appetite to good is love, which is complacency in good; while movement towards the good is desire or concupiscence; and rest in good is joy or pleasure. Accordingly, in this order, love precedes desire, and desire precedes pleasure. But in the order of intention, it is the reverse, because the pleasure intended causes desire and love.

For pleasure is the enjoyment of the good, and this enjoyment is, in a certain respect, the end, just as is the good itself.[81]

 [515]

Having seen that man is endowed with three types of appetite, (natural, sensitive, and intellectual), and realizing that for each appetite that attains its good there is a concomitant pleasure, it remains for us now to consider what constitutes the esthetic delight in the apprehension of the beautiful. Two things are required for pleasure or delight: the attainment of the proportionate good and an awareness of this attainment. And the second element is so necessary that St. Thomas asserts that "beings that lack knowledge cannot be said to enjoy pleasure or feel sadness."[83] This does not rule out the natural pleasure that follows upon the "connatural and unimpeded operation,"[84] of a faculty, for the knowledge referred to is simply an awareness of the pleasurable experience and not an antecedent knowledge. However, while the pleasure of the natural appetites regards the operation or activity as such, the pleasure of the sensitive and intellectual appetites regards the attainment of the good or end and requires a knowledge of this attainment.[85]

The pleasure of the sensitive appetite follows upon the attainment of the desired good as perceived by the senses and it is always accompanied by some transmutation in the body.[86] But the senses afford pleasure either by reason of knowledge or by reason of usefulness, and of all the senses, that of sight affords the greatest pleasure by reason of knowledge, while that of touch gives the greatest pleasure by reason of usefulness.[87] We have already seen that the beautiful is not related to utility but to the pleasure attained by reason of knowledge or apprehension. And since beauty must be apprehended to be enjoyed, the two senses that delight most in the beautiful are sight and hearing, since they are more closely related to reason and are therefore capable of providing a pleasure that [516] is more proper to the human being than the pleasure of touch, which, though more vehement, is common to all animals.[88] Thus, the pleasure experienced by brute animals is usually utilitarian, i.e., regarding the necessities of life, while man derives pleasure not only in these things but also by reason of the fact that the senses serve man's intellectual powers. So St. Thomas states:

The senses are given to man not only for the purpose of procuring the necessities of life, for which they are bestowed on other animals, but also for the purpose of knowledge. Hence, whereas the other animals take delight in the objects of the senses only as ordered to food and sex, man alone takes pleasure in the beauty of sensible objects for its own sake.[89]

But the pleasure that is most proper to man is spiritual pleasure, which accompanies or is consequent upon the operation of the intellect and will. Unlike the pleasure of the sensitive appetite, spiritual delight is not necessarily accompanied by a change in the body, though this may occur if the spiritual delight is sufficiently intense.[90] St. Thomas teaches that the pleasures of the intellect and the will are much greater than those of the sense order and the sensitive appetite, although the latter may be more vehement.[91]

To specify in particular the essential elements of esthetic pleasure, we think it is helpful to recall the teaching of St. Thomas on contemplation, because the esthetic experience, as we have seen, is a quasi-intuitive contemplation of the beautiful object, a visio delectabilis.[92] Moreover, we have seen that man is endowed with a threefold appetite: the natural, the sensitive, and the intellectual; therefore, we would expect the esthetic experience to embrace all the pleasures of those appetites [517], either as concomitant to the operation of the appetites or as consequent to the operation. So far as the esthetic experience results from a quasi-intuitive contemplation, the distinction made by St. Thomas concerning the delight of contemplation would seem to apply here:

There may be delight in any contemplation in two ways. First by reason of the operation itself, because each individual delights in the operation which befits him according to his own nature or habit... Secondly, contemplation may be delightful on the part of its object, insofar as one contemplates that which one loves, even as bodily vision gives pleasure, not only because to see is pleasurable in itself, but because one sees a person whom one loves.[93]

