Distinction: Social Constructs and Arbitrariness

A distinction that SJWs often fail to make (in fact, I don't think I've ever seen it made by such people) is between the fact of something being a social construct and the degree to which the signifier for that construct is an arbitrary relation. (You'll learn something to this effect in any introductory semiology course, which is rooted in modern philosophy, regarding the relation between the signifier and signified in Saussure's--mistaken--conception of the sign, but I've never seen the connection applied in this conversation.)

For example, English uses the generic word "dog" to refer to a number of animals of a certain genus and species. The particular use of the letters "d-o-g" is an arbitrary historical accident; hence the same concept may be expressed by different letters, a different word, in a different language, e.g. "perro."

The concept of a dog is derived from a combination of accrued sense perceptions by multiple individuals over time and an implicit, public agreement to use a common word to express the concept constructed by these sense perceptions of different dogs. Hence the concept of a dog is literally a social construct, AND the word used to label dogs as dogs is also a social construct.

The difference lies in the degree of arbitrariness. The concept of dog is not an arbitrary concept even though it is a social construct that has evolved over time. In fact, it is not arbitrary at all but based on common perceptions of a class of objects, in this case, the domesticated canine. These perceptions are not random, arbitrary, or fruitless, but of the sort that can be further refined by scientific (ideoscopic in John Deely's language) investigation.

The very fact of a certain thing's being a social construct says nothing about whether it has an arbitrary relation to the "reality" that it expresses, such as the relation between the letters d-o-g, the concept of a dog, and the actual, individual dogs going about their daily business, so to speak.

Hence, even if one were to grant that gender is merely a social construct, it would require FAR much more work to establish further that gender is an arbitrary construct, that it has no relation whatsoever to biological sex ontology and functioning (or put in other words, that they vary totally independently).

Most social constructs are not arbitrary constructs but exist for very good reasons. In fact, one could argue that society is held up by a deep, historic foundation of social constructs, and society itself is just such a construct necessary to preserve its unity and continuity.

Distinction: Sex/Gender Ontologically and Epistemologically Considered

Whatever sex and gender may be, there is often a conflation in most discussions when trying to define these terms between what they are ontologically, in themselves (in se or per se), and what they are epistemologically (esse ad aliud, being toward another).

Hence people try to define sex and gender along ontological considerations, what is this thing in itself regardless of how people perceive it; arguments of this sort tend to say something like, "A person is this sex/gender even if he/she or anyone in the world doesn't realize it. The person's sex/gender is determined by genetics."

When defining sex and gender along epistemological considerations, arguments of this sort tend to emphasize the social construction and interpretation of each notion, ultimately explaining both as different because of performative qualities.

Yet people on both sides of the spectrum (ho ho...) of this argument will unconsciously conflate both types of argumentation. Hence you'll see some social constructionist or antiessentialist types refer to the "genetic realities/differences" of sex but go on to emphasize the psychological and social perceptions, intuitions, self-consciousness, etc. that predominate any consideration of what sex and gender ultimately are concretely considered for this individual. Something like: "Yes, although her chromosomes are XY, she is a woman because she knew, etc...." Hence the psycho-social, epistemological dimension of the definition of sex/gender dominates the ontological and becomes in turn a new ontological definition, *the* only ontological definition that matters.

Genetic/essentialist types will take the opposite approach: "Whatever she 'thinks' she is, because of the chromosomes XY, she is actually a he." Or more crassly, it's "lipstick on a pig."

However, it seems clear that both dimensions, the ontological and epistemological, are necessary to keep distinguished and present when discussing sex/gender, for these ultimately can be understood only by both aspects.

It must be remembered that the effects produced causally by genes will always have exceptions; this does not mean that biological sex is somehow more complicated or varied than the binary of male-female. It simply illustrates a basic facet of causality in reality: the transition (ho ho...) from cause to effect is not always and everywhere perfectly accomplished. This is precisely the importance and meaning of final causality in such discussions. All things being equal, this cause tends to produce this range of effects; this cause tends to result in this range of effects if nothing impedes or hinders the causal chain. The fact that not all things are equal or that circumstances occur in which that causal chain is impeded does nothing to change the fact of its final causality. We would never say a lightbulb under any circumstances gives birth to a baby; such an effect is in no way possible given its teleology. But certainly the lightbulb can fail to emit light for any number of reasons; such a failure does not mean the lightbulb is "more complex" than a certain light-producing entity powered by electricity. It simply means that the cause, for various reasons, failed to result in the range of expected effects. We may or may not know why that happened, but that is immaterial to the causality itself.

Hence the mere existence of intersex conditions says nothing about the biological finality of genetics; it says something about the chaotic nature of reality itself, in which not every cause leads inevitably, always and everywhere, to its intended effect. A definition, therefore, cannot be based on an accidental exception foreign to the intrinsic nature of the cause itself, a nature that becomes clearly discernible over time through scientific investigation and peer review.

Investigation and peer review bring us to the epistemological consideration of sex/gender. We judge the sex/gender of others based on sensible signs that accrue from gradual observation. Mischaracterization of peoples' sex/gender boil down to a threefold possible failure: 1) on the side of the misgendered person, who perhaps gives off ambiguous signs about his/her sexual/gender identity; 2) on the side of the interpreter, who failures to interpret properly those signs; or both. There are an innumerable number of possible reasons why such a mischaracterization may occur.

This distinction can obviously be further expanded, but I'll leave it there for now.

Distinction: Reductionism vs. Eliminativism

If cognitive science has some breakthroughs on intentionality that naturalize it to physics, that's reductionism, not eliminativism. [...] If cognitive science reduces intentionality to a physics process, this establishes that intentionality exists as something that can be scientifically studied and analyzed (as whatever physics process cognitive science reduces it to). That would show that all eliminativists about intentionality are wrong, including Bakker. Reductionism is not eliminativism. And while very few people here I imagine are reductionist, we are all closer to the reductionist position than Bakker is, since reductionists agree with us on the primary point actually under dispute here.

---

Source: Brandon, January 14, 2015 (6:41 a.m.), comment on Edward Feser, "Post-Intentional Depression," Edward Feser blog, January 11, 2015, accessed June 30, 2015, http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2015/01/post-intentional-depression.html?showComment=1421246507704#c5670245010821610403.
---

[T]he dominant naturalistic position on intentionality is reductionist, not eliminativist, which holds both of the following:

(1) Intentionalism is true.

