[3] Some authors do not give formal communication so wide an extent; they do not consider every active participation in a non-Catholic religious service as a formal communication. Vermeersch, for example, looks upon playing the organ as a form of proximate material co-operation [sic].[16] Since the majority of the moralists,[17] however, consider that action as a formal communication in non-Catholic worship, and since the Holy See has said it is never allowed,[18] there seems to be justification for including it under the general heading of formal communication. By reason of its part in the function, playing the organ at a religious service is to be classed as a specifically religious action.
This attitude of Vermeersch follows from a difference he notes between communication and participation. Both consist in taking part in the action of another, whether merely internally by intention [4] and desire, or externally, too. To his mind external communication is considered as formal, while external participation is reduced rather to co-operation, which in some matters can be formal or merely material, according to the intention.[19] There seems, however, to be no practical reason for this distinction in regard to our matter. To participate actively, even only externally, in a non-Catholic religious ceremony is a formal communication. Therefore, communication and participation are used interchangeably in this study. [...]
[36] Per accidens intention and moral circumstances can become the primary sources of the morality of an human act.[3] When an act is indifferent morally from both its object and its circumstances, the only source of the morality of that act will be the intention for which it is done. For a person in every human act must act with some intention, which must be either morally good or morally bad. An act, which is morally indifferent by reason of its object, can also become good or bad by reason of one or more of the moral circumstances. In that case the circumstances assume the character of moral objects, and become accidentally the primary sources of the goodness or badness of the individual act. Thus, although the playing of an organ is morally indifferent in itself, when it is done as a part of a non-Catholic religious service, it becomes bad by reason of the circumstances making it an active participation in the non-Catholic religious service. [...]
[51] There is clearly a formal co-operation when there is question of a participation in what is essential in the service, as to receive the eucharist of heretics. An active participation in what is accidental in such worship, as singing, even though the hymns be orthodox in their content, or playing the organ in a religious service, is also a formal co-operation.[54] Such activity implies an approval of the cult, for it is intended to add beauty, attractiveness, and appeal to the service; this implication is inseparable from any subjective attitude of the one actively participating in accidentals. In other words, all accidental activity of a religious nature is as wrong, by reason of the circumstances, as that which is essentially a part of the service. Whatever activity in a non-Catholic service has a specifically religious character, whether by its nature, or by reason of the circumstances, is intrinsically wrong, as a profession of the belief of a false sect.[55] Since such activity in the exercise of idolatrous or false worship is intrinsically wrong, it cannot be reduced to merely material co-operation.[56] An objection cannot be made on the score that the sin of irreligion on the part of the non-Catholic is only material. Even if that is true, co-operation in it in a formal way is not licit. For one is never allowed to co-operate formally in something which is intrinsically wrong objectively. Although the other person may not be subjectively guilty of sin, the formal co-operator incurs the guilt of the virtues violated, for he does something he knows to be intrinsically wrong. [...]