Hence, as regards the operation itself—esthetic knowledge—it is a quasi-intuitive vision or contemplation, the delight of which constitutes the formal esthetic delight. The reason for this is that the beautiful is that which pleases on being seen, and hence the beautiful is made present to the percipient by an act of cognition, and then the appetites experience the pleasure attendant upon the vision.[94] Thus, St. Thomas states: "De ratione boni est quod in eo quietetur appetitus; sed ad rationem pulchri pertinet quod in ejus aspectu seu cognitione quietetur appetitus."[95]

If the esthetic delight consists formally in the cognitive operation or the apprehension of the beautiful, it would seem necessary to conclude that the delight of the intellectual appetite, or the will, is something consequent upon the delight of the cognitive operation; that is, indirecto et consequenter. The proper object of the will is the good as such, and when the good is known, the will tends towards is [sic] as to an end and seeks to possess it or be united with it. But the beautiful is [518] apprehended by man's cognitive powers and the very act of apprehension affords the delight of the natural appetite of cognition. Therefore, the will does not tend to the beautiful as to its proper object, but it enjoys fruition and complacency in the beautiful as the good and the perfection of the intellect.[96]

As regards the sensitive powers, both cognitive and appetitive, they would also have a role to play in the esthetic experience, since all man's powers have a natural appetite or an inclination to that which is proportionate to their nature. And since delight follows upon the unimpeded and facile operation of any faculty, the natural pleasure of the smooth functioning of the sensitive powers, both cognitive and appetitive, contributes to the enjoyment of the beautiful. We would say, however, that the external and internal senses (i.e., vision, hearing, imagination, cogitative power, etc.) function instrumentally and that their delight is secondary, though concomitant, to the apprehension of the beautiful. It should be noted, moreover, that one may enjoy an esthetic experience when the beautiful object is not actually present but is recalled by the memory and contemplated in the phantasm of the imagination; and this is a reason why the operations of the sensitive powers do not pertain to the very formality of the esthetic experience. Nor can we deny the possibility of an esthetic experience when the beauty contemplated is entirely spiritual, in which case the operations of all the sensitive powers would not be involved.

Finally, the operation of the sensitive appetite (the emotions) is normally a redundance or consequence of the delight in the very apprehension of the beautiful, since we have already stated that the formality of the esthetic experience is found in the apprehension or vision of the beautiful, with the accompanying delight of the natural appetite of the cognitive faculties in [519] question. Therefore we would not, as do some moderns, restrict the esthetic delight to the stimulation of the pleasurable emotions. It is true, nevertheless, that in the creation of the fine arts, the artist frequently attempts to speak to the emotions and feelings of the percipient; it is likewise true that quoad nos the pleasures of the emotions are normally more vehement than purely spiritual delight.[97]

The esthetic experience, therefore, embraces the totality of the singular being in all its plenitude and the resultant delight enganges [sic] (or can engage) all the cognitive and appetitive powers of man, each one according to its nature and function. All of man's powers are thus united in their variety by means of the esthetic experience, which apprehends and delights in the perfection, proportion, and splendor that constitutes the beautiful.

Jordan Aumann, O.P.
Univ. a Sancto Thoma - Roma

Footnotes:

1. Summa Theol., 1a.5.4 ad 1.
2. STh., 1a.39.8; cf. 2a2ae.145.2.
3. STh., 1a.5.4 ad 1.
4. STh., 1a2ae.27.1 ad 3.
5. STh., 1a.5.1.
6. STh., 1a.5.1 ad 1.
7. STh., 1a.5.1.
8. STh., 1a.5.1 ad 1.
9. STh., 1a.5.4.
10. STh., 1a.5.4 ad 1; cf. In de Divinis Nominibus, cap. IV, lect. 5.
11. In Psalmis, 44:2: "Pulchritudo, sanitas et hujusmodi dicuntur quodammodo per respectum ad aliquid."
12. STh., 1a.5.1.
13. STh., 1a.5.4 ad 1.
14. STh., 1a.5.6.
15. STh., 1a.5.4 ad 1.
16. In de Divinis Nominibus, loc. cit.
17. STh., 1a2ae.27.1 ad 3.
18. STh., 2a2ae.145.2 ad 1.
19. STh., 1a2ae.27.1 ad 3.
20. J. Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, New York, Scribner's, 1933, p. 128, note 1.
21. STh., 1a2ae.3.2.
22. Cf. In Meta, lib. V, cap. 18.
23. STh., 1a.6.3.
24. STh., 1a.73.1
25. Cf. also STh., 2a2ae.184.1 ad 2.
26. STh., 1a.5.1; 1a.6.3.
27. STh., 1a.5.1: "That which has ultimate perfection is said to be simply (simpliciter) good, but that which has not the ultimate perfection it ought to have (although insofar as it is at all actual, it has some perfection), is not said to be perfect simply nor good simply, but only relatively."
28. Cf. J. Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, p. 20.
29. In de Divinis Nominibus, cap. IV, lect. 5.
30. Cf. In de Divinis Nominibus, loc. cit.
31. STh., 1a.12.1 ad 4.
32. Cf. In de Divinis Nominibus, loc. cit.; STh., 2a2ae.54.4; 2a2ae.145.2. In this respect the beauty of material things has been described as the splendor of a being, shining through the proportioned parts of matter (intrinsic proportion).
33. Cf. J. Callahan, A Theory of Esthetic, Washington, D.C., Catholic University Press, 1947, p. 61; De Bruyne, Etudes d'Esthétique Médiévale, tom. III, p. 303.
34. Cf. Paredes, "Ideas estéticas de Santo Tomás," La Ciencia Tomista, 1911.
35. Cf. De Bruyne, op. cit., tom. III, p. 302.
36. Cf. J. Maritain, op. cit., p. 22.
37. STh., 1a.5.4 ad 1.
38. STh., 2a2ae.145.2.
39. Cf. De Wulf, Art et Beauté, p. 213; Paredes, art. cit.; De Bruyne, op. cit., tom. III, p. 307.
40. Cf. Maritain, op. cit., p. 23.
41. STh., 1a2ae.9.2 ad 1.
42. Cf. De Bruyne, op. cit., tom. III, p. 307.
43. Cf. STh., 1a.5.4 ad 1.
44. STh., 1a2ae.27.1 ad 3.
45. According to Maquart, beauty cannot be listed as a transcendental property of being in a strict sense because it does not follow immediately from the concept of being, but indirectly through the good and the true. But beauty is a transcendental so far as it relates to the intellect and will, which have all being as their object. Cf. Maquart, Elementa Philosophiae, Paris, Blot, 1938, tom. III, pp. 104; 126 ss.

Gredt classifies beauty as a quasi-bonum and not as a distinct transcendental (Elementa Philosophiae, tom. II, p. 29), but the following authors classify beauty as a transcendental: Maritain, Garrigou-Lagrange, Paredes, Grabmann, Krug, Sertillanges, Febrer, Moliner and Cory. Cf. also Kowalski, "De artis transcendentalitate secundum quosdam textus divi Thomae," Angelicum, 1937, tom. XIV, pp. 348-349.