(2) Naturalism is true.

That is, reductionists hold that intentionality really exists and that there is reason to think that it admits of a perfectly naturalistic explanation in terms of physical processes, evolution, or what have you. Thus the bare fact of appealing to naturalism does not establish eliminativism; almost all naturalistic positions on the subject are reductionist, and reductionists about intentionality are intentionalists.

---

Source: Brandon, January 14, 2015 (8:35 a.m.), comment on Edward Feser, "Post-Intentional Depression," Edward Feser blog, January 11, 2015, accessed June 30, 2015, http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2015/01/post-intentional-depression.html?showComment=1421253336089#c6101963426624473851.

Distinction: Cynicism vs. Wisdom

Cynicism is not the same as wisdom.

Both come about from experience, but cynicism is precisely the result of one who has been disillusioned by their experiences, usually of selfishness and evil. Because of this conditioning, the cynic views all activity or tends to reduce all activity to this core motive of selfishness. Wisdom is never disillusioned because it is never surprised. Usually disillusionment carries with it resentment because the cynic feels compelled to give up his original ideals. Wisdom, on the other hand, sees all things move according to their limitations and must be guided by higher actualities and that resentment stems from selfishness itself. Honesty is a cure for resentment.

Wisdom is the intuitive grasp and unity of higher principles and their relation to particulars. It comes about from experience as well but never loses sight of the final goal, which is fundamentally (or ontologically) good because a being is positive in nature rather than negative (a being is rather than is not although there are respects in which a being is not, but these result from the semiosic process and a metaphysical analysis of potentiality, for example).

Hence, wisdom acknowledges the existence of selfishness but is not disturbed by such nor does it reduce all activity to such a principle because it maintains its firm grasp on the actual complexity of particular behaviors, and the unity it brings does not fluster it precisely because peace and unity coincide.

Wisdom is the source of all compassion because wisdom sees the current state of abjection, the final goal to attain, the means to attain it, the current lack, etc. Wisdom also brings love because all being is united by love insofar as all being is created by the Divine Love and held together in relations of mutual fecundation.

Hence, the moment a cynic expresses compassion, the cynic in that moment absolutely ceases to be a cynic, for in cynicism itself, there is no room for compassion, only despair. Despair because it forgets the ideal and the means to achieve the ideal.

Distinction: Being and Choosing Reindeer

There is a serious confusion between being and action here. "Being a reindeer" is not a choice but a state of being, which poor Rudolf couldn't change even if he wanted to (and maybe in his abused, depressed state, he pondered at some point whether Santa might be able to change his ontological status to fit his subjective self-constructed identity mush).

Being an atheist and being a Christian are not ontological states but free choices.

Choosing to be an atheist is objectively evil because it rejects truth.

Choosing to do evil after having converted to Christ is an even graver evil than being an atheist because those redeemed by Christ have made a promise at Baptism to renounce sin and Satan.

Shaming religions doesn't make sense because religions have no feelings. Religious believers have feelings, and they can be shamed.

Homophobia, misogyny, racism, and hatred are not states of being—one cannot "be" these things. One can feel homophobic/misogynistic/racist/hateful feelings, and one can act on these through some form of expression of ill will. These are firstly feelings (but without further qualification, these feelings may be sinful or not) and secondly actions, which are sinful because they are rooted in hatred.

Whether an act is truly homophobic/misogynistic/racist or otherwise an actual expression of hatred is not up for a secular meme or secular society to decide because secular society has absolutely no sense of what is actually loving and what is hateful. For example, the assertion that there exists a hierarchy between the sexes, where the man rules the woman even though the two are equal in dignity, is "misogynistic" only from a modernist lens. The assertion that the natural institution of marriage is between a man and woman is "homophobic." Actually, these labels are almost tautological within the modern paradigm. Why must this lens be accepted, and why should they mean anything beyond those who reject such views in the first place? I'm not concerned with being homophobic; I try not to make a point and go out of my way to offend people, but there are truly more important goals to pursue than to worry about if I'm offending someone.

In fact, the entire meme assumes a basically modernist narrative and makes sense only within that narrative. Maybe this narrative finds its epitome in an anthropomorphized reindeer that is a late capitalist ploy for brainwashing mass society into consumeristic conformity and totally incoherent notions of justice and morality, especially in reindeer-to-reindeer relations as well as Santa-to-reindeer relations. At that point, why not label anything as homophobic/misogynistic/racist? Does it really mean anything anymore?

Distinction: Critical vs. Cynical

Cynicism as we commonly use it refers to the idea that every person is inherently selfish and that all altruism is actually selfishness in disguise; it is the automatic tendency, for whatever reason, towards a negative conception of the other. Criticism historically has been free of this leaning towards negative judgment and simply meant an evaluation of something (usually literary or artistic work) based on a standard of aesthetics (e.g. a movie critic) with the purpose of revealing faults constructively and opening a space for reflective self-consideration. In English, criticism has taken on the denotation of a negative judgment—hence "why do you have to be so critical?" implies almost "why do you have to be so judgmental?"

Some may say that criticism is observing, interpreting, and appropriating the observations into one's framework in order to entrench current viewpoints. I think this is an inherently cynical perspective and actually too generalized (I think the determination of how an observation was appropriated should be evaluated by the case rather than generally; our experiences may however lead us to generalize that most people appropriate their observations uncritically). I'm not satisfied with it; the critical aspect could conceivably fall under only that last stage of appropriation, opening up the twofold possibility: 1) either to challenge one's beliefs, or 2) to confirm one's beliefs (if one views this confirmation as always negative, one might use the connotatively laden word "entrench" as I did above, but I suspect one would agree that sometimes the confirmation of an already held belief is not necessarily negative but simply always possibly dangerous).

Reflecting on criticism, I realize that it is a form of judgment, where judgment is simply, when stripped of its contemporary negative connotations, that function of our intellectual capacity to determine something either to be or not to be the case with respect to some explanatory principle or standard; in other words, to conclude whether something is or is not this or that way. Criticism implies a certain form of judgment. Off the top of my head, I distinguish different qualities a judgment may take on, in the form of binaries, and this list is by no means exhaustive:

A judgment may be:

reflective or not
thought through or not
positive or negative
informed or uninformed
self-oriented, other-oriented, or inclusive

I distinguish between reflective and thought through. Even if someone thinks something through, they may not be in a place of reflectivity, the capacity to see oneself, to bracket one's 1st person viewpoint into a 3rd person viewpoint or even a 2nd person viewpoint; reflectivity leads almost immediately to empathy, whereas simply thinking something through may just be the fodder of a tirade. A reflective criticism is that which opens the space of reflectivity, either towards myself, for others, or for all of us; the space of reflectivity is where we can truly begin to face our strengths and weaknesses in honesty and mutual support. It is a "democratic" space of rational, informed dialogue and public application to put it pragmatically.