[72] B. Singing or Playing Musical Instruments
Singing or playing musical instruments in non-Catholic religious services is an active participation, and, therefore, a formal communication. Concerning this point La Croix says that it is not licit to sing psalms together with non-Catholics in their churches or meetings, nor is it licit to play the organ or other musical instruments in their temples, because such things seem to be a public approbation of, or a scandalous communication in, sacred things.[53] The author of the Appendix to the article Fides in the Bibliotheca of Ferraris says that they ratify a false rite and cult, who play the organ or exercise the musical art in another way in churches of schismatics and heretics.[54] Kenrick holds that in this country those who sing hymns or play the organ in the churches of heretics become participants in the cult, and, therefore, betray their faith in some way.[55] [73] Konings states that to perform the office of organist, even only one or the other time, in the churches of heretics in their religious gatherings would be illicit, for it involves a communication in their religious rites or a formal co-operation.[56] Noldin-Schmitt,[57] Marc-Gestermann,[58] Prümmer,[59] Merkelbach,[60] and Aertnys-Damen[61] agree that singing or playing the organ in religious services is wrong, because each involves a participation in the cult. Noldin-Schmitt expressly call these actions formal communications in the worship.[62] Wouters makes the same judgment about playing the organ, but does not mention singing.[63] Lehmkuhl[64] and Augustine[65] call singing and playing the organ formal co-operations. Sabetti-Barrett consider singing in a non-Catholic religious service as an active part in the cult, and, therefore, intrinsically wrong.[66] In 1889 the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith stated, with the approbation of Pope Leo XIII, that it is illicit to play the organ in the churches of heretics when they are exercising false cult there; the seriousness of this matter is made clear when it is remembered that this was a reply to a petition for permission to play the organ in Protestant churches on feast days so that the organist could provide for himself.[67]
Davis allows a Catholic organist to continue in his position in a non-Catholic church so long as he is in grave necessity, provided there is no serious scandal.[68] This opinion indicates that he looks upon this action as a form of proximate material co-operation. Vermeersch expressly states that he considers organ playing as a proximate [p. 74] material co-operation.[69] These opinions are too mild. In licit material co-operation there is required an action which is at least indifferent. Playing the organ in a non-Catholic service adds beauty, solemnity, and appeal to the worship, and as such is inseparable from the religious rite. Therefore in that circumstance it is intrinsically bad, and is a formal co-operation. Because of the strength of the intrinsic arguments for this opinion, and of the great weight of extrinsic authority favoring it, the view of Davis and Vermeersch is somewhat singular and exceptional, to say the least.
Sabetti-Barrett cite, without approval, an opinion that a Catholic may sing in non-Catholic services in a very rare case, when the following conditions are verified: (1) there is nothing contrary to the faith in the hymns; (2) there is no scandal or danger of perversion; (3) there is a most grave necessity. The reason given is that in these circumstances the malice seems to be, not on the part of the action, but on the part of other persons, and hence the co-operation is only material, and can be permitted for a just cause. On the other hand, Sabetti-Barrett believe that singing must be considered as an active part in non-Catholic worship, and intrinsically wrong. Hence it involves a formal co-operation, and the intention, or the grave necessity, of the singer cannot change the nature of the act placed in such circumstances.[70] It is difficult to see how singing in the religious services of non-Catholics can be viewed in any other way.
Regarding the singing in non-Catholic services, it makes no difference whether the hymns are orthodox or not.[71] Even if they are orthodox, they are used as a part of non-Catholic worship. Non-Catholic worship, even when it contains nothing false, is conducted in defiance of the Catholic Church, the only organization authorized by God to establish public worship. Vermeersch says that for Catholics to sing the Te Deum together with non-Catholics in a non-Catholic church as an expression of common joy, even when it has a religious signification, is not intrinsically wrong, although Catholics should not do it.[72]
[p. 75] It seems, however, that an action of this kind always has a religious signification, and hence it implies an approval of non-Catholic worship, and is an expression of religious indifference. It seems, therefore, to be wrong. The Holy See has allowed Catholic civil officials to assist only passively at non-Catholic religious celebrations commanded by the state at which the doxology was sung.[73] The mind of the Church is that Catholics have their religious celebrations separately in their own churches.[74]
Playing the organ, or other musical instruments in the course of a non-Catholic religious service, but not as a part, or as an ornament of it, will not constitute a religious participation, for example, to do so in honor of a non-Catholic king who is present.[75] Similarly, it contains no religious communication to play the organ or other musical instruments, or to sing hymns which are orthodox, for profane purposes in non-Catholic churches outside all occasion of cult.[76] The use of the church, however, brings in some co-operation, and there must be a proportionate reason present to justify such activity. For a Catholic to sing hymns containing errors in faith, even outside the occasion of a religious function, is a formal religious communication, as an external expression of wrong doctrine. This could apply to some negro spirituals. On the part of a Catholic organist accompanying such hymns there is a formal co-operation, because in the circumstance the music makes the external expression of wrong doctrine more appealing.