46. St. Augustine: "Omnis corporea creatura ... bonum est infimum, et in genere suo pulchrum, quoniam forma et specie continetur" (PL XXXIV, 138); "nihil est enim ordinatum, quod non sit pulchrum, et sicut ait Apostolus, omnis ordo a Deo est (Rom. 13:1)" (PL XXXIV, 156).
47. Cf. De Bruyne, op. cit., tom. III, pp. 278 ss.
48. De Veritate, q. 22, a. 1, ad 12; cf. Maritain, op. cit., pp. 129 ss. St. Thomas also states in the passage from De Veritate: "Unde et eodem appetitu appetitur bonum, pulchrum et pax". For the enumeration of the transcendentals, cf. De Veritate, q. 1, a. 1.
49. STh., 1a.5.4 ad 1.
50. Cf. G. Phelan, "Beauty in Nature and Art," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, Washington, D.C., 1935, p. 175.
51. STh., 1a2ae.11.1 ad 2.
52. Cf. Gredt, Elementa Philosophiae, tom. II, pp. 45-46.
53. Cf. Maquard, op. cit., tom. III, pp. 250-251.
54. STh., 1a.16.1.
55. STh., 1a.14.4.
56. STh., 1a.14.5 ad 2.
57. STh., 1a.16.1 ad 3.
58. STh., 1a.14.2.
59. STh., 1a.16.3.
60. Cf. STh., 1a.5.4 ad 1; 1a2ae.27.1 ad 3.
61. STh., 1a.12.2.
62. STh., 1a.84.6.
63. Cf. STh., 1a2ae.27.1 ad 3; St. Augustine, De vera religione, cap. 30; De lib. arbitr., lib. II, cap. 16; Confessiones, lib. X, cap. 27; Vallgornera, Theologia mystica D. Thomae, q. 1, a. 1.
64. "In homine vero cogitativa operatur cum collatione et discursu quodam propter suam conjunctionem cum ratione. Et ideo dicitur ratio particularis... Adverte tamen ad quid praecipue inserviat hoc munus collativum cogitativae: a) sive ad invicem coadunat aliquam imaginem communem, quae comitatur cognitionem intellectualem universalem cum aliqua imagine singulari, et sic praeparat, una cum intellectu, judicium practicum: unde ad actionem praeparat; b) sive ad invicem coadunat plures imagines communes quarum synthesis, sic efformata, praeparat intellectionem universalem. In his diversis actibus syntehticis, cogitativa imagines, sive singulares sive communes coadunat, utendo quadam associationem sibi propria, secundum leges similitudinis et dissimilitudinis" (Maquart, op. cit., tom. II, pp. 228 ss.).
65. STh., 1a.86.1.
66. STh., 1a.85.1.
67. Cf. STh., 1a.86.1; De Veritate, q. 2, aa. 5, 6; q. 10, a. 5; In II Sent., dist. 3, q. 3, a. 4 ad 1; Contra Gentiles, lib. I, a. 65.
68. STh., 1a.84.7; cf. Contra Gentiles, lib. II, q. 73, a. 1; In II Sent., dist. 20, q. 2, a. 2; In III Sent., dist. 31, q. 2, a. 4; De Veritate, q. 2, a. 6; q. 10, a. 6.
69. John of St. Thomas, Cursus Philosophicus, tom. III, p. 331; cf. also tom. I, p. 701.
70. Marín-Sola describes experimental knowledge as distinct from speculative knowledge: "Scientia experimentalis autem est per connaturalitatem, per modum inclinationis, cognitio affectiva, nolitia experimentalis, per affinitatem, per modum naturae, per viam voluntatis, per contactum, per unionem, per amorem, ex intimo sui, per deiformem contemplationem, ad modum primorum principiorum, sine discursu, ex instinctu, cognitio absoluta et simplex" (La Evolución Homogénea del Dogma Católico, cap. V, sect. 5).
71. Cf. Hugon, Cursus Philosophiae Thomistae, tom. V, p. 139.
72. Cf. De Veritate, q. 16, a. 1.
73. Cf. STh., 1a.12.2.
74. Cf. De Veritate, q. 8, a. 9.
75. Cf. STh., 1a2ae.26.1 ad 3.
76. Cf. STh., 1a.19.1.
77. Cf. STh., 1a.80.1.
78. STh., 1a2ae.26.1.
79. STh., 1a2ae.74.3 ad 1.
80. STh., 1a2ae.17.7.
81. STh., 1a.81.3.
82. STh., 1a2ae.25.2.
83. STh., 1a2ae.41.3.
84. STh., 1a2ae.31.1 ad 1.
85. STh., 1a2ae.32.1.
86. STh., 1a2ae.31.4.
87. STh., 1a2ae.31.6.
88. Cf. STh., 1a2ae. loc. cit.
89. STh., 1a.91.3 ad 3.
90. STh., 1a2ae.31.4.
91. STh., 1a2ae.31.5.
92. Cf. Maritain, op. cit., p. 127.
93. STh., 2a2ae.180.7.
94. Cf. STh., 1a2ae.3.4; 4.1, where St. Thomas treats of the operation of the intellect as constituting the essence of happiness, and the role of delight in happiness.
95. STh., 1a2ae.27.1 ad 3.
96. "The intellect attains the vision of the beautiful as the executive power, but the will as the motive power, moving the intellect and enjoying the end attained." Cf. STh., 1a2ae.11.1 ad 1. "The perfection and end of each power, so far as it is a good, belongs to the appetitive power" (ibid., ad 2).
97. Cf. STh., 1a2ae.31.5.