I distinguish also between positive/negative and constructive/destructive. By positive/negative I mean something like affirmative/disapproving. We can affirm/praise and be constructive or destructive, destructive if what we affirm really ought not be affirmed. We can disapprove in a way that is constructive or destructive. Usually a destructive form of disapproval is shaming another person. I think shaming is one of the worst things a person can do to another person.

A judgment can be informed about its subject matter or not. We see people talk about things and make judgments based out of ignorance and out of information; we appreciate those judgments made out of information even if we disagree with them because at least the judgment is less likely to be coming from a place of bigotry or in other words non-reflective, unconscious prejudice.

Self-oriented/other-oriented simply refers to the direction of the judgment—is it directed to myself, to others, or to all of us?

I think criticism in its best form should be inclusive, reflective, thought through, informed, and constructive. It may be positive or negative depending on the context, but if negative, at least sensitive to the other. Criticism as it usually is referred to, however, is other-oriented, non-reflective, uninformed, destructive, negative, etc.

Distinction: "Lifelong Catholic" vs. Living Catholic

There is really only one use for describing oneself as a "lifelong Catholic": a statement of chronological fact regarding one's self conception. In other words, it describes a fact of time—that the lifelong Catholic was baptized soon after birth, confirmed, received First Communion, etc., continued attending Mass throughout life, receiving sacraments, perhaps praying.

But what good is a label in itself? I can call attention to any other "chronological fact" regarding myself—I'm a lifelong brown-haired male. Or I can state a fact regarding how I view myself (self-conception), a view that may change with time; e.g. in high school I believed I was ugly because I had acne.

The label and the self-conception are morally neutral, psychological qualities. These qualities may be harmful or beneficial to our flourishing and striving for happiness. There is, however, no intrinsic point in any of these labels. The labels are spoken so as to be used, to set oneself in relation to something else. Hence labels, while neutral qualities in themselves, are always concretely employed in relation to something else; hence enters their political dimension.

However, I want to draw attention to how a person will call himself a "lifelong Catholic." Usually this label is spoken in order to give moral or political weight and authority to what is said; it serves as a sometimes-very-subtle power play, a badge of honor or pride, saying, "Look at me. I've lived this all my life. My opinion therefore is worth something."

But the problem is that being a "lifelong" anything doesn't guarantee mastery. One could be a lifelong entrepreneur, manager, woodworker, painter, etc. Length of experience certainly exposes one to more possibilities, but it in itself does not guarantee mastery. Mastery requires deliberation and intentionality, usually growing through a slow, heuristic process; sometimes, however, such deliberation draws out an intrinsic genius and leads to spontaneous leaps (punctuated growth rather than gradual).

Hence, the label "lifelong x" is an expression of unconscious pride. The label of the Saint is "I am a sinner; don't listen to me but to Christ, to the doctors, to the Church" (paradoxically in so doing, the Saints then become listened to themselves precisely because they submit their experience and knowledge to the greater tradition and judgment of the Church). The self-styled expert, or "lifelong Catholic," reveals himself to be a novice. If the "lifelong Catholic" would only realize that salvation and sanctification can be lost in a single moment, a single moral act, that salvation is not guaranteed, that the grace of perseverance must always be begged for, that the mystical life, just as with any art and virtue, must be advanced upon by calm and persevering deliberation that is oblivious to time and the growth of which is not set in proportion to the length of time that has passed, then perhaps that lifelong Catholic may actually become a living Catholic, which is the only kind of Catholic that is worth anything for glorifying God, working for the salvation of souls, and being saved.

Distinction: Incapacity of Action vs. Incapacity of Becoming

There is a difference between incapacity of action and incapacity of becoming. I have said that incapacity may be juxtaposed with unworthiness, where incapacity refers to action; unworthiness, to being. But incapacity itself may refer either to being or action.

Incapacity of action is more easily illustrated. For example, a plant is in its being incapable of flying like a bird or breathing through water like a fish. It would be absurd to press the point that a plant is at a disadvantage compared to the fish because of this incapacity in its very nature although the point is true. The disadvantage, of course, exists only when comparing the plant with something else that, in its being, may do something.

Incapacity of becoming is related to incapacity of action since both stem from the very nature of a particular being. A plant cannot become, for example, an internal combustion engine. Such a transformation transcends the nature of the plant, and in a certain sense would be a reversion of nature from something vital and organic to something non-living and mechanic. Because of this limitation of the nature of the plant, we shouldn't therefore expect a plant to do anything other than what a plant does, which can be any number of things. Likewise, we shouldn't look to an internal combustion engine to photosynthesize.

Distinction: Unworthy vs. Incapable

There is a difference between being unworthy of something and incapable of something. Unworthiness refers to being; incapacity refers to doing or activity. And although activity follows being (function follows form), one has to be careful in how this concept is applied.

For example, we are unworthy of salvation before God because we have sinned. Nevertheless, even if we hadn't sinned, as finite creatures we still could not save ourselves without God's grace because salvation transcends the capacity of finite power; it requires the infinite absolutely. Sin, on the other hand, makes us in a certain sense further incapable of salvation because it makes us unworthy by willfully rejecting the only thing which could save us, namely, God's grace.

Sometimes the Church makes this distinction. For example, She tells us that two persons of the same sex are incapable of marrying each other through the Sacrament of Matrimony. She tells us that women are incapable of ordination, and at one point, She decreed that women were incapable of singing in the choir because it is a liturgical function and hence reserved for men. In none of these instances does the Church decree that such people are unworthy so as to shame them. In a certain sense, all are unworthy of the grace of marriage, priesthood, and contributing to the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass. But most people take the notion of unworthiness as a stimulus for shame rather than humility. 