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Footnotes:
16. Op. cit., [Vermeersch, Theologiae Moralis Principia, Responsa, Concilia] Tom. II, n. 50, p. 41; n. 8, p. 124. Cf. Davis, Moral and Pastoral Theology, Vol. I, p. 286.
17. Noldin-Schmitt, op. cit., [Summa Theologiae Moralis] Tom. II, n. 39, 4, c, p. 40; Aertnys-Damen, Theologia Moralis, Tom. I, n. 314, II, Qu. 4, p. 236; Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis, Tom. I, n. 526, d), p. 372; DeMeester, op. cit., n. 1253, note 4, p. 154; Kenrick, Theologia Moralis, Tom. II, Tract. XIII, n. 37, p. 48; Konings, Theologia Moralis S. Alphonsi in Compendium Redacta, Vol. I, n. 313, 1, p. 142.
18. Col. S.C.P.F., Vol. II, n. 1713, p. 240.
19. Loc. cit., p. 41.
3. Aertnys-Damen, op. cit., Tom. I, n. 54, p. 50. Cf. I-II, q. 18, a. 9 and a. 11.
54. Cf. Augustine, A Commentary on Canon Law, Vol. VI, p. 197.
55. De Meester, op. cit., [Iuris Canonici et Iuris Canonica-civilis Compendium] Lib. III, Pars I, n. 1252, 2, pp. 153–154.
56. Konings, op. cit., Vol. I, n. 313, 1), p. 142. Cf. Genicot-Salsmans, Institutiones Theologiae Moralis, Tom. I, n. 198, p. 149.
53. Theologia Moralis, Tom. I, Lib. II, Tract. I, Cap. III, n. 68, p. 170.
54. Prompta Bibliotheca, art. Fides, Appendix, n. 57, Tom. III, col. 1137.
55. Op. cit., Tom. II, Tract. XIII, n. 37, p. 48.
56. Op. cit., Vol. I, n. 313, (1), p. 142.
57. Op. cit., Tom. II, n. 39, 4, c, p. 40.
58. Op. cit., Tom. I, n. 449, 6, p. 288.
59. Op. cit., Tom. I, n. 526, d, p. 372.
60. Op. cit., Tom. I, n. 758, (3), p. 586.
61. Op. cit., Tom. I, n. 314, I, Quaer. 4, p. 236.
62. Op. cit., Tom. II, n. 38, 2, p. 38.
63. Op. cit., Tom. I, n. 557, 5, p. 391.
64. Op. cit., Vol. I, n. 813, p. 450.
65. Op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 197.
66. Op. cit., n. 154, 10, pp. 159–160.
67. Epistola S. C. de Prop. Fide, July 8, 1889, Coll. S.C.P.F., Vol. II, n. 1713, p. 240.
68. Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 286.
69. Op. cit., Tom. II, n. 147, 8, p. 124.
70. Op. cit., n. 154, 10, pp. 159–160.
71. Prümmer, loc. cit.
72. Loc. cit., n. 147, 9, pp. 124–125.
73. Instructio S. C. S. Officii, May 12, 1841, Coll. S.C.P.F., Vol. I, n. 921, p. 519.
74. Cf. Littera Encyclica S. C. de Prop. Fide, April 25, 1902, Coll. S.C.P.F., Vol. II, n. 2136, p. 425.
75. Lehmkuhl, op. cit., Vol. I, n. 813, p. 450; Merkelbach, op. cit., Tom. I, n. 758, (3), note 2, p. 586.
76. Konings, op. cit., Vol. I, n. 313, (1), p. 142.
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Source: John R. Bancroft, "Communication in Religious Worship with Non-Catholics," PhD diss., (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1943), 3–4, 36, 51, 72–75.
