Distinction: Reductionism vs. Eliminativism

If cognitive science has some breakthroughs on intentionality that naturalize it to physics, that's reductionism, not eliminativism. [...] If cognitive science reduces intentionality to a physics process, this establishes that intentionality exists as something that can be scientifically studied and analyzed (as whatever physics process cognitive science reduces it to). That would show that all eliminativists about intentionality are wrong, including Bakker. Reductionism is not eliminativism. And while very few people here I imagine are reductionist, we are all closer to the reductionist position than Bakker is, since reductionists agree with us on the primary point actually under dispute here.

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Source: Brandon, January 14, 2015 (6:41 a.m.), comment on Edward Feser, "Post-Intentional Depression," Edward Feser blog, January 11, 2015, accessed June 30, 2015, http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2015/01/post-intentional-depression.html?showComment=1421246507704#c5670245010821610403.
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[T]he dominant naturalistic position on intentionality is reductionist, not eliminativist, which holds both of the following:

(1) Intentionalism is true.

(2) Naturalism is true.

That is, reductionists hold that intentionality really exists and that there is reason to think that it admits of a perfectly naturalistic explanation in terms of physical processes, evolution, or what have you. Thus the bare fact of appealing to naturalism does not establish eliminativism; almost all naturalistic positions on the subject are reductionist, and reductionists about intentionality are intentionalists.

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Source: Brandon, January 14, 2015 (8:35 a.m.), comment on Edward Feser, "Post-Intentional Depression," Edward Feser blog, January 11, 2015, accessed June 30, 2015, http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2015/01/post-intentional-depression.html?showComment=1421253336089#c6101963426624473851.