This stimulus to shame rather than humility is fueled by a lack of healthy self-integration usually caused by childhood experiences in being raised poorly. Shame is fueled by falsehoods, pain, and hatred. Humility is fueled by truth, consolation, and love. Humility can feel painful, but it is a very different kind of pain than the pain that accompanies shame. The pain of humility is the pain of subduing one's pride, of resisting the allure of falsehood. The pain of shame is utterly destructive and usually leads to a form of overcompensation: either a person acts "nicely" and allows himself to be walked over without asserting healthy boundaries so as to avoid further pain; or the person acts like a jerk, stomping over others to give himself a false sense of power. Both reactions are extremes that try to hide from the simple presence of shame.

Hence when a person is told they "can't" do something, usually due to the above circumstances, this denial is used as a way to shame the person, confusing the notions of unworthiness and incapacity. In the past, others may have said, "You can't do that" so as to shame the person; e.g. "You can't watch TV/be with those people/eat this food/do that activity/etc." This "can't" took other forms as well: "Stop crying/don't be a cry baby/grow up/toughen up/don't talk about that/shut up/etc." These commands express one reality: you "can't" talk about your emotional state and what's really going on.

Rather than being a way to state a simple, humbling truth, "can't" becomes a powerful tool to place people into positions of shameful submission. Instead of something obvious, such as, "You can't fly because you don't have wings" or "You can't touch the stove or else you'll burn yourself real badly," can't takes on the form of unhealthy social dynamics that leads to shame. 

Hence when the Church declares something very simple and pure and profound, such as, "You can't deliberately miss Sunday Mass without committing mortal sin," She isn't trying to shame us to go to Mass but reminding us of a very basic reality: the primacy of God in our lives, and the most obvious expression of that primacy is weekly worship as handed down to us from Christ Himself.

All the commandments and dogmas of the Church are interpreted as shaming mechanisms by people who themselves feel ashamed for whatever reason. They cannot be properly seen as humble statements of divine truth when a person is caught up in such a psychological-spiritual state. But in reality, these commandments and dogmas are lampposts to our happiness and freedom because they guide us to humility, and as Scripture tells us, "God resisteth the proud, and giveth grace to the humble" (Jas. 4:6).

Distinction: Points of View vs. Worldview

There is a difference between specific points of view on various matters and a worldview that frames those points of view. Specific points of view are formed by premises and conclusions about some matter and use a discourse provided by the worldview behind them. The worldview itself is the narrative that makes all points of view for an individual coherent, or at least attempts to do so. Clearly, many individuals hold within their own worldviews conflicting points of view, of which conflict they may not be cognizant; and this for several possible reasons: 1) ignorance; 2) lack of self reflection; 3) lack of understanding the implications of other points of view or a worldview (related to ignorance); 4) a psychological factor that presses them to accept the conflict, such as guilt, resentment, or desire, etc.

Therefore, when a person, for example, says that they are Christian, or spiritual, or an atheist, or a supporter of something, and when two people attempt to discuss an issue, although they may happen to use similar words in their conversation, these words may be nuanced by radically different worldviews and narratives and hence carry different meanings. These different meanings, however, may contain enough similarity between the two people that their differences go unnoticed. This phenomenon is most clearly seen when people "talk past each other" in a debate. The reason is not simply that a word must be defined, but the context of the word must also be defined. When both the words used and the context in which those words are placed have been defined and displayed clearly, a conversation may begin.

The process of listening to another involves differing degrees of self-reflection, in which the discourse of another person is compared with one's own in order to spot differences and similarities and hence make progress in conversation. Listening requires the realization that there must be a synchronizing of some kind in order to advance in the conversation.

Sometimes for this synchronizing to occur, either or both of the participants must undergo a process of growth—in knowledge, in reflexivity, in maturity, etc.

Thus many younger Christians who don't understand what Protestantism is in contrast with Catholicism because they don't even know the basic history of their own religion, such Christians will never understand the stresses that Catholicism places on certain aspects of Catholic faith, such as justification, salvation, the Sacraments, the Pope, apostolic succession, the communion of Saints, etc.

Distinction: Resolve and Achievement

A trap in the spiritual life that I've been learning through experience is neglecting the difference between making a resolution and achieving the goal of that resolution. Making the resolution is the first step towards reaching the goal, not the goal itself. If I resolve to avoid a particular kind of sin, it doesn't mean that I will from that point on be able to avoid the sin as though I had complete control over myself. The resolve is made precisely because I know that I have a hard time avoiding that sin, so when I make the resolution, I should make it with the realization that I will now undergo a spiritual war in which I will probably lose many battles, but with the Lord's help, achieve ultimate victory.

Because the resolution is the first step towards reaching the goal but not the goal itself, it would be silly for me to be discouraged at failure. The only real failure would be to give up the resolution all together. Only through persevering in renewing the resolution and putting it into practice will I ever hope to achieve the goal of the resolution.

Distinction: Beginning of Life vs. Beginning of Human Life vs. Beginning of Human Person

This interviewer confuses three distinct notions: 1) when does "life" start (whatever that means); 2) when does the life of a distinct biological organism start (in this case, a human); 3) when does a human being become a human person.

The first two questions posed as they are in this context makes them biological/scientific questions rather than philosophical ones as the interviewer intended because both questions can be answered very easily by science:

1) to ask when life starts without any further qualification is similar to asking whether the chicken or the egg came first; the sperm and ovum must both be alive for there to be any conception; when conception occurs, a distinct biological organism forms that is alive (this is the beginning of the life of this distinct human);

2) to ask when this biological organism becomes human is simple: by referring to the genetic makeup of the organism, we can tell what species it is; in this case, human.

The third question might be philosophical depending on whether or how a person distinguishes the notion of human being from human person. A lot of the philosophical aspect of the abortion debate circles around these concepts. The political aspects focus more on the utilitarian and concrete consequences of either supporting or preventing abortion.

Of course, for Catholics and many realists, the human being is always a human person because although the notions may be logically distinguishable, they are not so and cannot be so in the concrete. We exercise such "distinguish-ables" all the time: e.g. "tree" doesn't simply exist on its own but exists in concrete manifestations of trees: elm tree, birch tree, apple trees, etc.; there isn't just a "car" but specific models and makes: Honda Civic 2013, Ford Fiesta 2012, Volkswagen Passat 2014, etc.

Distinction: Divisions of Hatred

Hatred is increasingly becoming the new conversation stopper, similar to using words like "bigot" and "dogmatic." But just because someone uses this word doesn't mean they are using it intelligently or even coherently. It seems therefore convenient and useful to draw up several distinctions and definitions of hatred for Christians. The following is far from adequate but is an attempt to work towards clarity. It is a work in progress.