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Source: Jordan Aumann, "Beauty and the Esthetic Response," Angelicum 54 (1977): 489–519.

Notes: I omitted footnote one, which merely cited a number of early-to-mid 20th century Neo-Thomistic authors who have commented on the nature of beauty. I also reformatted references to the Summa Theologiae from the more traditional (Ia IIae, q. 31, a. 1, ad 1) to a more contemporary form (1a2ae.31.1 ad 1). Italics are original to the essay.

Fr. Jordan Aumann on the Contemplative and Active Lives Compared

[87] Active Life

5. As the contemplative life consists essentially in the operations of the speculative intellect, which has knowledge of truth as its proper object, so the active life consists essentially in the operations of the practical intellect, which controls and directs the lower faculties in view of the means to an end. The practical intellect is not a distinct faculty from the speculative intellect, but a distinct operation of one and the same intellect, so far as the intellect is able to consider truth as such (speculative operation) or truth as ordained to action—something to be done or made—(practical operations).[1] The immediately eliciting principle of contemplative activity is the speculative intellect, while the activity of the will is antecedent, concomitant or consequent. In the operations of the active life, however, the immediately eliciting faculty is not the speculative intellect, but for prudence the practical intellect, for justice, the will, for courage and temperance the sensitive appetite.

6. As with contemplation, so with the operations of the active life, it is possible to consider them as purely natural or as supernatural. According to ethics the acquired moral virtue of justice is the primary eliciting virtue in the active life, although the moral virtues of temperance and courage likewise are part of the active life, but as removing impediments to the virtue of justice. According to Christian theology, the active life depends on a working and instructed faith, the infused virtue of prudence, enhanced by the Gift of Counsel, the infused virtues of justice and mercy and the Gift of Piety first of all, and then on the infused virtues of courage and temperance and the Gifts of Courage and Fear of the Lord.

The active life is essentially related to the performance of the acts of the moral virtues and its first fruits should be the perfection of the individual through the practice of virtue. But since the active life consists principally in the acts of justice and the Gift of Piety, it follows that it not only performs the works of justice but it is ordained directly to the love of neighbour [sic].[2] For that reason the virtue of mercy, under the direction of charity, forms part of the supernatural active life. For St [sic] Thomas, the good active life is a disposition or preparation for the contemplative life; it is also a consequence of the contemplative life, as being ordained to love of neighbour. In its perfection the active life looks to the supernatural society of the Church and seeks to extend the kingdom of God on earth. As the interior life, rectified by the moral and theological virtues, is a source of the good done to others in the works of mercy and justice, so the contemplative activity is a source of preaching and teaching in the apostolate.

[88] Active and Contemplative Life Compared

7. Both the contemplative and the active life can be considered in their interior operations and in their external acts. As regards the interior or immanent acts of the virtues characteristic of the contemplative life, the following supernatural powers will predominate: the theological virtues (including the interior act of love of neighbour), the speculative Gifts of the Holy Spirit and the virtue of religion (especially in the worship of God). The contemplative acts of the Christian are therefore designated as constituting the 'interior life' or the 'life of prayer'.