---

Last updated: June 7, 2014.

Hatred (synonymous in this case with anger) generically is a movement of extreme dislike, antipathy, or opposition in the face of some perceived evil typically exceeding what is reasonable. By itself the movement is morally neutral. Its object and motivation determine its sinfulness. This movement may occur in the passions (emotions), the intellect, the will, or any combination of the three. This movement may be conscious or unconscious. This movement may be sanctified or not. This movement may be individual or collective.

1.1 Hatred as a passion is a feeling of deep aversion and dislike for some object perceived as evil. Usually it is vigorous and energetic.

1.2 Hatred as an intellectual act is a negative judgment towards an object deeming the object worthy of opposition because it is evil in some way/degree.

• Problems: this definition is clearly inadequate because it doesn't seem to be able to distinguish between hatred and simple opposition.

1.3 Hatred as an act of the will is a decision to work against an object's proper good due to it, especially through the expression of dislike.

• Problems: this definition is inadequate for the same reason as above.

2. Hatred may be under the conscious awareness of an individual or group of individuals. In such a case, the individual(s) recognizes the movement of opposition towards a specific object. Nevertheless, the degree of recognition may extend over several levels:

2.1.1 recognition of the movement itself;
2.1.2 recognition of the object of the hatred;
2.1.3 recognition of the reasons for the hatred;
2.1.4 recognition of the unconscious associations motivating the reasons for the hatred.

2.2 Of 2.1.1–2.1.4 above, whichever degree that an individual does not attain to in his conscious awareness remains unconscious. That is unconscious hatred.

3.1 Sanctified or holy hatred can mean either an emotional detachment from some object (as when Christ said, "If any man come to me, and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple" (Lk 14:26)) that would otherwise impede the individual's taking responsibility for his own life with moral integrity; or holy hatred may mean an antipathy towards some object fully in accord with God's will primarily by means of connaturality through the activation of the gifts of the Holy Ghost and/or secondarily by means of knowledge of the theological sciences. Only insofar as this movement cooperates with the will of God is it a holy hatred. Nevertheless only the movement of the Holy Ghost may fully and in the concrete circumstances protect the movement from exceeding its proper bounds. Although knowledge of the theological sciences may help protect and direct this hatred to a certain extent, knowledge alone is no guarantee of moral excellence and hence self-control.

3.2 Unholy hatred is any hatred that falls outside of the will of God, known primarily connaturally and secondarily through science. This hatred descends by degrees insofar as it moves away from God's expressed will. Furthermore, insofar as this hatred falls outside the will of God, it may apply both to the motivation for the hatred as well as the object of hate. This hatred is therefore by definition sinful to varying degrees.

4.1 Finally, this movement may exist simply in one individual.

4.2 The movement exists collectively when the the same generic movement is focused at the same object. The coherence of this movement increases insofar as its conscious awareness (of varying degrees as indicated above) coordinates and exists identically among individuals. For example, the Saints of heaven possess a collective, holy hatred of sin and all the forces working against God's will, directed principally through the illumination of the Holy Ghost and freely consented to with perfect moral liberty.

---

To accuse someone of hatred may itself be a veiled act of hatred and may not necessarily mean that the accused actually is acting out of hate.

Furthermore, because hatred may be an act of the will and not concomitantly a movement of the passions, hatred may not be "felt." Hence even apparently apathetic, cold, or even joyful people may be hateful; e.g. a person laughing out of schadenfreude or out of sadistic tendencies.

Indifference is commonly said to be worse than hatred and the "true" opposite of love because at least hatred is some sort of reaction towards an object. In fact, indifference is not the true opposite of love, and often indifference is a form of unconscious hatred precisely because it resists the good by rendering the good meaningless or irrelevant. Indifference may be hatred without its concomitant passion. Strictly speaking, the opposite of an attraction to the good is an aversion from it, but because indifference may also indicate a more subtle form of aversion (by not embracing the proper good), indifference itself may be hatred.

Distinction: Right to Live vs. Right to Conceive

Apropos this chilling article on the growth of gestational surrogacy in recent years (http://www.crisismagazine.com/2014/gestation-surrogacy-harms-children), I would simply comment that there is a difference between the right to live and the "right" to conceive a child by any means possible. Does such a right exist? I don't think so. Although sexual reproduction and the rearing of children may be inherent to our animal nature, such activity is both unnecessary for each individual's happiness even as human and regulated by natural law. No one would argue that because a person has a "right" to conceive a child therefore another person may be raped in order to satisfy that right.

Distinction: One Confusion in Gender Norm Analyses

There's a confusion that I've seen in various places whenever an analysis on gender norms is done (and perhaps this tendency exists only among "amateur" analyses). I don't put much interest into such analyses, so I don't keep record of them and can't give any specific examples of where I've seen it happen, but whenever I do read a gender norm analysis, I usually also spot this confusion:

There is a difference between the presentation of the male dominating stereotype with its corresponding female submissiveness and the presence of weakness in a female character at all.

The presence of weakness in a woman is not per se an indication of a gender norm unless one wants to hold that depicting weakness in anyone is a sign of gender/sexual stratification, which seems absurd to me. As humans, we have weaknesses and strengths, each adapted to the individual and circumstances. I've never seen a gender analysis note the unfairness of depicting weakness in any male character. It only rages against that weakness present in female characters.

These analyses, however, do not make their context clear enough: weakness present in female characters becomes gender typing only when the contrast to the presence of strength in male characters is predominant. Sometimes this distinction is made only in a passing paragraph or in the conclusion.

Sometimes I've seen gender norm analysis imply some very bizarre things: for example, if the presence of weakness in female characters is lamented, then the implication (whether the analyzer means it or not) is that female characters ought to be predominantly if not completely strong characters. Yes, it is bizarre and absurd when spelled out so explicitly, but this implication occurs when people tend to write without sufficient clarity and distinction of terms and context. Perhaps one could do a gender norm analysis of these analyses...

Typically (and must this really be stated?), people are interested in characters that possess both strengths and weaknesses. An impenetrable character as well as an infantile character are uninteresting because there is no way to relate to them. If there is a character shrouded by mystery, the assumption is that there is an underlying motive behind that mystery; otherwise the mystery loses its allure. If that motive is not gradually revealed in some way, that mystery loses its appeal. The difficulty for fiction writers is striking the balance between revealing too much and not enough. (E.g. Thomas Harris, who introduced the character Hannibal Lecter to the world, perhaps ended up by revealing too much of the origins of the character's disorder.)

Distinction: Equality of What? Validation of What?

TIME's latest issue spotlights the transgender equality movement in an article titled "America's Transition" by Katy Steinmetz. While reading through it, my attention was drawn immediately to how ambiguous "equality" is. I've commented on this discourse of these sorts of movements before (http://rugwig.blogspot.com/2013/10/human-rights-campaign-discourse-of.html). There seems to be a blending of several different equalities:

1) Practical equality—equality in pursuing stable and comfortable living circumstances, such as health care, education, employment opportunity and wages, in travel, military, etc.

2) Abstract equality—non-concrete/physical things, such as dignity, ontological status, psychological and spiritual validation, conscience formation and moral responsibility, etc.

Equality is always a difficult concept because its application depends on what is being called equal. Equality is always equality with respect to ... There is a qualifier for equality. When we say that 2=2, we mean equality of quantity. It would be meaningless to say that the number two has equality with respect to its redness. Numbers are intellectual concepts, not things that can possess redness. Likewise, to say that one tree is equal to another as a tree is not to say that any two trees are necessarily the same in height, species, or oxygen production capacity. I can hear it now: "How dare you suggest that elms are in any way inferior to redwoods!"

Therefore, we have to define what is being equated. But to state what is being equated (aequandum), we must have a shared notion of the aequans (the equalizing notion), or in other words, we need a definition. But how do we have a discourse when we meet such statements like: "Perhaps the biggest obstacle is that trans people live in a world largely built on a fixed and binary definition of gender. [...] For the majority of people who are accustomed to understanding gender in fixed terms, the concept of a spectrum can be overwhelming" (pp. 40, 42). Okay, perhaps we could grant that gender is not binary (whatever gender means), but even within a spectrum of possible genders, each gender is a finitude, a specific, concrete, psychological modality. These genders may transition among different genders and gradually be replaced or eclipsed by others, but even in such processes, the transition is from one concrete to the next and back. There cannot be a complete disintegration of gender's manifestations without a total annihilation of any meaningfulness to gender itself. If spectrum makes any particular gender meaningless, then the spectrum itself is a meaningless glob upon which any meaning may be projected and upheld. Under such circumstances, we must return to the question: equality of what? Equality of meaninglessness?

For rational discourse to occur, there must be some subject. Perhaps the transgender movement implies (whether consciously or not) that the entire notion of gender ought to be revamped or even discarded. That may be for another discussion.

The TIME article repeatedly emphasizes that the choices of trans people are based on a fundamental desire to validate their inner psychological experience, which is/has been incongruous to their external experience and how others perceive them. The implication is that gender is a moral application of psychological states and feelings:

• "Green describes gender dysphoria as discomfort with the gender a person is living in" (40).
• "It felt like being locked in a dark room with my eyes and ears cut off and my tongue cut out and not being able to connect my own inner experience with an outer world" (ibid).
• "Wearing dresses didn't feel right" (ibid).
• "I wish [my father] could see me as what I want him to see me" (42).
• "No matter their anatomy, transgender people want to live—and be identified—according to how they feel" (42).

It's clear that trans people struggled very deeply with a lack of validation throughout their formative years, both from parents and peers (such as in bullying). This experience continued under various forms of discrimination into their adult years. 

It seems clear that the moral choices a person makes should not deprive them of equality with respect to practical living as well as the possibility to pursue genuine moral excellence. Everyone ought to be emotionally and spiritually validated and guided by competent and loving parents into an integrated, responsible adulthood. The difficulty as Catholics, however, is that the pursuit of equality in these aforementioned matters is then extended by activists to the very ontology of the Mystical Body, the Church. Then women demand ordination, homosexuals demand marriage, etc. 

Trans people as well as homosexuals see the language of the Church as simply another manifestation of what they received from their own severely deficient parents and peers growing up: "disordered." This word "disordered" brings back all of the lack of validation and love that the person sought but never received. 

The problem, of course, is that such people, being so caught up in the unarticulated and equivocal language of equality, are unable to differentiate between the validation owed a person in their very being and development towards a morally-responsible individual and the validation of any preponderant desire and intuition in their psyche.

Here the question must be asked: does every overwhelming and consistently-present desire deserve validation? Do the constant and thoroughly-embedded impulses of a serial killer or rapist deserve validation? Did the stalking tendencies of Father David Ajemian (notorious for stalking the TV host Conan O'Brien; http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tag/rev-david-ajemian/) deserve validation? Do the illusions of many of the contestants who go on talent TV shows yet possess very little talent deserve validation? Examples may be multiplied.

In every case, the answer is no; nevertheless, the person, in their intrinsic dignity as a person, ought to be validated. Validation, like equality, requires a qualifier. The validation of what? We cannot indiscriminately validate everything. It would have the effect of reducing validation itself to a meaningless term and action.

The language of the Church is ontological and psychological but always with respect to a standard, always in the context of an aequans. Trans people, not subscribing to that standard or perhaps being totally unaware of it, suddenly think that being called "disordered" is a rejection of their very selves.

Distinction: Looking At and Looking Into

Relevant to modesty, there are two kinds of looking. First is looking at and second is looking into.

We look at a body when a body draws attention to itself in order to arouse desire. Of course, bodies cannot do anything by themselves but are controlled by people. It would be more accurate to say that a person draws attention to his or her own body in order to arouse desire. Lust is looking at bodies with such a desire and to arouse further such desire.

The desire in turn creates a fantasy in which the desire can be ultimately satiated although this satiation sometimes can even take the form of endlessly building up desire rather than releasing it. The fantasy focuses on the body, but its underlying mechanism and energy is found in desire.

The basic reason for creating this desire through the body is narcissism, and the root of narcissism is a lack of love. Love (as a noun) is a state of wholeness and integrity by which a person can live harmoniously according to the nature of his own being as a person—a substance who gives and receives of itself in relation to other beings. In order to reach this state, a person must first be loved (as a verb), and in the process of receiving love, the person is filled with love and can give it to others. When this love is lacking, the person lives on the verge of death, creating fear and despair.