The active life, on the other hand, calls into play the interior acts of the virtues and Gifts which pertain to self and neighbour, mainly the moral virtues (especially justice), prudence and the practical Gifts of the Holy Spirit. For that reason the active life is also called the 'moral life', the 'life of the moral virtues' or the 'ascetical life'.

Both of these lives are aspects or phases of the one and the same spiritual life of an individual person, though they will vary with the individual. And since the spiritual life necessarily involves the interior acts of the theological and the moral virtues as well as the gifts which perfect them, every Christian should cultivate both the interior or contemplative aspect of life and the moral or active aspect. In practice, however, because of dispositions flowing from temperament and character, some persons will be more inclined to contemplative acts, even if they are in an active state of life, while others may be more inclined to the moral and ascetical acts, even if they are in a contemplative state. According to the teaching of the early Fathers it was to be expected that contemplatives would at the beginning be concerned primarily with the ascetical practices of the moral virtues, since the active life was considered a preparation for the contemplative phase. On the other hand, although there have been 'contemplative types' who remained in the active life (St Ignatius of Loyola was called a 'contemplative in action'),[3] the person who has this inclination would normally be expected to seek a contemplative state of life. Judging from the history of spirituality, it would seem that women are generally more disposed to the contemplative state than men, because they usually have more of an inclination to prayer and are more devout and receptive than men.

The person who is active by disposition is usually characterized by a strong sense of duty to God and neighbour, a desire to prove his love by actions and great facility in the practice of the moral virtues. The active type is much more common than the contemplative type and the reason given by St Thomas is that 'the contemplative life is not properly human but superhuman',[4] while 'the properly human life is the active life, which consists in the practice of the moral virtues'.[5]

[89] 8. Considering the external acts or spiritual exercises proper to the contemplative and the active life, the former is manifested predominantly by the practice of prayer, both liturgical and private, while the latter is expressed by the works of mercy in some type of apostolate. This does not mean, of course, that prayer as a spiritual exercise is restricted to those who are contemplative by profession, for St Thomas says that 'although all who are in the active life do not arrive at the perfect state of contemplation, nevertheless every Christian should engage in contemplation to some degree'.[6] There is, however, this opposition between the exercise of set prayer and the performance of the works of mercy: both activities require time and it is impossible to give one's attention to both at the same time. Nor does it solve the problem to state that work can be made prayer, for the two are distinct. What can be done is to supernaturalize one's external action by proper motivation and to restrict one's external occupations so that time for genuine prayer can be provided. This is more necessary for those who are engaged in study, teaching, preaching—what we may call a doctrinal or intellectual apostolate—because those engaged in the manual or mechanical tasks can usually remain recollected in God and even pray as they work.

The most important thing is charity, and this should motivate the activities of both the contemplative and the active types of life. In the supernatural order what matters most is not what one does, but the love with which he does it. As St Thomas says 'The root of merit is charity'.[7] Consequently, the truly spiritual man will strive with all his power for the perfection of charity, and as he grows in charity he will feel compelled to manifest it in his actions. The person who is inclined to external works will manifest his charity especially in the works of mercy, out of love of neighbour; the person who is more inclined to the interior life and its practices will manifest his charity in the practice of prayer, which is the language of the love of God.

Footnotes:

1. cf. Ia. 79, 11

2. cf. 2a2ae. 182, 2

3. cf Nadal, H., S.J., Epistolae, Monumenta Historiae S.J., IV, Madrid, 1905, p. 651

4. De virtutibus cardinalibus 1. In Ethic. X, lect. 11 & 12, he calls the contemplative life 'divine'

5. De virtutibus cardinalibus 1

6. III Sent. 36, 3, 5

7. 2a2ae. 182, 2

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Source: Jordan Aumann, Appendix 1: Active and Contemplative Life," in Summa Theologiæ: Volume 46: Action and Contemplation, trans. by Jordan Aumann (Cambridge: Blackfriars, 1966), 87-89.

Fr. Jordan Aumann on Effective Apostolic Work

The apostolate is a supernaturally vital activity and not a purely mechanical activism or naturally acquired technical skill. This follows from the fact that the value of the external action flows from the inner disposition; the value of good works depends on the charity which prompts those works. Therefore, the Christian apostolate—which is love of neighbour [sic] in action—requires grace and charity in the apostle. It is in this sense that the motu proprio Primo Feliciter (1948) refers to the apostolate of secular institutes: "The exercise of this apostolate in constancy and holiness must derive from such sincerity of mind [N.B.: another translation is "purity of intention"], interior union with God, generous self forgetfulness and courageous self-denial, such love of souls, as to nourish, unceasingly renew and outwardly express the spiritual reality within" [n. 6]. [...]

As supernatural transitive action, the apostolate has as its cause not only the grace and charity of the apostle, but God himself. The apostle of grace, as an instrument, acts under God, His own formation, spiritual and technical, makes him more suited as an instrument; his apostolate the more fruitful. But the primary condition of fruitfulness is submissiveness to God, and this is the reason why the apostle must, in the words of Pius XII, sentire cum Ecclesia ["to think with the Church"]. This primacy of God's causality explains why the apostolic efforts may well produce effects beyond the personal endowments of the apostle. Like all instruments, he achieves a greater effect through his subordination to the principal cause [which is God].

The end or purpose of the apostolate is to bring souls to God. All its endeavours [sic], even when accomplished through temporal, material or profane activities, are pointed towards the supernatural end of salvation and sanctification. Otherwise, there might be good works, service for neighbour, but there is no apostolate. The supernatural end is what gives the service of neighbour its specific character as apostolic action. No field of human endeavour can be excluded as a field of work for apostolic co-operation with Christ. Thus whatever a person does in a conscious manner to contribute directly or indirectly to the redemption of souls, to the rebirth of men in grace, can be called a true apostolate.

Every Christian is bound to be an apostle, because Christ calls all to love of neighbour. But just as some live and manifest their love of God by a predominantly contemplative life, others by one that is predominantly active, so also all men do not engage in the apostolate to the same extent. Hence the distinction is drawn between the direct and the indirect apostolate. The direct includes all those acts whereby a person brings souls to God through an immediate, personal contact—e.g. administering the sacraments [as a priest], preaching or teaching, etc. The indirect apostolate is a supernatural activity directed towards neighbour, but lacking this immediate contact, or being natural activity with simply an apostolic end—e.g. the prayers and sacrifices of contemplatives for others, teaching profane subjects, corporal works of mercy. That all are bound by the precept of charity to at least some sort of indirect apostolate is beyond question; love of neighbour obviously includes this. While some have affirmed an equal obligation with reference to direct apostolate, this seems an exaggeration. [...]

As a form of active life, the apostolate presupposes a threefold preparation or perfection: intellectual, moral and professional or techincal. [...] These predispositions will likewise be supernatural, excepting professional skill, which may be purely natural.

The intellectual formation of an apostle is doctrinal and therefore involves the virtue of faith and the penetration of the truths of faith through theological study, meditation and spiritual reading. The moral formation involves the practice of the moral virtues, especially justice, and the love which inspires the apostolate as well as the ascetical practices which safeguard all the virtues. Nor can one underestimate the importance of the virtue of prudence, which shapes and directs all the moral virtues. It touches the contemplative aspect of life by grasping the universal principles of right action; it extends to the existential order by applying those principles to particular actions. The steps of prudence are to reflect, to judge, to act; but then the experience acquired can foster growth in prudence by a reverse process: act, reflect, judge. Of the remaining moral virtues, fortitude is required to control the emergency or irascible passions; temperance for the control of the concupiscible or pleasure passions. If this control of the sensitive appetite be lacking, the apostle degenerates to a life of the passions, which is not human but animal.

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Source: Fr. Jordan Aumann, "Appendix 7: The Apostolate," in Summa Theologiæ: Volume 46: Action and Contemplation, trans. by Jordan Aumann (Cambridge: Blackfriars, 1966), 120-123.