Unable to withstand the pain of this proximity to death, the person seeks to create desire in the hopes that someone may love him. But the fatal mistake is made by drawing attention not to the deficient and suffering person, but to the body. The body, which becomes a vehicle of attention, the hook with a worm to drawn in fish, suddenly and paradoxically becomes its own end. Everything goes wrong. Instead of desiring the person, an attracted person desires only the body of the person that is doing the attracting. And the attracting person, forgetting or not knowing that he is seeking love and not merely the attention of another, mistakes that attention for love itself and thus finds ways to bolster the attraction of the body. Love is confused for attention, which is only the first step on the way to giving love (for we can love only what we actively attend to).

As for those who look at the body, because they remain fixated on the body and the fantasy—the image—, they cannot descend deeper into their soul and hence they either have no interior life other than the imagination or whatever interiority is present is quickly stifled. This is why the Desert Fathers noted that lust or sins of the flesh in general were one of the quickest ways of totally destroying the spiritual life and leading to what they called a distaste for prayer.

I would also note that looking at may also apply not only to bodies but to other creatures and things. Any-thing that is physical or at least can be visualized in some way and made the object of a fantasy can become an object looked at. Reading, watching movies, and all sorts of activities. Here, however, we shift from merely looking at and remaining on the surface to a slightly different but related notion of where one's attention is placed. When attention is not placed on the interior life, then the interior life is stifled. Hence attention has always been a necessary condition for effective prayer according to the formula that God does not listen to those who do not listen to themselves while praying.

But, on the other hand, we look into a soul and through the body when we exercise purity of heart. Purity of heart is the constant realization of and clinging to what is true and what is false in matters of true love. By doing so, the attention can never remain on the body because it sees the futility of doing so. Rather the person looks through the body to the soul and sees the truth. What truth is seen? Ultimately, purity sees the truth that most people defile purity, even by those who claim to uphold it.

Immodest dress always reveals an impure soul. A pure soul is not fooled by narcissism and thus would never dress narcissistically. Even if the immodest person is unaware of the mechanisms of immodesty and narcissism at work, that doesn't mean that those mechanisms are not in fact at play.

A person who draws attention specifically to the body cannot have an interior life beyond the imaginative realm for the very reason that the attention remains on the physical surface in order to produce a fantasy. Even those who focus intemperately on a certain spiritual faculty, such as the intellect or imagination, by being over-studious, for example, typically give little attention to the body and hence draw little attention. Although body and soul are not opposed in goodness, for both by being manifestations of being are intrinsically good, immodesty draws attention to the body to the neglect of the interior soul as well as the distraction of the will and desires away from the interior, where God is, to the exterior, where the fantasy thrives. Hence anyone who encourages this psychological-spiritual activity, whether consciously or not, is revealing a lack of interiority. If the activity is unconscious, as in many cases it seems to be, then the reason may firstly be due to ignorance and a lack of self-reflection, which would quickly reveal the emotional traps that a person has been going through, say in abusive relationships.

Just as grace can overflow to the body and have sanctifying effects on it—for this reason do we venerate the relics of Saints because in doing so, we can "touch" God in a way distantly similar to how we receive Christ in the Eucharist [1]—so too sin can have vicious effects on the body. There are some who are so depraved that one can see the emptiness of sin in their faces and eyes.

Nevertheless, modest dress does not necessarily reveal a pure soul. Attention to the externals of dress may be due not because of intrinsic purity but because of adherence to rules, a sense of duty, or the fear of punishment (and many other circumstances around the decision to dress modestly). A person can still obey the law even if they do not desire or appreciate the law or its deepest spirit and sentiments. Thus the law of purity demands modest dress, but the reason for this demand may be completely unapparent to a modestly-dressed person.

But what about those who know that and why the law of purity demands modesty and nevertheless are still impure? The only remaining possibilities are either weakness or malice in their character. And sometimes weakness can give way to malice and vice versa.

---

Footnotes:

1. Fr. Marie-Eugène, I Want To See God, trans. by M. Verda Clare (Notre Dame, IN: Christian Classics, 1953), 30: "The transforming union extends its influence too over the sense powers and even radiates out to the body.... The body itself is sanctified by the radiation of grace; it is by virtue of this that it is honored in the case of the saints, and that God Himself sometimes glorifies it even here below."

Distinction: Being Nice

What does it mean to be nice? It seems to me to mean basically that a person follows social conventions with a certain gracefulness, exhibiting socially and biologically attractive qualities. Those socially-attractive qualities are relative to the culture. In our society, they may include independence and personal resolve. The clothes we wear also reflect these qualities and project an image. Biological qualities may be things like confidence and self-sustenance (a form of independence).

Social conventions include mostly the different forms of etiquette as well as colloquial language (and slang). Clothing reflects an aesthetic sense as well as a sense of fashion. Hair, make up, and accessories also complement the image.

Basically, being nice means you fit into this particular culture well by exhibiting the qualities and behaviors that this culture proclaims are positive, good, "wholesome," uplifting, constructive, etc.

But just because you fit in, what does that matter to God? It matters to God only if we think God is nice. But God isn't nice. God commanded the genocide of entire peoples, slew the first born of Egypt, threatens unrepentant sinners with hell, and laughs at the folly of sinners. God wiped out the entire human population, crushed Sodom and Gomorrah, and sent His own people into exile.

But this culture rejects the Biblical God. Then what god does it believe in? What is the god that most people adhere to? Is it the god of nice? Where is this god of nice? Do we worship it? What will it do if we commit heinous crimes? What will it do if we sacrifice all that we have and are in service to others? Does any of it matter?

Therefore the issue must be clarified:

1) What God are we talking about here? The God of the Bible? Or the god of nice? What God is the object of our belief?

Answering this question reveals the trajectory of what follows. In fact, answering this question closes the conversation: if we answer the God of the Bible, the conversation ends because we know what the God of the Bible expects. If we answer the god of nice, then the conversation ends as well because the god of nice accepts everything, tolerates everything, cares about nothing. And if that's what a person believes in, all you can really say is, "Have a nice day then!" After all, if you said, "I'll pray for you," they could just as well say, "That's nice." There is no leading "nice" people to the truth because nice people don't care about the truth. Truth demands sometimes that we not be nice. Truth is a higher standard than niceness. Truth calls us beyond social expectations.

There are some people who reject and rebel against social convention because they see its emptiness. Although there is truth to this perception—social convention is mostly relative and changeable—, it tosses the baby out with the bathwater. After all, not everything that is nice is wrong or evil. Some nice things really are good things. But then again, many people use these nice conventions so emptily that humanity disappears, and when humanity disappears, manifold opportunities open up for mutual manipulation, the politics, the game playing, the lies.

Sadly, most "rebels" end up playing their own game because you can't overcome the game by rebelling against it. That sets off another game. Rebellion is as blind to the truth as niceness is. Only a reflective mind and a magnanimous heart can hear the call of truth and follow it.

Distinction: Ethnic Cultures & Faith

The Faith always grows and spreads in a culture and with a culture. One danger is that what properly belongs to the Faith and what properly belongs to the culture may become confused. For example, now it's simply a joke that only the Catholic faith can bring together German, Polish, Italian, Irish, (etc.) people under the same roof. But all these different ethnic groups, despite their apparent Catholicity, have always been famous for their ethnic jingoism. This is also especially apparent in Eastern Europe.

People caught up in the midst of these ethnic rivalries and grudges may not realize just how St. Paul strikingly speaks against them: "There is neither Jew nor Greek: there is neither bond nor free: there is neither male nor female. For you are all one in Christ Jesus" (Galatians 3:28). Christ, when His relatives came asking to see Him and given a space because they were His blood kin, replied, "My mother and my brethren are they who hear the word of God, and do it" (Lk 8:21). A woman among the crowd cried out, "Blessed is the womb that bore thee, and the paps that gave thee suck." And Christ responded in a way quite puzzling to those who place blood relations above everything else: "Yea rather, blessed are they who hear the word of God, and keep it" (Lk 11:28). To His Mother, this was not a rebuke but the highest compliment, for Mary heard and kept the Word of God above all others. It indicated the closest and most permanent relationship: the relationship of grace.

But when Faith develops alongside ethnic culture, these simple admonition may lose their clarity. Then actions against other ethnicities may be taken in the name of the Faith.

It isn't clear what steps must occur for there to be a collective realization that the Faith and the ethnic culture in which the Faith develops are separate principles. In America, perhaps the pluralism and secularism have allowed for this realization to occur at least among those who pay attention to such matters. Perhaps it requires a culture in which multiple ethnicities are accorded equal dignity or at least the attempt is made to do such.

Nevertheless, it remains that in Christ, the only relation that matters is that of grace. There are those in Christ and those who aren't. Hence Christ also warned:

Do not think that I came to send peace upon earth: I came not to send peace, but the sword. For I came to set a man at variance against his father, and the daughter against her mother, and the daughter in law against her mother in law. And as a man's enemies shall be they of his own household. He that loveth father or mother more than me, is not worthy of me; and he that loveth son or daughter more than me, is not worthy of me. (Mt 10:34-37)

Distinction: St. Paul, St. Thomas Aquinas on Freedom for Excellence vs. Freedom to Sin

Chapter 6, lecture 3, n. 501: But the one who obeys God is made a slave of this obedience, because through the habit of obeying the mind is inclined more and more to obeying and as a result achieves holiness. Therefore, he says: or of obedience, namely, of the divine precepts, which leads to righteousness: “It is the doers of the law who will be justified” (Rom 2:13). 

Chapter 6, lecture 4, n. 508: In regard to the first it should be noted that man is by nature free because of his reason and will, which cannot be forced but can be inclined by certain things. Therefore, in regard to the freedom of the will man is always free of compulsion, although he is not free of inclinations. For the free judgment is sometimes inclined to the good through the habit of grace 

or righteousness; and then it is in slavery to righteousness but free from sin. But sometimes the free judgment is inclined to evil through the habit of sin; and then it is in slavery to sin and free from righteousness. Now, slavery to sin consists in being drawn to consent to sin against the judgment of reason: “Everyone who commits sin is the slave of sin” (Jn 8:34). 

And in regard to this he says: When you were slaves of sin. Freedom from righteousness, on the other hand, implies that a man rushes headlong into sin without the restraint of righteousness; in regard to this he says: you were free in regard to righteousness. This happens especially in those who sin of set purpose: “Long ago you broke your yoke and burst your bonds; and you said, ‘I will not serve’” (Jer 2:20); “A vain man is lifted up into pride, and thinks himself born free like a wild ass’ colt” (Jb 11:12). 

509. Yet it should be noted that this state involves true slavery and only apparent freedom. For since man should act according to reason, be is truly a slave when he is led away from what is reasonable by something alien. Furthermore, if he is not restrained by the yoke of reason from following concupiscence, he is free only in the opinion of those who suppose that the highest good is to follow one’s concupiscence.

---

When we become slaves to sin, we are free from righteousness. But when we are free from sin, we are slaves to righteousness. Hence the arbitrary freedom of hedonism is diametrically opposed to the freedom for excellence although both make use of the will's profound dynamic energy behind habitus, whether virtuous or vicious.

Notice also how St. Thomas identified so clearly the false autonomy that exists in Western society today: "If he is not restrained by the yoke of reason from following concupiscence, he is free only in the opinion of those who suppose that the highest good is to follow one's concupiscence." Hence people say, for example, of a homosexual couple who "love" each other that they should be allowed to marry and follow their "love." The love itself is justification for the act. This is morality for excellence reduced to bestiality, the moral animal to the beasts.

St. Thomas also identifies the psychological indicator of slavery either to sin or righteousness: the predominant inclination to one or the other. Notice St. Thomas also says that we shall never be free of inclination itself, which is desire. If there is a predominant inclination to sin, such that we usually fall into sin by acting on that inclination, then we know we are enslaved to sin. But if the predominant inclination draws us to act righteously, then we know that we are enslaved to righteousness. 

Hence the psychological test that I have given elsewhere to demonstrate one's predominant inclination, namely, can you go at least three months without fixation on some object or action? For example, only recently I was reminded of a song I used to listen to over and over when I was younger. The fact that I haven't thought of that song in such a long time demonstrates to me that I have no attachment to it any longer. I am "free" from that song, not a slave to it. 

Then St. John of the Cross shows us that the way to freedom for excellence is to remove ourselves from that object of inclination and enter the dark nothings by which our desire can refocus on God. St. John of the Cross further shows that in the transforming union, the soul reaches such a state that although it may suffer temptations as God allows them, these are alien to its predominant desire, which is centered on God. Hence these temptations are hardly occasion for sin but rather occasions for further perfection.

---

Source: St. Thomas Aquinas, Lectures on the Letter to the Romans, trans. by Fabian Larcher, ed. by Jeremy Holmes, Nova et Vetera, accessed April 23, 2014, http://nvjournal.net/files/Aquinas_on_Romans.pdf.